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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the operation of a system of second 
hand car dealer licensing introduced to Scotland in 1982. The 
aim is to assess whether or not this policy is having a 
beneficial impact upon the experiences of second hand car 
purchasers in Scotland. 
The second hand car trade exhibits a number of characteristics 
of market failure with respect to consumer's interests. The 
complexity of the product and the infrequency of purchase make 
information about both product and dealer particularly 
difficult to obtain and evaluate. 
One regulatory response to consumer problems in this market is 
to licence second hand car dealers. This approach has been 
adopted in a number of other countries notably, Canada, 
Australia and some states of the US. The policy has provoked a 
great deal of debate about the achievement of consumer 
benefits associated with information and standards as opposed 
to producer benefits associated with restrictions to entry and 
mobility. 
In the Scottish case the power to licence second hand car 
dealers was delegated to Scottish district councils who were 
iv 
able to take advantage of considerable discretion in 
designing, implementing and operating their own licensing 
system. When seen from a national perspective, this delegation 
has led to a number of undesirable consequences. 
This thesis presents two major findings. The first is that 
district councils in Scotland have largely neglected their 
licensing systems. As a result the licensing of second hand 
car dealers in Scotland is only partially operative. The 
second is that second hand car dealer licensing in Scotland is 
having no impact upon the purchase experiences of consumers. 
There are two implications of these findings. First, without a 
fully operational system no evaluation of licensing as a 
policy is possible. Secondly, far from being unaffected by 
this partially operating system, consumers are worse off than 
without licensing. This raises issues for consumers, district 
councils and policy makers. 
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Chapter 1 The Market Mechanism 
1.1 Introduction 
The fact that economic resources are scarce immediately 
implies that there must be some mechanism to ensure that 
those resources which are available are allocated 
efficiently. This is not just in a static sense but in 
response to the changing requirements of members of the 
economy. Some resources are so plentiful as to 
completely satisfy all demands, for instance air and 
light. By contrast the great majority of resources are 
not so abundant and demands made upon these can only be 
partially met. The economic interdependence of 
individuals in society turns the problem of allocating 
scarce resources into a social problem. The solution is 
for individuals to organise their economic activity in 
some way to ensure that the allocation process is 
operated so that individuals receive the resources they 
desire. Such organisation could be the adoption of a 
single central director who allocates according to need. 
Alternatively, it could be the adoption of a system 
which allocates according to the ability to pay or 
produce. Whatever form of organisation is adopted there 
is an underlying assumption that the reason why 
individuals organise themselves is to accrue some 
benefit. This will increase the well being of all 
individuals so organised. 
2 
1.2 Economic Relations 
Individuals benefit by taking part in economic 
relations. Trading or exchange is beneficial because 
they have not the capacity to produce all that they 
require themselves and through exchange they can gain 
what they cannot produce. However, once individuals are 
producing not for their own consumption but for 
consumption by others there is a need for some method 
whereby people can indicate what they require and what 
they no longer need. In a simple economy this is 
achieved by a market where individuals meet-and exchange 
goods and services. In a more complex exchange 
environment such as that which prevails in developed 
economies, the requirement is for a mechanism which 
directs the production and distribution of economic 
resources according to the aggregate preferences of 
individual consumers. In this way resources are not 
wasted in producing goods and services that are not 
wanted. In a world where individuals' needs and desires 
are constantly changing the task of the economic 
organisation is also to ensure that production is quick 
to respond to the changing requirements of consumers so 
that resources are allocated to production in the most 
efficient way over time. If this is not the case then 
the primary objective of economic organisation, to - 
provide individuals with the goods and services they, 
require has not been met and such organisation has not 
provided any benefit. 
3 
1.2.1 The Effect of Competition 
In the pursuit of personalsatisfaction the action of 
one individual may have a detrimental effect upon the 
possible attainment of satisfaction for others in a 
situation where resources are limited. The introduction 
of conflict into the attainment of personal satisfaction 
appears at first sight to suggest that economic 
organisation' embodies a notion of survival of the 
fittest. But, in the context of market exchange, 
conflict and competition for resources can lead to a 
perfectly harmonious solution to the problem of resource 
allocation. Such a mechanism induces selfish individuals 
to maximise their own well being and by so doing brings 
the economy to a point where every individual's, well 
being is being maximised. People do not need to be aware 
of the effects of their actions upon others in this 
system since as long as free markets operate everywhere 
in the economy, it is the unhindered pursuit of private 
well being which ensures a societal solution to the 
problem of resource allocation. 
The mechanism described is a perfectly competitive 
market economy based upon a price system. This form of 
organisation gives all resources in the economy a price. 
Individuals receive income from work and can spend this 
income on purchasing whatever resources they wish. The 
market mechanism registers their purchases in aggregate 
form and directs production by providing a profit 
4 
incentive to producers to satisfy the aggregate wishes 
of individuals. 
1.3 The Perfect Market 
Even before the publication of the Wealth of Nations by 
Adam Smith, unhindered or perfect competition based upon 
the price system was assumed to be the most desirable 
form of economic organisation. The belief was based upon 
both political as well as economic grounds. Economic 
theorists developed the idea of unconstrained action by 
individuals put forward in liberal ideology to construct 
an ideal model of an economy. In this perfect market 
model consumers' wants and desires are at the forefront 
of all other requirements. This situation where 
consumers control the economy through their 
decentralised decisions is a situation known 
as consumer sovereignty. This concept was first 
described as early as 1936 but was loosely defined by 
Rothenberg(1968) and Lerner(1972). Simply, whatever the 
consumer demands of the system, the market will provide 
if the consumer has the means to pay. 
This model, to achieve such an efficient resource 
allocation did assume certain things about the 
prevailing economic environment. Without 'these 
assumptions the model would not operate properly and 
could not solve the allocation problem. These conditions 
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lay the theoretical foundations upon which perfect 
competition is based. It is assumed that: 
1. A market exists for all goods and services 
produced in the economy. Whilst there are 
goods available every consumer will want to 
purchase them since individuals are assumed 
to always want more. 
2. Each producer and each consumer is assumed to 
be a price taker in all markets. No consumer 
or producer possesses any form of market 
power. 
3. Products within a category are homogeneous 
and cannot be differentiated other than by 
price. 
4. Production is characterised by freedom of 
entry and exit. 
5. Perfect information is possessed by both 
consumers and producers. The market is an 
integrated whole, not segmented by 
limitations on information acquisition and 
. analysis. 
6. There is an instantaneous market equilibrium. 
The perfect market absorbs all inputs and 
arrives at an equilibrium price without any 
cost. This is achieved by constantly and 
instantly matching demand and supply. . 
Based upon these assumptions the model for the 
competitive economy relies upon two key sets of actors. 
The interaction between these two sets of people in 
pursuing consumption and production leads to the 
attainment of an equilibrium in the economy, a solution 
to the allocation problem. 
6 
1.4 Consumption and Production 
The operation of the perfectly competitive market is 
characterised by two opposing forces, those of demand 
and supply. Each is associated with the two groups of 
economic actors, producers and consumers. Producers 
demand resources and supply goods, consumers supply 
labour and demand products. Each market has a supply of 
a certain commodity and a demand for it. The amount of 
each depends upon the prevailing price. Simply, if the 
price of a commodity is higher than the value attached 
to it by those who want it then a purchase will not take 
place. Similarly if the cost of supplying a commodity is 
greater than the value attached to its supply then the 
commodity will not be available. The ability of markets 
to arrive at a position where these criteria are matched 
without external interference is the. strength of perfect 
competition. Whatever the features of a particular 
market, the mechanism will arrive at an equilibrium 
point. This model will be examined in more detail 
through two market analyses, consumption and production. 
In this way economic reality and economic theory can be 
compared. 
1.4.1 Consumption 
It is assumed that individual rational consumers desire 
to purchase goods from which they obtain satisfaction. 
The consumer gains satisfaction from purchasing a 
7 
combination of goods available in the economy, the more 
goods that can be purchased the greater the 
satisfaction. For the purpose of analysis this situation 
is represented by an economy with just two goods. The 
locus of all combinations of these two goods from which 
the consumer derives the same level of satisfaction 
forms an indifference curve. An indifference map is a 
collection of a number of indifference curves 
corresponding to different levels of total satisfaction 
see Figure 1.1. 
There are a number of assumptions about these curves 
which will not be dealt with here except to say that the 
curves are convex to the origin and cannot cross. A 
consumers' income with which to purchase these two goods 
and so derive satisfaction is given by the number of 
hours worked multiplied by the hourly wage rate. Because 
the goods have a price the individual seeks to maximise 
his or her individual. satisfaction for a particular 
level of income bearing in mind the relative prices of 
the goods on offer. Formally the consumer is maximising 
utility (Max U= f(X, Y)) subject to the constraint of 
their budget (Income M= Px. X + Py. Y). 
8 
Figure 1.1 Indifference Map for an Individual 
Consumer 
Good Y 
0 Good X 
The possible combinations of products X and Y available 
for a given level of income and product prices is 
represented by a straight line known as the budget 
constraint, shown as line MM in Figure 1.1. The slope of 
any indifference curve at a particular point is the 
marginal rate of substitution of one commodity for the 
other. The marginal rate of substitution is defined as 
the number of units-of one commodity that must be given 
up for an extra unit of the other commodity so that 
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total satisfaction remains the same. For a consumer to 
be in equilibrium utility must be maximised. This is 
where the slope of the indifference curve is equal to 
the ratio of the prices for the products, ie where the 
budget constraint is tangential to the highest 
indifference curve (point A in Figure 1.1). Formally, 
for any utility maximising individual i where the prices 
of goods X and Y are PX and Py: 
Ui 
Xi PX 
MRSXy =--- 
Ui Py 
Yj 
(1) 
Of prime importance when considering consumption is the 
amount of income the consumer has available to purchase 
goods X and Y which defines the budget constraint. An 
individual's income is derived from selling their own 
labour to producers. In selling their labour individuals 
have a choice to make about how to allocate their time 
between earning income(M) and taking leisure(l) since 
both are desirable. This choice can also be analysed 
using indifference curves where the axes of the 
indifference map are income and leisure as shown in 
Figure 1.2. Any one indifference curve shows 
combinations of income and leisure which are equivalent 
to the individual. The slope of the indifference curve 
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is the marginal rate of substitution between income and 
leisure. The further the curve is from the origin the 
higher the level of utility. 
Figure 1.2 Individual Supply of Labour 
Income 
per period 
o Leleure per period 
As stated above the income (M) obtained through work is 
a function of the hours worked(h) and the wage rate per 
hour(w), formally M=wh. Assuming that the individual 
must spend a certain amount of time sleeping and eating 
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the amount of leisure taken will always be greater than 
zero. For any given wage rate (w), (assuming that there 
is no unearned income) the budget constraint shows the 
income level that can be obtained by working a 
particular number of hours at a given wage rate. The 
slope of the budget constraint is equal to the wage 
rate. The higher the wage rate the higher the slope of 
the budget constraint since the same number of hours 
achieves a higher level of income. 
It is assumed that the individual maximises utility 
U(M, l) subject to the budget constraint determined by 
the wage rate(w). This is achieved where the budget 
constraint is tangential to the highest indifference 
curve. At this point: 
U 
d1 1 
MRSM1 =-_ 
dM U 
M 
W 
(2) 
These two conditions, equations (1) and (2) above, 
describe the equilibrium consumption of goods'and the 
equilibrium selling of labour. It is assumed that all 
individuals in the perfectly competitive market behave 
precisely as stated. When these conditions are achieved 
the individual is at equilibrium, ie has achieved 
maximum utility. 
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1.4.2 Production 
The second market analysis concerns production of the 
commodities that are consumed. A firm is a technical 
unit of the economy which produces commodities. An 
entrepreneur heads the firm and decides how much and 
what commodities to produce. He then gains the benefit 
through profit or bears the loss. The entrepreneur 
transforms inputs, the raw materials of production into 
goods subject to the technical constraints of his 
production function. The over-riding objective of the 
entrepreneur is to maximise profit. 
In the previous analysis the consumer maximised utility 
for a given income. In production the producer 
determines the output which maximises profit, and then 
minimises the cost of this output. Assume that 
production is a function of just two inputs defined as 
capital(K) and labour(L). The entrepreneur allocates the 
two inputs to produce a certain level of output. The 
locus of points of combination of the two inputs to 
produce a certain level of output is a production 
isoquant. An isoquant map is a collection of isoquants 
corresponding to different levels of production (see 
Figure 1.3). This curve is analogous to the consumer's 
indifference curve and has similar theoretical 
assumptions, they are also convex to the origin and do 
not cross. The entrepreneur purchases the two factors of 
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production in the open market at the market price. Given 
the profit maximising output level the entrpreneur 
chooses the optimal capital and labour combination to 
minimise costs. The constraint is therefore a function 
of the market price of these factors. This is 
represented by an isocost line, CC in Figure 1.3 which 
shows the minimum cost of producing the profit 
maximising output Q1. 
Figure 1.3 Production Isoquant Map 
Labour 
(L) 
0 Capital (K) 
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The slope of the isocost line is the ratio of prices of 
the two factors capital(K) and labour(L), or (PK, PL)" 
Assuming that the factor prices for capital and labour 
are given, a profit-maximising entrepreneur would seek 
to minimise cost subject to the profit maximising output 
level which is at a point where the isocost line is 
tangential to the production isoquant Q1. The rate of 
substitution between the two factor inputs for any 
production level is the marginal rate of technical 
substitution (MRTS). For cost minimization the MRTS 
must be equal to the ratio of the productivity of the 
two factors (the marginal product (MP)) and factor 
prices (PL, PK). Where the good produced is X then for 
any producer (A) of good X: 
XA 
MPL LA PL 
MRTSLK = 
MPK XA PK 
KA 
(3) 
A similar formulation is appropriate to any producer of 
good (Y). 
Given that firms utilise all available factors of 
production, and firms produce both X and Y products, the 
level of output for each product has to be defined, that 
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is the product mix for each firm. The locus of points of 
production for different levels of X and Y which use up 
all the available resources of the firm is the 
production possibility curve. 
Figure 1.4 Factor Mix for Producer of Goods X and Y 
Good Y 
0 Good X 
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The optimal combination is one which yields the highest 
revenue. This is found using an isorevenue line which is 
the locus of points of combinations of goods X and Y 
which yield the same revenue. This is represented by the 
line DD in Figure 1.4. The slope of the isorevenue line 
is equal to the ratio of prices of the products in the 
market. The equilibrium is found where the given 
production possibility curve is tangential to the 
highest isorevenue line (ie point R). This is the point 
where the amount it is possible to produce provides the 
highest revenue. The slope, of the production possibility 
curve at any point is the Marginal Rate of 
Transformation (MRT). This is the rate at which 
production of one product within the firm can be changed 
to production of the other product. The MRT is equal to 
the-ratio of the marginal products of labour and capital 
in the production of good X or good Y. Formally: 
MPLX MPKX 
MRTXy = 
MPLY MPKY 
(4) 
The slope of the isorevenue line is equal to the ratio 
of the product prices therefore the equilibrium point is 
at a point where: 
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MPLX MPKX P}{ 
MRTXy = 
MPLy MPKY Py 
(5) 
At this point (R) the firm achieves the most profitable 
mix between the products that uses all resources. 
The final condition for producer equilibrium is one 
which defines the optimal total level of output for the 
firm. Returning to the main assumption, that firms 
maximise their profits, a firm will not produce an extra 
unit of output unless the revenue from its sale is equal 
to or greater than the cost of producing it. If the 
revenue of the extra unit is greater than it cost to 
produce then the firm, following the assumption of 
profit maximisation, must increase output to take 
advantage of the profit available. The formal assertion 
of equilibrium output is that marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue which in turn is equal to price. 
MCX MRX PX 
MCy MRy Py 
(6) 
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1.5 The Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium 
When all the above conditions are met then both 
consumers and producers are maximising their respective 
satisfactions. The market mechanism through the price 
system ensures that the achievement of equilibrium by 
both consumer and producer in the pursuit of personal 
satisfaction will lead the economy to a position where 
they are both sustainable. Perfect competition for 
consumers means that the prices of goods available to 
them are given and as sellers of their own productive 
capacity the price they receive is also given by the 
factor markets. The question is how to allocate income 
to consumption. Equality at the margin, that is the 
substitution of more of one product for less of another, 
is assumed to be equivalent for all consumers despite 
the different needs and preferences. This provides 
producers with the information they require through 
demand to produce according to consumers' desires. 
Each producer is assumed to be faced with unlimited 
demand for his production at the market price. Perfect 
competition among producers in the purchase of factors 
of production means that the price of labour and capital 
are given and the firm employs factors of production 
such that the marginal cost does not exceed the marginal 
revenue produced. If the producer increases price to 
obtain extra profits above the prevailing market price 
then the assumption of perfect knowledge ensures 
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consumers know of this and switch their consumption to 
the products of other firms. If the overall price level 
were too high then entrepreneurs would be obtaining more 
than normal profits, this would attract more firms into 
the industry. Similarly if the price level is too low 
all producers will not be able to earn sufficient profit 
and will leave production, therefore reducing supply and 
increasing price. 
All that has been described so far is the way consumers 
and producers operate in their respective roles within a 
market. Within the confines of the perfectly competitive 
model consumers and producers operate harmoniously. Yet, 
what is needed is some external criteria to measure 
whether or not the allocation is efficient in satisfying 
consumers' needs. Formally whether the equilibrium 
condition of this model describes an optimal resource 
allocation. 
1.5.1 The Assessment of Efficiency 
To assess efficiency there needs to be some concept of 
perfection as a yardstick. Standards of perfection in 
social science are not easily established. In pure 
science perfect efficiency can be defined, for instance 
a perfectly efficient engine is one which transforms all 
the potential energy of the fuel into movement of the 
vehicle. Actual engine efficiency is then measured as a 
percentage of perfect efficiency. However for economic 
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organisation it is difficult to define a success 
criterion or indeed a set of success criteria. The root 
of the problem lies in the fact that each individual in 
society will assess economic efficiency on the basis of 
their own personal satisfaction rather than taking into 
account the aggregate satisfaction of all individuals in 
the economy. In a centrally planned economy success is 
measured by the extent to which the objectives of the 
pre-defined economic plan have been fulfilled and how 
fast. However for a market economy, any evaluation of 
success must be based upon the extent to which the 
economic organisation has fulfilled the wants and 
desires of individuals in the absence of a consensual 
economic plan. 
One method of evaluating economic efficiency was 
presented by Vilfredo Pareto (1897). The assessment of 
the performance of any given method of economic 
organisation is made by reference to a value judgement: 
could a change in the allocation of resources be made 
such that one person be made better off but no one worse 
off. A situation where it is impossible to make anyone 
better off without making anyone else worse off is said 
to be Pareto optimal. 
It is only relatively recently with the development of 
comparative statics analysis that perfect competition 
has been rigourously examined in the light of such 
welfare criteria. Work done by Lerner and Lange(1942) 
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formed the basis of the proof presented by Arrow in the 
papers of the Berkeley Symposium(1951), that under a 
broad set of conditions the competitive mechanism is a 
'Pareto satisfactory mechanism'. This means that the 
equilibrium position of a perfectly competitive economy 
is simultaneously Pareto optimal, where all consumers 
are optimally satisfied through their consumption 
behaviour. This proof was developed in Arrow and 
Debreu(1954). 
So far perfect competition has been portrayed as a 
mechanism that is automatic in achieving an equilibrium, 
a harmonious solution to all demands made upon the 
system. By reference to the Pareto criterion, perfect 
competition can be proven nbt only to be automatic in 
operation but to achieve an equilibrium which is Pareto 
efficient 
1.5.2 Pareto Optimality 
For the attainment of a Pareto optimal state three 
conditions must be satisfied: the efficient distribution 
of commodities among consumers, efficiency in the 
allocation of factors of production among producers, and 
efficiency in the allocation of factors between the 
products made by the producers. Underlying these 
efficiency criteria are a number of assumptions that are 
applied to the model in addition to those already 
accepted. 
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1. The underlying societal structure is static. in 
such a time frozen economy, uncertainty cannot 
exist and all individuals have perfect knowledge. 
The size of the population is constant and 
individual utility functions do not change. 
Technical progress does not exist and there are no 
other external influences on consumption or 
production. 
2. Each individual's preferences about allocative 
states of the economy are characterised by 
selfishness. As Rowley and Peacock (1975) point 
out, quoting Buchanan (1968) the preference 
ranking must be defined over the commodity bundle 
actually received by the consumer and not by 
commodity bundles allocated to other individuals. 
In practice the interpersonal comparison can occur 
but is considered as an externality. 
3. Each individual's preference ranking can be 
represented by a continuous and twice 
differentiable utility function characterised by 
strong convexity. (This is the definition of the 
indifference curve which ensures each equilibrium 
point is unique). 
4. All production functions are continuous, twice 
differentiable and demonstrate non-increasing 
returns to scale. (This defines the production 
isoquant for the producer which is analogous to 
the consumer's indifference curve. ) 
5. All individuals and producers seek to maximise 
utility and profits respectively. 
These five assumptions can also be formulated into 
axioms based upon choice criteria that define the point 
at which a Pareto optimum solution can be achieved which 
was used in the analysis by Quirk and Saposnik(1968). 
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1.5.3 Conditions for the Achievement of Pareto 
optimality 
To summarise, a Pareto optimal state in the economy can 
be attained where the following marginal conditions are 
satisfied: 
(a) The the Marginal Rate of Substitution between any 
pair of goods X, Y must be equal for all consumers 
in the economy. 
AND 
(b) That the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution 
between any two factors of production k, l must be 
equal in the production of all commodities. 
AND 
(c) That the Marginal Rate of Transformation of X, Y 
for producers must be equal to the Marginal Rate 
of Substitution of X, Y for consumers. 
These conditions form the basis of a mechanism which 
will achieve an efficient solution to the problem of 
resource allocation. In the next part of this analysis 
these marginal conditions will be applied to the 
equilibrium achieved under perfect competition. 
1.6 Proof of Pareto Efficiency Solution Under Perfect 
Competition 
In applying the Pareto criterion, the distribution of 
commodities among consumers is efficient if it is 
impossible to redistribute the commodities in such a way 
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that one person is made better off and no other is not 
made worse off. This situation can be represented 
diagrammatically for two individuals using a box diagram 
first described by Edgeworth (1881). The box is formed 
by superimposing the inverted indifference map of 
individual A on to the indifference map of individual B, 
and is shown below in Figure 1.5. 
Fig 1.5 Edgewoth Box Diagram Describing Consumer 
Equilibrium 
Yb 
16 
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:t 
:ý 
ý, sý 
OB 
pAx. Xb 
q 
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The dimensions of the box are the total quantity of X in 
the economy measured along the x axes and the total 
quantity of Y in the economy measured along the y axes. 
As a consequence any point within the box describes an 
allocation of the total X in terms of XA and XB, and 
similarly for good Y. The indifference curves of each 
individual retain convexity to their respective origins 
OA and OB. The indifference curves of individual A and 
individual B are tangential at a number of points, the 
locus of these points is the 'efficiency locus' which is 
represented by the line OAOB. Along the efficiency locus 
the value of X in terms of Y is the same for both 
individuals. 
1.6.1 The Marginal Rate of Substitution 
For the consumer, maximising satisfaction requires a 
choice of a combination of products such that the 
marginal rate of substitution between them is equal to 
the ratio of prices (see equation 1). Since all 
consumers are faced with the same prices and each is 
assumed to be in equilibrium, then at the Pareto optimal 
point E in Figure 1.5, where their indifference curves 
are tangential, it must be true to say that 
MRSAxy=MRSBxy. By drawing a line tangential to the 
intersection the allocations of-X and Y can be found. If 
consumers' indifference curves actually intersect then 
one of them is not on their highest attainable 
indifference curve. The allocation in this case could be 
26 
improved for one without the other being made worse off. 
simply one person remains on their indifference curve 
and the other moves to a higher curve (for example a 
single move from z2 to z3). Formally at the Pareto 
optimal point E it must be the case that: 
PX 
MRSA = MRSB a 
PY 
(7) 
This is the point where a Pareto optimal distribution of 
goods between consumers occurs, where the marginal rates 
of substitution for consumers A and B are equal. 
Referring back to equation 1 it can be seen that this is 
also the formal condition required for an individual 
consumer to be in equilibrium. Consequently where all 
individuals are maximising their utility the equilibrium 
point for the economy is also Pareto optimal. 
1.6.2 The Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution 
The second Pareto requirement is that of profit 
maximisation by the individual producer. This means that 
whatever output level the firm may choose it must be 
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procured at the minimum cost for a given revenue. This 
is ensured if the firm chooses the combination of inputs 
labour(L) and capital(K) such that the marginal rate of 
technical substitution (MRTS) between the two factors is 
equal for the production of all products. Further, that 
the ! ORTS is also equal to the ratio of their prices. 
Using the Edgewoth box diagram it is possible to 
represent the production of goods X and Y. The box is 
shown below in Figure 1.6. 
The box represents the total quantities of capital(K) 
and labour(L) to be allocated between the production of 
goods X and Y. To achieve the maximum output for any 
given cost from available factors, the production of 
good X and Y would need to be on the highest isoquant 
for each product ie at point H where the production 
isoquants for X and Y are tangential. The locus of 
points where the isoquants are tangential is the 
efficiency locus represented by the line OAXOAY. If this 
were not the case then resources would not be utilised 
efficiently and profits would not be maximised. 
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Figure 1.6 Edgeworth Box Diagram For Producer 
Equilibrium 
Ow 
H 
Kir 
Ax 
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At point H the marginal rate of technical substitution 
of capital for labour in producing X (MRTS(X)kl) and Y 
(MRTS(Y)kl) is equivalent. Since producers are price 
takers in the market for factors K and L then at the 
tangential point the ratio of prices is also equal. 
Formally : 
P1 
MRTS (X) kl = MRTS (Y) kl = '-'+"` 
Pk (8) 
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At this point the second condition is achieved that of 
. equality in marginal rates of technical substitution 
between products. This has also been established in the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium condition equation 
(3). Consequently in production a perfectly competitive 
economy will have an equilibrium point which is also 
Pareto optimal. 
1.6.3 The Marginal Rate of Transformation 
Finally, to ensure that products are transformed as 
consumers substitute them for one another the marginal 
rate of transformation between X and Y (MRTXy) for 
producers must be equal to the Marginal Rate of 
Substitution of X for Y by consumers (MRSXy). From 
equation (4) MRTXy for producers is equal to the ratio 
of marginal products of capital and labour. At the 
equilibrium point this is also equal to the ratio of 
product prices. Formally: 
MP1X MPkX PX 
MRTXy ==-_ 
MPkY MP1Y Py (9) 
This can then be compared to the equation for the 
marginal rate of substitution for a consumer at their 
equilibrium point which was derived in in equation (1) 
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pX 
MRS a 
Py 
With reference to the third condition for a Pareto 
optimal solution to resource allocation, at the 
equilibrium point of product mix for a perfectly 
competitive producer, the marginal rate of 
transformation is equal to the marginal rate of 
substitution for the consumer ie the ratio of product 
prices: 
PX 
MRS s MRT = ------ 
Py 
This satisfies the third condition for a Pareto optimal 
equilibrium. 
The perfectly competitive model reaches an equilibrium 
point where the allocation of resources cannot be 
improved upon using the efficiency criteria put forward 
by Pareto. The above analysis proves that the model of 
perfect competition achieves a Pareto optimal solution 
to the problem of resource allocation. All consumers" 
wants, while not completely satisfied, are satisfied 
optimally, given available resources. Based on this 
analysis the proposition that free unhindered 
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competition benefits consumers is irrefutable because of 
the implied acceptance of the concept of consumer 
sovereignty. Free competition ensures an optimum welfare 
for all members of the society. In essence this model is 
a market structure characterised by a complete absence 
of conscious rivalry between individuals. All the actors 
merely respond to market conditions in a way that is 
beneficial to themselves. This action satisfies 
individual preferences and aggregate preferences at the 
same time by directing production toward an efficient 
solution of the resource allocation problem. 
1.7 Criticisms of Analysis 
The model of perfect competition as presented here makes 
some major theoretical assumptions about the prevailing 
economic environment. For the analysis to achieve all 
that is theoretically possible the assumptions must be 
met in their entirety, there is no allowance for 
approximation. As Lipsey and Lancaster(1956) point out 
the failure of one condition for perfect competition 
means that 'first best' Pareto optimality cannot be 
achieved although there will be a second best solution. 
The model relies totally upon the defence of the 
underlying assumptions about the economic environment 
and about individual behaviour. It is clear that the 
assumptions are not tenable individually or collectively 
in the real world. What is observable is a form of 
competition which approximates this model. The 
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divergence between the theoretical and the observable 
economy has a number of implications. 
Green and Nore(1977) argue that if the real economy does 
not operate as the model would predict then consumer 
sovereignty does not exist and justification for a 
competitive system diminishes. For, not only is the 
possibility of an equilibrium doubtful but if achieved 
at all there is no basis for considering it to be Pareto 
optimal. One could counter this argument by minimalising 
the differences, rejecting the complete breakdown of the 
competitive model in favour of a form of approximation 
which follows the underlying workings of the model and 
would be Pareto optimal only in as much as it accurately 
reflected the theoretical assumptions. Implicit in both 
arguments is an acceptance that the observable economy 
does not display the same characteristics as those 
suggested in the model. The fundamental question is what 
impact this has upon producers and consumers. 
Where one or more of the assumptions of perfect 
competition are not found there exists a situation known 
as market failure as described by Bator(1958). The 
disparity between the model and observable features of 
the economy has been used as a means of identifying 
areas where the operation of markets is inefficient. 
Again inefficiency is a subjective term depending upon 
how the disparity is viewed. On one hand the existence 
of market failure removes consumer sovereignty and so 
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can only be detrimental to consumers. However market 
failure in a particular market can in reality be 
beneficial in some circumstances. But whatever the 
assessment, the real economy does not operate as 
predicted by the perfectly competitive model and the 
existence of Schecks and balances' implicit in the model 
are debatable. 
There are potential market failures associated with each 
of the formal conditions of perfect competition. It is 
possible to group these conditions as relating to two 
broad areas, those which characterise the producers' 
environment and those which are relevant to the 
consumers' economic behaviour. 
1.8 Market Failure in the Producers' Environment 
First, the assumptions pertinent to the producers' 
environment can be re-stated as: 
1. The firm is assumed to be price taker in all 
markets. No producer possesses any form of 
market power. 
2. Industry is characterised by freedom of entry 
and exit 
3. Perfect knowledge exists throughout the 
economy. 
These conditions will be assessed below as the basis for 
an examination of market failure. 
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1.8.1 Market Power 
Much of the accepted theory and modelling in economics 
focuses upon the two extremes of the market structure 
spectrum. Those of perfect competition and monopoly. 
These two extremes are relatively well specified and the 
behaviour of participating producers can be predicted 
using profit maximisation as the principle determinant 
of behaviour. In the pure competition situation 
producers are price takers with no price setting 
discretion and they earn normal profits in the long run. 
By contrast in a monopoly situation the firm is able to 
produce at a sub optimal level taking advantage of a 
price set above marginal cost thereby earning higher or 
super-normal profit. 
By far the largest number of markets facing consumers 
are neither of these two extreme types but fall into the 
category of oligopoly (imperfect competition) where a 
relatively small number of firms share a 
disproportionately large share of the market., Where 
imperfect competition occurs the characteristics of the 
market are less precise and producer behaviour is 
indeterminate because it is dependent to a'degree upon 
the actions of other producers. These responses may or 
may not be based upon wholly economic criteria. This 
market structure gives scope for producers to use market 
power contrary to the competitive assumptions of the 
model. 
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The basis of market power is in price setting 
discretion. Theoretically the discretion increases as 
firms operate in increasingly concentrated markets where 
the extreme discretion is characterised by monopoly. 
Consequently a fundamental feature of market power is 
the number of sellers in a particular market. Market 
concentration has been used as a measure of the degree 
of potential for market power to be exercised. For 
instance the seller concentration ratio can be obtained 
based upon the proportion of sales volume accounted for 
by for instance the largest four firms. Concentration 
ratios produced by the OECD and the EEC have pointed to 
the increasing trend toward concentration in many market 
sectors. (OECD 1979). This has been explained by 
Sweezy(1970) as the shift in economic structure from 
competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism and as 
Jones and Pickering(1979) note such a shift has 
implications for consumers as well as producers. 
For consumers, the existence of market power is one of 
the most serious aspects of market failure. Where price 
setting discretion is placed in the hands of producers 
rather than as a function of consumer demand the 
signalling function of price is distorted to meet 
producers' rather than consumers' needs. Market power in 
the hands of producers is emphasized and may be enhanced 
by the existence of other market imperfections such as 
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imperfect knowledge, product differentiation and by 
barriers to entry. 
However, this is not to say that market power is solely 
in the hands of producers. Traditionally consumers have 
been disadvantaged in the exercise of market power 
because of the fragmentary nature of their aims which 
has denied them the benefits of collaboration. Over the 
last twenty years market power has been identified in 
the actions of consumer groups in particular the policy 
of boycotts and the provision of specific product 
comparisons as identified by Smith(1986) and Box (1986). 
Market power in this context is not founded upon price 
setting discretion but on less tangible features of 
concerted action. In particular, it identifies political 
and consumer organisations as defining non-economic 
choice criteria thereby undermining the atomistic nature 
of consumption decisions because they act in a concerted 
way. 
1.8.2 Barriers to Entry 
The second market failure in the producers' environment 
is the barrier to entry erected by existing producers to 
protect their position in a particular market. The 
perfectly competitive model assumes that firms are free 
to enter and leave production at will in response to the 
profit earning capacity of production. Additionally, the 
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entry to profitable markets and the exit from 
unprofitable markets occurs with no cost. It is apparent 
that this costless freedom does not exist in reality. 
There are three identifiable types of barriers to entry: 
(a) The initial cost of entry 
(b) The existence of economies of scale 
(c) The existence of absolute cost advantage 
1.8.2(a) The Initial Cost of Entry 
Following the theoretical model, entry and exit should 
be costless. However, as Leftwich(1979) points out 
initial entry cost is particularly high for some 
industrial sectors for instance oil, chemicals or steel. 
A potential entrant would need to find capital to make 
entry feasible, the precise amount depending upon the 
type and the scale of production. The requirement for 
capital even in the purest market analysis incurs a cost 
defined by the rate of interest. In reality access to 
sufficient capital may be the most significant barrier 
to entry for any new firm attempting to break into a 
protected market. The ability to secure sufficient 
return to service the set up cost may also be dependent 
upon the existing size of the firm, the market concerned 
and the potential for penetration. The existing 
producer(s) will have had the ability to discount the 
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initial set-up cost over the period of existing 
production. other cost barriers are associated with 
technological cost advantages, research and development 
and experience cost. 
1.8.2(b) The Existence of Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale as a barrier to entry are defined as 
a long run reduction in unit cost as the volume of 
production increases. Where existing producers have 
achieved economies of scale the opportunity arises for 
either a reduction in market price for the goods 
produced or an increase in profit afforded through lower 
costs. Where the minimum efficient scale for a 
production unit exceeeds 50% of the market capacity, any 
new entrant would be unable to achieve the scale 
necessary to secure a sufficiently attractive return to 
enter. 
Further economies of scale can be derived from the 
impact of indivisibility. For instance, a machine may 
only be available in certain sizes or capacities. A 
larger producer may not only be able to keep the machine 
fully loaded but may be able to spread fixed costs over 
a larger volume of output. 
The existence of economies of scale is not in dispute 
but it is apparent that the degree of possible 
economies does vary from industry to industry depending 
39 
upon the production technology employed. Economies of 
scale as a barrier to entry are described in more detail 
by Bain(1956), Silberston(1962), Pratten(1971), 
Williamson(1968), and De Prano(1969). 
1.8.2(c) Absolute Cost Advantages 
The final barrier to entry is the existence of absolute 
cost advantage. These advantages are accrued through 
specialist knowledge or techniques. This is amply 
displayed where producers possess patents and allow 
other producers into the market at their discretion 
through the issue of licences and with the payment of 
royalties. The patent system can be used as an effective 
and legally enforceable barrier to entry. 
These three barriers reinforce the problem of 
concentration and add considerably to the continuance of 
oligopolistic competition and the prevalence of market 
power. For a full discussion of the barriers to entry 
encountered by new firms see Bain (1956), Bhagwatti 
(1970), Spence(1977). For a detailed economic analysis 
see von Weizsacker(1980). 
1.8.3 Perfect Knowledge 
The third broad market failure to face producers is the 
absence of perfect knowledge. It is proposed that the 
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perfectly competitive economy is populated by omniscient 
individuals. For the producers in this economy the 
possession of perfect knowledge is paramount because of 
the importance of identifying profitable production 
opportunities. Excess profits entice more producers to 
enter the market, as a consequence all producers in the 
economy must be fully aware on an up to date basis of 
profit earnings of all other producers in all other 
sectors. This assumes of course that profit earnings are 
the only consideration and that'barriers to entry do not 
exist. If perfect knowledge does not exist then excess 
profits could be earned in particular markets as excess 
demand is maintained. Potential entrants are then 
unaware of profit opportunities. 
Another element of perfect knowledge for producers 
concerns the identification of new market opportunities. 
The underlying assumption is that producers know what 
consumers require. They can react immediately to a 
change in consumer requirements. The only indicator of 
consumer needs in the model is effective demand which is 
demonstrated by the actual purchase of existing 
products. Perfect knowledge assumes that producers know 
the hidden desires of consumers. In reality this perfect 
knowledge does not exist and producers have to rely upon 
test marketing and market research techniques to 
identify new product opportunities which often incurs 
cost which is not recouped. 
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The third effect of an absence of perfect knowledge is 
in production techniques. Producers are assumed to know 
the production techniques employed by rival firms. in 
this way production costs are similar for all producers 
since only the resources of capital and labour can vary 
in cost and these are defined by the market. In fact 
firms are generally unaware of production techniques 
used by other firms because they are kept secret or 
patented. In this sense imperfect information in 
relation to production technology could also be 
considered as a barrier to entry. 
1.9 Market Failure in the Consumers' Environment 
There are two major conditions required by the perfect 
competition model applicable directly to the consumer 
and their immediate market environment. These 
assumptions are re-stated: 
4. Perfect information is assumed for both 
consumers and producers. The market is an 
integrated whole, not segmented by 
limitations on information acquisition and 
analysis. 
5. Product differentiation does not exist. All 
products in the economy are homogeneous and 
consumers cannot distinguish between a 
producers' products except by price. 
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1.9.1 Perfect. Information 
The first and perhaps most contentious assumption in 
relation to consumers is that of perfect information. On 
the basis of this assumption the model of the perfectly 
competitive market ensures that purchase behaviour is a 
direct response to the relative prices of goods 
available throughout the economy. Perfect knowledge may 
be applicable to a simple two good, two producer economy 
but in situations of millions of products and millions 
of producers even a minimum level of information about 
goods available becomes impossible. 
Information for the purpose of this analysis is defined 
by Hughes(1971) as "any stimulus perceived relevant to 
the decision to buy or consume a product or service". 
This definition is broad but information as a concept in 
consumer theory has not achieved a precise definition 
(except in the mathematical branch of Information 
Theory). The pure market theory identifies price 
information as the only stimulus perceived as relevant 
to a purchase decision. This relevant information is 
then processed in relation to a preference ordering for 
all goods which make up a basket of purchases that 
achieve the maximum satisfaction subject to the 
individual's disposable income. There are two points to 
consider in this analysis, the available information and 
the processing of that information into a decision. 
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1.9.1(a) Available Information 
The information environment in the real economy is much 
more complex than the model suggests. Individuals are 
not merely a price/preference response mechanism but are 
capable of thought and opinion with motivations such as 
self-image and aspiration. The information available 
that is relevant to a particular purchase is not 
restricted to price information. It includes information 
on durability, performance, suitability as well as 
sympathy to beliefs held by the individual about 
themselves. 
In today's society the consumer is assailed daily by 
vast quantities of information. That which is relevant 
to purchase decisions can come from a variety of 
sources. Information may come from commercial sources 
(such as product design, packaging, salespersons, 
advertising, and shelf displays), or from non-commercial 
sources (Which magazine, independent assessment, 
government, or academic research), from social sources 
(friends, neighbours, family etc) or from individual 
experience and perception gained as a result of previous 
action or previously held information. The point is that 
consumers do not possess information innately; it is 
either given to them or they search for it. Information 
about the specific qualities of products are held by 
producers. This is then imparted to consumers through a 
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number of commercial routes. By far the most important 
of these commercial routes is advertising. 
The use of advertising has a dual role. The first-is one 
of providing information which is much emphasised by the 
advertising industry itself and market supporters. 
Indeed advertising has been identified by consumers: as a 
source of information for purchasing decisions in a 
number of studies, Bucklin(1965), Katona and Mueller 
(1955), Udell(1966) and Nelson(1974). Several studies 
have tried to measure the information content of 
advertising but the measurement criteria have been very 
general and the results have been inconclusive, see 
Resnik and Stern(1977). Sepstrup(1981) and 
Marquez(1977). The problem here is that advertisements 
often omit information in favour of non-rational 
appeals. 
The second role of advertising is much more contentious, 
that of persuasion. The debate about the persuasive 
content of advertising material is still going on.. It is 
apparent that advertising contains an element of both 
hard factual information and other non factual appeals. 
It is the non factual information which is most 
contentious in this analysis. As Galbraith (1975) points 
out, advertising may in fact undermine the rational 
decision process of consumers in the economy and may be 
a source of market distortion because of the dilution of 
information. It is difficult not to get involved in an 
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argument that encompasses not only economic 
considerations but also moral and political. Persuasion 
may not be a negative factor in considering the 
consumers' market environment where it prevents damage 
to health or other individuals. Although Foxall(1980) 
widens the debate by making the point that "persuasion 
is perfectly legitimate in an open society". However, 
such a debate cannot distract attention from the 
disparity of information available to consumers. 
1.9.1(b) The Processing of Information 
The second consideration relevant to the consumer 
information environment is processing of information. It 
has been suggested that the quantity of information in 
the real economy, whatever the source, will be too much 
for consumers to process effectively. When this 
situation occurs the consumer is experiencing 
information overload. This topic is well covered in the 
literature, for instance Betturan (1970), Henry (1980), 
and Jacoby Spelling and Kohn (1974) who concentrate upon 
individual reactions to information overload. The work 
of Schroeder et al (1967) attempts to classify the 
different processing abilities of individuals but with 
limited effect. 
In response to information overload consumers adopt 
strategies to avoid this situation or minimise its 
effect. These strategies can be positive where the 
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individual deliberately seeks out selective information 
felt relevant or the strategy can be negative, 
deliberately avoiding information. Information found 
valuable or acceptable may be adopted whereas 
information of low value or disagreeable may be 
rejected. In this way the individual restructures 
information over time. 
The effect of information overload and processing 
disparity can lead*to a situation that Williamson(1975) 
has described as information impactedness. Individuals 
do not communicate potentially useful information to 
each other which leads to a situation where individuals 
operate within information clusters. The boundaries of 
these clusters sometimes intersect with other 
individuals and this interaction can either add to the 
information held or deplete the information held by 
contradicting that already possessed. The net effect is 
to make the consumer environment segmented in terms of 
the possession of information. Where purchase decisions 
need to be taken, consumers are very often faced with 
uncertainty as a function of information deficiency 
within their boundary. This prompts consumers either 
actively to seek out information where they perceive 
that information is needed to reduce perceived risk or 
alternatively to carry on without it. This view emerged 
in the work by Klapper (1960) and Grunert (1981). 
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Finally, information has a short life. Following the 
market assumption, consumers would have information 
continually updated. This would take account of price 
changes resulting from the redirection of production. 
This is not the case, there is no automatic updating of 
information in fact consumers appear to retain old 
information for future use and rely upon this as an 
alternative to information search. In the absence of up- 
dating it is fair to say that consumers operate on the 
basis of outdated information. 
Whatever the reason it is clear consumers do not have 
perfect knowledge upon which to base purchase decisions. 
Because of : 
a) Selective information sourcing 
b) Processing disparity 
c) Product specific information 
d) Information updating delay 
The consequences of imperfect information have not been 
pursued with much rigour although it is clear from work 
by Maynes et al (1977) that insufficient information 
leads to consumer dissatisfaction and poor purchasing 
decisions. This was also identified by Buskirk and Rothe 
(1970) and Day and Aaker(1970). Indeed research by 
Maynes and Assum (1982) has concluded that price 
dispersion of similar products is caused by imperfect 
information being held by consumers. This proposition 
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went some way to confirming the work of Devine and 
Hawkins(1972)-which examined price effects after 
supplying additional information to consumers. Keller 
and Staelin(1987) make a distinction between quantity of 
information and quality where improvements in quality 
increase decision effectiveness . but increases in the 
quantity of information reduce decision effectiveness. 
Research based upon the implications of consumer 
information deficits such as that by Morrison and 
Bronson(1970) has identified economic loss due to 
imperfect information. Other research such as that by 
Ackerlof(1970) Maynes(1979) Thorelli and Thorelli(1977) 
and Cave(1985) have approached the problem of imperfect 
information by pointing out the imbalance of power 
between consumers and suppliers and identified an 
information gap leading to price and quality 
uncertainty. This situation is described by' 
Ackerlof(1970) as 'information asymetry'. It has been 
observed that since communication between suppliers and 
consumers is organised and initiated mainly by suppliers 
the information transmitted will be determined by the 
aims and objectives of business rather than the 
information needs of consumers. This puts a different 
light upon the perfect market construct where 
information flows freely and instantaneously without 
limit. It identifies the possibility of market power in 
relation to information which is detrimental to 
consumer's interests. 
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1.9.2 Product Differentiation 
The second market failure occurs where products are not 
homogeneous (as assumed) but are differentiated from one 
another. Essentially product differentiation is the 
process of making products of the same description 
different in one or more respects. In the perfect 
competition model it is assumed that buyers cannot 
distinguish between the outputs of the various 
producers. All products are differentiated only to the 
extent that price may be different and the fact that 
they may actually be different products. In reality the 
products of different firms are identifiable, even 
though they may be similar to other producers' products 
in all other respects. Chamberlin provides a good' 
description of the nature of product differentiation: 
"A general class of product is differentiated if 
any significant basis exists for distinguishing 
the goods or services of one seller from another. 
Such a basis may be real or fancied so long as it 
is of any importance whatever to buyers, and leads 
to a preference for one variety over another .... Differentiation may be based upon certain 
characteristics of the product itself, such as 
patented features, trade marks, trade names, 
peculiarities of packaging etc ... but may also 
exist with respect to the conditions surrounding 
its sale" 
Chamberlin(1950) p175. 
A feature of all product differentiation is the adoption 
by producers of some method to convey to potential 
purchasers that the product is better in some way than 
rival products. One way to achieve this, contrary to 
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assumptions of how the market operates, is to charge a 
higher price than competitors which may signal higher 
quality to some consumers. This has been identified by a 
number of writers including Wolinsky(1983). 
Scitovsky(1944), and Monroe(1973). The most usual way of 
conveying information relevant to product 
differentiation is through the use of advertising and 
brand labelling. 
The economic rationale for product differentiation by 
producers is clear. As soon as the product becomes 
different to that of competitors then the producer 
acquires price setting discretion and so a degree of 
market power. The more intense the product 
differentiation the greater the tendency toward price 
setting discretion and so to market power. This power 
can be exploited by the producer to earn more profit up 
to the point where the cost of differentiation does not 
exceed the additional revenue obtained. 
The market failure approach treats the phenomenon of 
product differentiation as an undesirable distortion to 
the competitive mechanism. However as Sherer(1980) and 
Morris(1980) point out, in reality differentiation may 
be a legitimate response to consumers' desire for 
product choice. In many cases consumers demand products 
which are differentiated from one another as a means of 
expressing individuality or exclusivity. If this 
argument is accepted, differentiation is not detrimental 
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or undesirable but beneficial to consumers in terms of 
meeting their demands. However, product differentiation 
may also be a source of confusion to consumers. 
Stuyck(1983) highlights the point that the fundamental 
issue for consumers in relation to product 
differentiation is deficient information as to the true 
nature of products' attributes. In conclusion, a 
distinction must be drawn between differentiation which 
is detrimental and that which is beneficial. Although 
this is a conceptual possibility in practice it is very 
difficult to achieve. 
So far the market failures explored have been directly 
related to the stated assumptions of perfect 
competition. However, there is a second type of market 
failure which does not relate directly to'the stated 
conditions of the model; failures associated with 
externalities and the provision of public goods. 
1.10 Externality 
The first of these, externalities, is concerned with the 
effect of costs which are not considered in the model 
and are therefore external to the analysis. These 
external effects can be either negative or positive. 
A negative externality is one which has detrimental 
effects upon third parties. For instance, a chemical 
factory produces a chemical product. As a by-product of 
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the production process some waste is deposited in the 
local river causing mild pollution. Because of the way 
in which production costs are treated in the model the 
cost to the environment is not part of the production 
cost and is not therefore included in the cost 
calculation for the chemical producer. If the cost to 
the environment were considered by the producer as a 
production cost then less of the chemical would be 
produced. Therefore there is an inefficient over- 
production. 
By contrast positive externalities occur where an 
external effect creates benefit. A commonly cited 
example is the benefit of education. It is suggested 
that the private exchange of educational services 
generates beneficial effects for those not involved in 
the exchange. An educated society has value for the 
whole of the economy not just to those educated. A 
similar example is where the majority of individuals 
purchase a vaccination. Some people will not purchase 
the vaccine and not pay for the benefit because the 
chance of catching the disease is reduced by the actions 
of others. If the benefits of some product can be had 
without purchase then the market under produces since a 
purchase is the only signal for production. Therefore, 
the market displays inefficiency due to under 
production. 
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1.11 Public Goods 
Market failure in providing public goods is closely 
associated with externality. A public good is a good 
which everyone consumes. Unlike other goods the 
consumption of a public good by one consumer does not 
diminish the amount available to any other consumer: 
for instance uncongested streets, roads, and television 
signals. These are types of public good where the 
individual can vary consumption ie there is a choice 
attached to consumption. A second type of public good is 
one where consumption cannot be varied such as national 
defence or clean air. 
The problem for the market is how to charge people 
according to what they consume of these public goods and 
take into account 'free riders'. Where a person 
concludes that enough other people will demand the 
public good provision, they will be able to use the good 
without demanding it, ie without paying for it. These 
consumers are free-riding upon the demand of others. The 
problem is that for goods such as national defence non- 
payers cannot be excluded from usage. In reality the 
state pays for public goods and estimates both 
consumers' preferences and the level of demand. However, 
it must set the price of these goods. The market states 
that price is set where marginal cost is equal to 
marginal revenue. The marginal cost of providing 
national defence for one more person for example is nil. 
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The market fails to set a price but obviously national 
defence incurs a cost but it cannot be properly 
incorporated in the determination of market equilibrium. 
1.12 Implications of Market Failure 
The observable differences between the model assumptions 
and the conditions in the economy make it clear that 
perfect competition cannot exist because the conditions 
in which it operates are not tenable in the real world. 
This has a number of implications: 
1. If the economy does not in fact exist in the form 
prescribed by theory it would be fair to say that 
the operation of a market economy is also not as 
prescribed by the theory. 
2. If the assumptions of the analysis are not met 
then this casts doubt upon the self regulatory 
nature of the real world economy and the automatic 
achievement of a Pareto optimal solution. 
3. Consumers cannot rely upon the system to ensure 
allocative efficiency since consumer sovereignty 
does not exist. 
The fact that the real economy does not display the 
characteristics of the theoretical construct in no way 
diminishes the importance of perfect competition. Ever 
since the concept of a perfectly competitive system was 
developed it has been used as an ideal state, a 
situation that describes an economic paradise. It is 
proven to obtain an equilibrium position where resources 
are allocated according to the desires of consumers and 
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that the allocation is the best possible attainable. On 
the other hand market failure clearly shows that the 
market mechanism as a form of economic organisation is 
flawed, the conditions are not universally tenable. This 
observation has been used to identify a role for an 
agent external to the market with responsibility for 
providing what Adam Smith referred to as a 'guiding 
hand'. 
1.13 The Role of Government 
If it is accepted that the market cannot provide a 
completely automatic and self-regulatory system of 
resource allocation then there is a need for some other 
mechanism. The role of this mechanism is either to 
completely replace the market or to provide varying 
degrees of complement to the market. The complementary 
role requires a solution to market failures while 
leaving the essence of the market mechanism untouched 
and is the role adopted by most democratic governments. 
This is characterised by the pursuit of policies 
designed to limit the detrimental effects of market 
failure in an attempt to promote a form of workable 
competition. Where the market mechanism is operating 
efficiently there is no need or at least no economic 
rationale to intervene. However, where the market is not 
operating efficiently there is a role for an external 
agent to intervene. The role of government exists in the 
sphere between achievable and theoretical. 
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The role of government can be considered that of market 
supervisor, the rationale for intervention is where the 
market response to a demand is inadequate or imperfect. 
It is also possible that the market will provide 
socially undesirable products and here there is a 
rationale for the government to intervene in order to 
supercede the market mechanism and by implication 
consumer sovereignty, in the interests of fairness and 
safety. If the market is not so efficient in providing 
public goods such as defence, education or protection of 
people and property the government acts as a supplement 
to the market. 
The three main functions for government based upon this 
argument are: 
1. To provide something that the market cannot or 
will not. 
2. To help the market achieve something by itself by 
ameliorating market failure. 
3. To prevent the market from supplying something 
that is not desirable in the public interest. 
Ramsay (1984) has suggested that these reasons be 
classified into two underlying rationales for 
intervention; those based upon efficiency and those 
based upon equity. This classification provides a basis 
for the analysis of government intervention. 
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1.13.1 Intervention in Pursuit of Efficiency 
Intervention on the grounds of efficiency is directly 
concerned with providing solutions to market failures, 
specifically those outlined above. The aim is to smooth 
away any barriers to the free operation of markets so 
that the mechanism itself will achieve the desired 
objective of an efficient allocation of resources. A 
successful intervention on'the grounds of efficiency 
would lead to greater social welfare because ofa more 
efficient use by the market of available resources. For 
consumer markets the concept of imperfect information 
has received a lot of attention in relation to market 
efficiency. Indeed consumer policies can be justified in 
terms of imperfect consumer information since the 
concept of a well informed consuming public is one which 
appeals both to consumers themselves and to governments. 
A second consideration of market efficiency is that of 
the provision of public goods such as health services 
and education where market provision is not efficient 
and direct intervention to provide public goods would be 
beneficial. 
The economic rationale for governments to intervene in 
the economy is restricted to closing the efficiency gap 
by pursuing action designed to-negate identified market 
failures. But the observable role of government is much 
wider than this. It not only encourages the market to 
58 
progress in certain areas but also restricts it from 
others. This means that the efficiency rationale is not 
a complete justification for intervention. 
1.13.2 Intervention in Pursuit of Equity 
The second rationale identified is one of equity. Equity 
in its legal sense is the overriding concept of justice. 
In the economic context, equity is designed to over-ride 
the market or indeed market failures in the belief that 
there are basic human needs which must be met. There may 
be inequalities between need and the ability to acquire 
goods to satisfy through normal market transactions. 
The distribution of resources to members of society to 
enable them to achieve transactions is one aspect of 
equity: distributive justice. A second thread of equity 
is protective justice. As Ramsay(1985) points out, this 
embodies the view that individuals have a right to 
regulatory protection in specific instances from the 
action of the market. Essentially equity requires that 
the market would need to operate with fairness, honesty 
in trade and a notion of the public interest. Since 
these concepts do not appear in the market model the 
responsibility for ensuring their observance rests with 
government. 
A rationale for intervention closely linked with the 
concept of equity concerns the political ideology of 
government. Governments view some inequalities more 
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seriously than others, depending upon their ideology. 
The bestowing of rights upon certain sections of the 
economy in response to direct political pressure may be 
used by governments to balance interests and reduce 
conflict either between groups or between themselves and 
groups. Governments rarely subscribe to the view that 
policy decisions are taken on this basis but the 
reduction of conflict and the response to pressure 
groups is a feature of the policy making process. This 
also implies that government's judgement of competing 
issues will change over time. 
At different times governments in many European 
countries, including the UK, have pursued a less market 
orientated route to economic prosperity. This approach 
has been characterised by a clear demarcation between 
those areas where the market is and is not allowed to 
direct activity. This demarcation has been achieved in 
the UK through state ownership and other mechanisms 
which allow the government to by pass the market in the 
provision of identified necessities. 
1.14 Conclusion 
The comparison of the model of perfect competition and 
the real economy have identified areas where the 
assumptions of the model are not tenable. The economic 
analysis only accepts government intervention to 
ameliorate market failure ie to pursue efficiency. 
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However a broader analysis identifies equity and 
possibly ideology as rationales for intervention. 
Whatever the response to the observable deficiencies of 
the free market, government undoubtedly has a role. In 
political terms any government must ensure economic 
prosperity by pursuing policies designed to achieve the 
most efficient allocation of resources possible. The 
present governments of the UK and USA have a strong 
tendency to follow the free market school of thought 
popularised by among others Friedman (1962) and 
Hayek(1979) which presents competition as the ideal 
state, using the benefit to consumers as a justification 
for removing government presence from large areas of the 
economy. The promotion of a form of workable competition 
is seen as a means improving the lot of consumers. in 
essence the closer the economy matches the theoretical 
ideal, the better consumers are served by the economic 
process. This is based upon the assumption that 
consumers benefit at each incremental move toward free 
competition. 
In the UK there has always been an underlying acceptance 
that both government and market have a role although in 
different proportions. Consistently, policies have been 
pursued which take the market provision as a fundamental 
basis. These policies have been directed toward the 
undesirable consequences of identified market failure 
and these form the basis of a typology of'government 
intervention in markets considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Rationales for Government Intervention 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the role of government will be examined 
in the context of market intervention. First, the source 
of government authority has to be established and this 
necessarily moves the argument from an economic market 
model to a social market model since government 
authority is based upon a socio-political consensus. 
Having established authority, the rationales for 
intervention in the market are considered before 
developing a framework for considering the different 
forms of intervention in the UK. This analysis is based 
upon an examination of the various mechinisms commonly 
used to achieve the objectives of intervention. Such a 
framework will allow the examination of a specific type 
of intervention and its impact upon a specific market 
sector. 
2.2 Government Intervention 
Government is the only external market institution with 
the requisite authority to, undertake market 
intervention. Only government is in a position to 
observe and react to market failure on behalf of all 
groups within the economy. Its role is to balance the 
deficiencies of economic behaviour in an effort to 
secure the optimal allocation of resources. However 
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governments do not act solely upon economic grounds-but 
are also responsive to social pressure because of the 
source of their authority. This response to social 
pressure may in some circumstances cause a conflict of 
roles. It is possible that in some circumstances 
intervention may not be restricted to limiting or 
reversing the impact of market failure. It may extend to 
limiting or reversing the effects of market allocation 
in response to social and political pressure. Government 
is able to do this by virtue of its external market 
position. The price the market pays for the 'benefit' of 
intervention is that it cannot dictate, in terms of the 
market model the motivation of such an external market 
institution. 
2.3 Root of Government Authority 
The market philosophy is one of individual 
responsibility for purchase decisions based upon the 
free allocation of income. The aggregate effect of this 
individual behaviour is an efficient allocation of total 
resources among members of the economy. This philosophy 
rests upon the delegation of responsibility for 
efficient allocation from the individual to the market 
mechanism. This principle of delegation also underlies 
the process of democratic government with individual 
responsibility delegated to a governing institution. 
Because of this similarity the free market and 
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democratic government are philosophically compatible. As 
Hayek(1944) points out: 
, 'It is often said that democracy 
capitalism. If capitalism means 
system based upon free disposal 
property , it is far more impor- that only within this system is 
possible. ' 
will not tolerate 
here a competitive 
over private 
Cant to recognise 
democracy 
Government authority based upon democracy is as 
fundamental as the market system of allocation. The 
ancient Greek idea that people govern themselves is 
inherent in any democratic political system. This has 
been given renewed currency throughout the world as the 
major economic powers have presented democracy as the 
only legitimate form of government. In its literal sense 
it is of course impossible in any sizeable community for 
people to govern themselves and so representative 
government is accepted as a surrogate for the 
unattainable ideal. In recognising this approach to 
democracy there is a. reliance upon some form of 
referendum, a preference for frequent elections and an 
acceptance that the responsibility of elected 
representatives is in advancing the cause of their 
constituents. According to Birch(1975) this populist 
view of government has never had much adherence in 
Britain, unlike countries such as Sweden and America. It 
is not part of the British political tradition that the 
peoples' representatives should be bound by the wishes 
of their constituents in making decisions or feel bound 
to give priority to their opinions. The accepted view is 
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that the duty of elected representatives is to promote 
national and party interests before constituents. 
In Britain the population do have the power to choose 
their rulers and exert some small influence upon the 
operation of government but the people neither have nor 
expect direct control over government policy decisions. 
The view which has found much more acceptance in British 
politics is the legitimate concentration of power in the 
hands of elected representatives for a given period of 
time. Authority is invested in Parliament and more 
precisely in the Government for a period of five years 
at a time. The population then react to the handling of 
affairs and the future prospect of policy direction 
periodically. Between these periods the government is 
delegated absolute power although it may lack the 
political means of exercising such power unhindered. 
It would be an impossible task to consider the wide 
range of individual policies pursued by democratic 
governments throughout the world in response to market 
failure for a number of reasons. First because each 
country and each government have their own priorities 
dictated by the pervailing political view of those 
elected to govern. Some Governments view the market 
allocation as sacrosanct and restrict their activities 
to ameliorating the most obvious inadequacies. Others 
view the market allocation of resources as a basis upon 
which to impose their own allocation in response to 
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social or politically determined priorities rather than 
those determined by the market. Secondly, there is a 
time dimension involved. Governments change not only in 
response to democratic election but also in response to 
a more enduring social pressure brought about by changes 
in economic prosperity. Thirdly, government intervention 
is dynamic in nature. While Governments change and 
policy emphasis shifts there is a cumulative effect upon 
the economy of previous interventions. Governments build 
upon the existing forms of intervention already in place 
and rarely if ever start from a first position. 
Therefore it is difficult to identify the impact of 
individual policies upon the market mechanism. 
In order to make the following analyses of types of 
government' intervention useful, a number of assumptions 
have been made. First, the economy and government 
considered will be that of the United Kingdom and all 
descriptive material and-examples will be drawn from the 
UK. Second, that government in the UK has authority 
based upon a democratic system. -Third that there are 
institutions in place which both protect the 
government's authority and implement decisions. 
2.4 Role of Law in Government Intervention 
Before considering types of government intervention it 
is worth highlighting one element of government 
intervention which is not considered in economic 
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analyses. This is the role of law in facilitating and 
legitimising government action. As early as 1776, Adam 
Smith suggested that the market system identified a 
government role in establishing an environment that 
facilitates market transactions. One of the identified 
elements of this role was the administering of justice. - 
Inman(1984) suggests that this duty involves the 
preservation of property rights, ensuring the voluntary 
nature of markets, and enforcing contracts. In short the 
government enforces basic rules which enhance the 
competitive process and which in turn ensure society's 
welfare. This is an important point for it identifies 
the legal system as the responsibility of government 
which it is anticipated will not seek to interfere with 
the operation of market transactions. However it is 
clear that government intervention in many cases is 
based upon the passing of laws which do affect the 
operation of market transactions. Therefore, whether or 
not the legal system is an intervention in the economy 
depends upon whether it is used by government to enhance 
the competitive environment or directly to affect the 
nature or process of market transactions. In more recent 
times government has displayed a tendency toward using 
the creation, maintenance and protection of legal rights 
directly to alter market transactions. As such legal 
rights will be considered as an intervention in the 
market. 
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2.5 Objectives of Intervention 
Usher(1981) suggests that any intervention by government 
must be based upon the pursuit of efficiency, equality 
and equity which is a wider taxonomy than that suggested 
by Ramsay(1984). This wider categorisation has also been 
used by Forbes(1986) and provides much greater 
discrimination in the categorisation of intervention 
objectives. The political ideology of the government 
will dictate which of these three objectives is given 
the greatest weight. However, Harris and Carman(1974) 
while accepting the importance of these three criteria 
as the basis of a broad classification, present an 
analysis of government intervention in the market based 
upon five observable objectives. Depending upon the 
mechanism adopted to achieve the objective all policy 
will display elements of efficiency, equality and equity 
but in different proportions. The objectives they 
identify are: 
1. Creating a new Market 
2. Enhancing an existing market 
3. Changing an existing market 
4. Preventing a market 
5. Substituting a market 
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2.5.1 Creating a New Market 
Government can intervene to create a market for goods or 
services where previously such a market did not exist. 
This can be achieved in two ways. First, by releasing 
products or information not previously available into 
the market place, secondly, by allowing the exchange of 
goods or services whose exchange had been previously 
prohibited. The effect in both cases is the same. An 
example of this type of intervention was the action of 
the UK Government between 1979 and 1983, who achieved 
the creation of a new market by allowing publicly owned 
Council houses to be sold to tenants under the Housing 
Act (1981). 
2.5.2 Enhancing an Existing Market 
Where this objective is pursued, government intervenes 
to promote or improve market exchange so that outcomes 
are closer to those which would theoretically be 
determined by the market. In this case government 
intervention is not intended to alter market outcomes 
but is more closely aligned to intervention to reduce or 
remove market failure. This type of intervention 
involves an acceptance of a market determined outcome 
and the encouragement of the market to operate more 
efficiently. An example is the requirement for 
information to appear on products enhancing the 
provision of information to purchasers. 
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2.5.3 Changing an Existing Market 
Action by government to change an existing market is 
much closer to what is normally expected of market 
intervention. In this case the objective is to changea 
market determined outcome in favour of one determined by 
government. This type of intervention changes the nature 
of the transaction by altering one or more of its 
components. This could be achieved by changing the price 
of goods or services by imposing a tax which 
artificially reduces demand. The restricting of exchange 
to certain classes of people (for instance alcohol to 
those over eighteen years) has a similar impact. 
2.5.4 Preventing a Market 
In many cases government intervenes to prevent a 
particular market where under normal conditions such a 
market would exist. This type of intervention usually 
involves prohibiting the exchange of particular goods 
and'services. For instance intervention to prohibit a 
market can be seen in relation to controlled drugs, 
state secrets and in the employment of children. In this 
scenario intervention relies upon compulsion in some 
form to enforce its authority. 
70 
2.5.5 Substituting a Market 
The substituting of a market by government is achieved 
where it alone determines allocation, the market is 
completely replaced by an artificial mechanism for 
distributing goods or services to individuals. This is 
usually achieved through some sort of administrative 
mechanism where the government defines which goods will 
be allocated in this way and to whom. It may also define 
the purpose to which goods allocated in this way may be 
put. 
2.6 Forms of Specific Government Intervention 
The five aims of government intervention referred to 
above can be operationalised in many different ways. The 
precise method adopted can be considered a mechanism 
which is used by government to achieve certain specified 
objectives. In general terms these can form the basis of 
a classification of intervention by government. The 
taxonomy of six types of government intervention 
presented here is developed from the work of Harris and 
Carman(1984). Their analysis is based upon intervention 
by the United States government and has limited 
application to the UK. However, despite differences in 
the detail of intervention the underlying principles are 
generalisable. As a consequence some of the 
classifications used by Harris and Carman have been 
condensed or omitted with new categories added in order 
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to arrive at a new typology of government intervention 
for the UK market. 
The typology identifies six categories each of which is 
rationalised with reference to market failures. The 
categories are intervention in respect of: 
1. Legal Rights 
2. Information 
3. Standards 
4. Collective Action 
5. Price 
6. Direct Action 
Under each of these headings a number of objectives are 
identified with specific mechanisms adopted to achieve 
these objectives. In addition examples are given drawn 
from recent UK government action. The purpose of the 
tables is to summarise the different objectives and 
mechanisms adopted to intervene in markets. 
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2.6.1 Intervention in Respect of Legal Rights 
Table 2.1 Intervention in Respect of Legal Rights 
Objective Mechanism Example 
Formalising of Definition and Common law, 
Exchange protection of Contract law, 
individual Statute law 
legal rights 
and liabilities 
Affecting the Assigning of Maintenance 
nature of recognised transaction costs of financial 
transactions system. 
Defining 
duties of 
seller. 
Affecting the Allocating Professional 
volume of recognised legal rights monopolies, 
transactions to transact Age limits. 
In the circumstances described by the theoretical 
construct of the free market, for exchange to take place 
all that is required is the demand for the product or 
service(the buyer), the supply of that product or 
service (the seller) and the paying of the market price. 
The terms of such an exchange are assumed to be 
negotiated privately between buyer and seller. There is 
also an implied assumption that the goods were 
originally the property of the seller and that this 
property right has been transferred to the buyer when 
the transaction is complete. Legal rights serve to 
define all elements of such a transaction. They may 
define the goods or services exchanged as well as the 
a 
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parties and their duties in relation to the transaction. 
Once the transaction has been formalised it is possible 
for government to affect all transactions which fall 
into certain categories of definition. For instance it 
would not be possible to prohibit the sale of alcohol to 
minors without a legal definition of alcohol as well as 
a definition of a minor and a definition of what 
constitutes a sale. Governments have formalised the 
exchange process through codifying common law, contract 
law and passing statutes. The identification and 
establishment of legal rights' recognises specific forms 
of exchange. 
The definition of legal rights can also provide an 
opportunity for the nature of recognised transactions to 
be affected through the assigning of transaction costs: 
for instance, the assigning of duties to the seller in a 
business transaction as opposed to a private 
transaction. But perhaps the most important transaction 
cost which can be assigned through the formalising of 
exchange is price. In a perfect market goods are 
exchanged with-reference to a price mechanism. However 
the market does not define a common medium of exchange, 
although undoubtedly one would emerge. In formalising 
the system of exchange a common or legal tender must 
also be defined upon which future price controls may be 
based. 
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Once the establishment of legal rights has taken place, 
then government is in a position to affect the volume of 
transactions. This can be achieved by defining and re- 
defining to whom the rights apply, in effect creating or 
removing legal rights. The creation of legal rights can 
be used to enhance the position of individuals or groups 
with respect to particular transactions, for instance to 
allow individuals who had previously been debarred from 
the transaction to take part. The effect is to increase 
the number of potential transacting parties. However 
legal rights can also be used to reduce the number of 
transacting parties, for instance creating a situation 
where only those individuals with a specified legal 
right can transact, where before all persons had the 
right to transact.. Similarly the removal of legal rights 
can have either beneficial or detrimental effects. The 
removal of rights can open up a market which was 
previously only available to a legally specified few, or 
conversely, removing legal rights can restrict those 
able to participate ie the withdrawing of a 'right'. 
Therefore the effect and nature of changes in legal 
rights are dependent upon the market situation to which 
they are applied. As such it is inappropriate to 
classify changes in legal rights purely in terms of 
creation or removal. 
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2.6.2 Intervention in Respect of Information 
Table 2.2 intervention in Respect of Information 
Table 2.2 Intervention in Respect of Information 
Objective Mechanism Example 
Facilitate Remove information Independent 
Information property rights product 
Exchange testing 
Audited 
accounts 
& company 
details 
Increase overall Require production Pharmaceutical 
volume of product trials 
Information 
Require disclosure Product 
labelling 
Provide information Government 
directly safety 
reports, 
complaint 
statistics 
Restrict Assign information Confidential 
information property rights records, 
exchange Official 
Secrets 
Government may intervene in information markets in a 
number of ways. The prime objective of government 
intervention in this context is to facilitate 
information exchange and to encourage the production of 
information. To facilitate information exchange 
government can remove the property rights associated 
with information, in effect putting private information 
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in the public domain. Without this alteration 
information about products and services would remain the 
property of the producer and could legitimately be 
denied to the-buyer. Removing property rights allows for 
the exchange of information between transacting parties 
regardless of the source of that information. An 
information market exists in the UK in the form of 
comparative product testing performed by the Consumers 
Association and sold to the public. While this is a form 
of private intervention since the Consumers Association 
is a private body it is the removal of property rights 
by government which allows this market to exist. 
However, information about products is still somewhat 
restricted especially in relation to harmful 
ingredients, additives and preparations. 
Government also intervenes in a number of ways to affect 
the volume of information. Primarily, because of the 
rationale for intervention, this involves increasing the 
volume, although the mechanisms are reversible. The 
first mechanism for increasing volume is by requiring 
the production of information which would not otherwise 
be produced: using authority to require individuals to 
prepare, collate or collect information. An example is 
the requiring of firms to deposit the results of field 
tests before pharmaceutical products can be licensed. 
The second mechanism for increasing the volume of 
information is by requiring its disclosure. In this 
situation government is using its authority to enforce 
77 
the exchange of information. An example of this is the 
requiring of producers to label products either with the 
manufacturer's name or in the case of foodstuffs with 
lists of ingredients and dietary information. Finally 
the volume of information can be increased by government 
directly by generating information itself for the 
market. This is usually achieved through the collation 
and dissemination of information via the Central Office 
of Information although many government agencies exist 
solely to provide information directly, for instance the 
Road Research Laboratory, and the Employment Research 
Unit. 
While the most common aim of government intervention is 
to increase and enhance information provision it should 
also be noted that the intervention may be to restrict 
information. This is achieved by reversing the 
facilitating mechanism and assigning property rights to 
information. This can be to protect personal or private 
information such as medical records or bank accounts or 
to protect the state. In the latter case official 
secrets are the property of government and cannot be 
communicated. Reales at al(1981) provide a comprehensive 
study of informational market failures and policy 
responses within the United States. 
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2.6.3 Intervention in Respect of Standards 
Table 2.3 Intervention in Respect of'Standards 
Objective Mechanism Example 
To define Setting of standards Environmental 
minimum with respect to control, 
acceptability production Health and 
criteria for Safety Code 
market activity 
Setting standards Weights and 
with respect to Measures, 
products and services composition, 
transacted Design 
Setting standards Recognised 
with respect to qualification 
persons certification 
and licensing 
Whatever the nature of the standard, the setting of 
standards per se is a means of differentiating between 
accgptability and unacceptability in relation to 
selected criteria. Three objects to which standards are 
applied have been identified for the purpose of this 
analysis, production, products and persons. 
Fundamentally any mechanism requiring, defining or 
prohibiting behaviour is an intervention to set 
standards. Normally the mechanism used to set standards 
is through the legal framework where enforcement is 
achieved by making non-standard activity illegal. 
However there are other methods to achieve the effect of 
removing non-standard activity such as the development 
of standards through market necessity such as 
voluntarily standardising through the British Standards 
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Institution so as to enhance exchange. The setting of 
standards by trade associations or professional bodies 
is equally valid, which although not government 
determined may be government encouraged. 
Intervention by government to set standards is 
exceedingly varied and complex. However this complexity 
is associated with the mechanisms adopted to achieve the 
objective rather than the objective itself. Each 
mechanism has a number of dimensions in which the 
operation of the standard is different in some respect. 
For instance the standard may set a required outcome 
leaving transacting parties free in the method chosen to 
achieve the outcome (for instance in the case of setting 
product standards). Alternatively standards may directly 
affect the form of the transaction which has an 
indirect impact upon the outcome of the transaction (as 
in setting qualification standards for individuals). 
Standards set in relation to production include the 
required use of certain production techniques,. such as 
those designed to minimise noise and pollution or 
protect the safety of employees. The setting of 
standards in relation to products or services produced 
includes defining performance criteria such as voltage 
in relation to electrical products or the strength of 
materials used. Quality standards can be set for 
products either in relation to the raw materials used in 
their manufacture (such as gold or silver standards) or 
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in their performance (as in the case of car safety 
standards). Design standards are also used though mainly 
in respect of product safety, for instance car bumpers 
or childrens' toys. 
Intervention to set standards in relation to persons 
involved in transactions includes the use of legal 
recognition for selected professional qualifications. 
Doctors, dentists, solicitors and barristers for 
instance must obtain legal recognition by passing a 
government recognised professional qualification before 
they can legally practice. Government can also intervene 
to allow only persons holding a licence to practice 
certain business. This may in some cases be associated 
with obtaining a recognised qualification or may require 
the licence holder to conduct business in a certain way. 
This approach is to ensure a minimum quality of 
practitioner and in some cases it could be argued that 
the state education system is an intervention to promote 
standards via nationally recognised qualifications. 
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2.6.4 Intervention in Respect of Collective Action 
Table 2.4 Intervention in Respect of Collective Action 
Objective Mechanism 
To maintain Restrict 
competitive industrial 
pressure concentration 
Promote 
industrial 
concentration 
Restrict 
anti-competitive 
activities 
Control Assigning legal 
Collective rights to 
Action association 
Financial 
assistance 
Example 
Monopoly and 
Merger Controls 
Agricultural 
Co-operatives 
Restrictive 
practices 
legislation 
Trade Union 
, recognition, 
Funding of 
consumer 
organisations 
Tax advantages to 
charities 
Government intervention in relation to collective action 
can be viewed from either an economic or social 
perspective. From a purely economic perspective the 
objective of government intervention is to reduce some 
forms of collective action since they distort the 
operation of the market mechanism. As industries 
concentrate so the opportunities for monopoly power 
increase. Measures to prevent industrial concentration 
such as monopolies and mergers legislation are justified 
upon the grounds of promoting efficiency through 
competition. Conversely authority can be used to 
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encourage concentration such as in the case of 
agricultural co-operatives to gain the benefit from 
collective action. 
Control over industrial structure may not preclude 
collective action through collective conduct through 
agreements between different companies. Therefore 
intervention by government is also aimed at restricting 
the opportunity for agreements of this kind. For 
instance requiring the registration of agreements 
between companies in relation to customers, prices and 
production. Similarly the recent takeover of Rowntree by 
Nestle highlighted the possible construction of the 
market as the European market not the national market. 
Under this construction one company could legitimately 
exist as a sole UK supplier. 
In some circumstances a recognition that collective 
action is inevitable leads to intervention by government 
aimed at securing at least a balance of power between 
different and economically opposed groups within the 
economy. This cannot be justified purely in terms of 
rectifying market failure since it is also as a result 
of social and political considerations. Protection of 
the right for unions to organise labour was a result of 
political and social pressure to promote a balance 
between the interests of individual workers and a 
collective management. This intervention could not be 
justified by purely market considerations since it 
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promotes collective action. Similarly the tax and 
financial assistance given to voluntary organisations 
and charities serve to promote acceptable collective 
action. It could be argued that the direct funding of 
consumer organisations such as the National Consumer 
council is also a means of securing collective action in 
direct response to a perceived risk of a power imbalance 
between transacting groups. This may be the motivation 
behind the establishment of OFTEL and OFGAS as consumer 
'watchdogs' to the recently privatised British Telecom 
and British Gas organisations. 
2.6.5 Intervention in Respect of Price 
Table 2.5 Intervention in Respect of Price 
Objective Mechanism Example 
To influence 
transaction 
prices 
Requiring price 
disclosure 
Petrol prices, 
Menu prices 
Publishing price 
information 
Tax and subsidy 
setting price 
'reasonableness' 
Price surveys 
Cigarettes, 
Petrol, mortgage 
tax relief 
Extortionate 
credit 
regulations 
To determine Direct price Postal rates, 
transaction setting prescription 
prices charges. 
Intervention by government in respect of price is 
perhaps the most fundamental market intervention because 
of the central role played by price in the market 
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allocation mechanism. There are two main objectives to 
price intervention. The first is to influence 
transaction prices, but not directly setting the final 
transaction price. The first mechanism to influence 
transaction prices is to require transacting parties to 
disclose price before the transaction. This mechanism is 
closely associated with information provision yet the 
purpose is to influence exchange price not solely to 
increase the volume of information available. This is 
most applicable to relations between business and 
consumer where without price disclosure the consumer 
would be unable to compare prices between suppliers and 
so unable to make an informed purchase decision. This 
was the underlying rationale for legislation to require 
petrol prices to be displayed outside petrol stations so 
that motorists can compare prices without stopping. As 
well as requiring pre transaction disclosure the 
government in common with intervention in respect of 
information can publish price information and thereby 
influence transaction price. This has been achieved 
through organising monthly publication of market prices 
for various agricultural products as well as collection 
and dissemination of the retail and wholesale price 
indices. 
Transaction price can be influenced by government using 
taxation and subsidy. This mechanism alters the true 
market price but does not set it. An example is the use 
of taxation to raise the wholesale price of petrol which 
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influences retail price but does not determine the 
price. The reasons for affecting an increase in market 
price may be collection of revenue or dampening of 
demand such as in the case of cigarettes or alcohol. 
Subsidy can be used in the same but opposite way to 
reduce a market determined transaction price. 
A stronger market intervention with respect to price is 
using authority to set market prices directly either on 
purely economic grounds to influence demand or on social 
grounds to reduce market price for particular groups. 
One example of this is the use of coupons or vouchers in 
combination with money or making some goods or services 
free, dental services for pregnant mothers or free 
prescriptions for older persons. This type of 
intervention is relatively easy to administer and its 
effect can be immediate. As such taxation and subsidy 
feature prominently in most governments' approach to 
market intervention. 
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2.6.6 Intervention in Respect of Direct Allocation 
Table 2.6 Intervention in Respect of Direct Allocation 
Objective Mechanism Example 
To substitute ownership of Nuclear 
market production Power 
allocation 
Rationing Food, 
petrol 
Franchise North Sea 
Production oil 
Licences, 
TV 
stations 
Proscribe market Police, 
allocation Prisons 
The most fundamental intervention in markets by 
government is where the authority of government is used 
to over-rule the market allocation mechanism. The 
government dictates the allocation of resources on 
criteria other than those associated with market 
allocation. 
The first identified mechanism for achieving a 
substitution of the market is where the government owns 
the means of production. This mechanism has been used by 
successive governments in relation to public utilities 
and industries which were considered to be of strategic 
economic importance to the UK economy. In these 
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circumstances while the market has been substituted 
because firms are not free to enter production the 
criteria of market allocation still persist because the 
government owned sectors perform, to a degree, as 
private firms. For instance the government's ownership 
of the Post Office does not mean a free postal service 
or ownership of British Rail does not mean a free 
railway system, although theoretically possible. In both 
cases government ownership has not precluded the 
criteria used in market allocation yet it does offer the 
possibility of supply decisions not being determined by 
purely market considerations. 
The mechanism of substituting the market yet allowing 
market allocation criteria to operate can also be seen 
where government franchises production. Instead of 
owning the production it allocates for a fixed term the 
rights to exploit a particular market. The franchise at 
renewal can be continued or withdrawn. This system 
operates in the case of North Sea oil production and in 
the granting of franchises to independent television 
production companies. Again a feature of this mechanism 
is not the apparent removal of market allocation 
criteria but the potential to do so if the government 
desired. 
One mechanism whereby the market is completely replaced 
is where the government rations the allocation. This can 
be achieved by issuing every individual with a voucher 
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or coupon entitling the holder to a specified amount. 
This mechanism was used to allocate staple foodstuffs 
during the 1940's and was suggested as a means of 
allocating petrol in 1974. 
Clearly, in some circumstances government must allocate 
resources on the basis of criteria entirely 
contradictory to the market allocation. Market 
substitution in these circumstances is complete since 
government authority is used to prevent market 
provision. Examples of this kind of intervention are 
difficult to identify because of the prevailing 
government view that the market should have the 
opportunity to provide goods and services in all 
markets. As a consequence, nuclear power once restricted 
to government provision is to be transferred to the 
private sector. Provision of a police force and prisons 
is still restricted to government provision though in 
the latter case this too may soon be transferred from 
sole government provision. 
The objectives, mechanisms and examples of different 
types of government intervention considered provide a 
framework for examining government activity in response 
to specified market failures. 
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2.7 Analysis of Forms of Intervention 
It is clear from the above analysis that government uses 
its authority to intervene in markets to acheive a 
number of objectives and is not restricted solely to 
tackling observable market failures. Because government 
authority derives from a socio-political dimension, the 
market cannot restrict the nature or extent of any 
intervention. Consequently the form of government 
intervention is as much dependent upon the philosophy of 
particular governments as on the perceived magnitude of 
market failure. The mechanisms for acheiving the 
objectives of intervention are varied and dynamic. As 
such they should not be viewed as either static or 
acting in-isolation. Government action and the operation 
of the market mechanism are inextricably linked in the 
present economic environment, one cannot be viewed 
without the other. However the general framework 
presented does allow a useful analysis of government 
intervention and identifes some of the main policy 
objectives. 
So far government intervention has been considered in a 
very broad sense and has included intervention in both 
consumer and producer environments based upon a number 
of objectives associated with market failure. At this 
stage of the thesis the focus will be narrowed to 
consider intervention with a single objective, the 
provision of consumer protection. 
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2.8 The Role of Consumer Protection 
In common with the forms of intervention outlined above 
the rationale for intervention in the market in order to 
acheive consumer protection is based upon a loose 
adaptation of the market-failure approach pursued so 
far. Ramsay(1984) and (1985) stresses the rationale(s) 
of efficiency and equity and points to the pursuit of 
consumer sovereignty as the underlying objective of 
consumer protection policies. As such, it could be 
argued that any intervention by government aimed at 
reducing or eliminating market failure is one of 
consumer protection. However, consumer protection 
policy describes any intervention specifically aimed at 
transactions between business and consumer and is 
characterised by intervention designed to regulate 
unfair trading practices and provide greater consumer 
information. In order to describe this specific form of 
government intervention two fundamental questions need 
to be addressed: first in what sense the word consumer 
is being used, secondly from what do consumers need 
protection. 
In answer to the first question the term consumer means 
in this context any individual acting as a, private 
citizen who purchases goods or services for the purpose 
of their own or their houshold's consumption. The key 
element here is the distinction between consumer as 
applied to business, government, groups and individuals 
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who all consume things at one level or another and 
consumer as applied to the private individual purchasing 
goods for their own consumption. It is in the latter 
context in. which "consumer" will be used. 
The second question, and one which raises a number of 
issues is what these individuals need protecting from 
and what is the role of government in intervening to 
secure this protection. The first stage in identifying 
the scope of consumer protection is the recognition and 
acceptance that consumers have a set of 'rights'. These 
rights form the basis of an agenda for intervention. in 
1985 the United Nations adopted a set of guidelines for 
consumer protection based upon a set of rights first 
identified in 1962. While mainly adopted to provide 
guidance to third world countries they have become 
generally accepted as the cornerstone of any 
comprehensive consumer policy, see Harland(1987). These 
rights are: 
1. The protection of consumers from hazards to 
their health and safety. 
2. The promotion and protection of the economic 
interests of consumers. 
3. Access of consumers to adequate information to 
enable them to make informed choices according 
to individual wishes and needs. 
4. Consumer education. 
5. The availability of effective consumer 
redress. 
6" Freedom to form consumer and other relevant 
groups or organisations. 
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Government intervention to pursue all or any of these 
objectives can be considered consumer protection policy. 
The mechanisms to achieve these obectives encompass all 
forms identified above. Koopman et al(1986) identify the. 
government's role in relation to consumer protection as 
only basic protection. Additional protection is provided 
through consumer and business self-regulation with some 
government responsibility and finally self-regulation 
with no government involvement. This taxonomy identifies 
government as providing a structure for consumer 
protection upon which other forms of regulation can be 
built. Indeed this relationship between direct 
intervention and self regulation is a feature of UK 
consumer protection. 
2.9 Conclusion 
So far a general framework for considering government 
intervention has been presented based upon the 
identification of over-riding rationales. The objectives 
associated with these rationales can be pursued through 
a number of individual policies or by pursuing a number 
in combination. Within this general framework, 
intervention to pursue consumer protection cuts across, 
all these general classifications since consumer 
protection encompasses information provision, structural 
controls, legal rights and so on. This is the root of 
consumer policy. 
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It is intervention to protect consumers that provides 
the basis for the following analysis of intervention 
within a specific market context and a specific 
location. These are policies to pursue the objective of 
consumer protection in the Scottish second hand car 
market. 
r 
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Chapter 3 Government Intervention in the Second-hand 
Car Market 
3.1 Introduction 
The chosen sector for the following analysis of specific 
government intervention is that of the second-hand car 
market in Scotland. This market displays a number of 
features of market failure associated with deficient 
information in relation to both the quality and 
performance of both suppliers and the product. As a 
consequence of the problems experienced by consumers, 
this market has been the object of considerable 
attention by consumer pressure groups and by central 
government in the pursuit of consumer protection. A 
number of policies have been pursued to ameliorate the 
most significant market failures. But these mechanisms 
have been introduced on an ad hoc basis to deal with 
specific problems as they arise and do not form a 
coherent whole. The following study examines the 
structure and operation of the second-hand car trade and 
considers some of the existing forms of consumer 
protection policy. Following chapters evaluate the 
introduction of a specific consumer protection policy in 
Scotland aimed at improving consumer protection in this 
market. It should be noted that there is a considerable 
private market for second-hand cars but this will not be 
considered in any detail. 
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3.2 The Second-hand Car Market 
The motor industry is an important sector in most 
developed economies. Its operation has traditionally 
been prominent in the industrial strategies of developed 
nations, not only as a significant component of the 
manufacturing base but also as the provider of 
employment for many thousands of people, either directly 
or through related industries. Because of its prominence 
the motor industry has been researched by a number of 
different academic disciplines including historic 
(Dunnett 1980), sociological (Goldthorpe 1970) and 
economic analyses (Bhaskar 1979). A feature of this 
research has been the concentration upon the production, 
distribution and consumption of new cars. This focus 
ignores one important feature of the motor industry, 
namely the existence of a second-hand market which 
operates alongside the market for new cars. 
In order to understand how the second-hand car market 
operates and its relationship to the new car market it 
is necessary to differentiate between a new car and a 
second-hand car. This is not such an easy task as it 
first appears. One definition of a new car could be that 
it was a car that had never been driven. However all 
cars that come off the production line are driven to 
storage or in distribution and so all new cars have a 
delivery mileage. An alternative definition could be 
that a new car is a car that has never been owned by 
anyone other than the manufacturer or retailer. This is 
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equally unsatisfactory since it excludes the new cars 
sold by retailers to other dealers or registered as 
demonstration vehicles. A better definition would focus 
upon whether or not the vehicle had a registered keeper. 
However, this is also unsatisfactory since many 
suppliers register cars to themselves as a way of 
meeting manufacturers' sales quotas. The most 
satisfactory definition of a new car is that it has not 
been previously registered by a consumer. Therefore it 
is the number of first time registrations of-cars which 
indicates the number of new cars sold. 
New car registrations in the United Kingdom have been 
increasing steadily over the last ten years according to 
monthly statistics published by the Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders. In 1981 the number of new 
cars, registered was 1.48 million, in 1986 this had 
increased to 1.88-million with registrations exceeding 
2.3 million in 1989. Although likely to reduce to 
between 1.9 and 2 million in 1990 the underlying trend 
is still upward. 
Each new vehicle sold has the potential to be re-sold a 
number'of times. This re-selling process establishes the 
fundamental link between the new car market and the 
second-hand car market. Quite obviously a car can be 
sold many times but it cannot ever be sold as-a new car 
more. than once. The total number of used cars in 
circulation at any one time is therefore a function of 
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the number of new cars sold In previous years, the 
length of ownership period for the new car owner and the 
life of the car. The value of this market is dependant 
upon, not only the total number of used cars in 
circulation but the frequency of transactions within any 
given period, which in turn is dependent upon the 
ownership periods of subsequent purchasers of new cars. 
Allowance must also be made for leakage in the system eg 
cars that are irreparably damaged and scrapped, or 
exported. This extensive and complex relationship has 
been modelled by Berkovec(1985) who provides a method of 
forecasting new vehicle sales based upon used vehicle 
scrapping and leakage rates. 
In this analysis, the definition of a second-hand car is 
a car which has been previously registered with a 
consumer. Therefore, changes in registered owners of 
vehicles provide the only sound basis upon which to 
approximate the size of the second-hand car market. 
Based upon information from DVLC, the Motor Agents 
Association and Glass's Guide there were approximately 
5.8 million transactions in second-hand cars in the UK 
in 1988. Of this number approximately 2.7 million were 
sold by the motor trade, the remainder are accounted for 
by private (consumer to consumer) transactions. Data 
based upon VAT returns puts the value of trade sales of 
used cars in 1988 at £7.4 billion (British Business 
1989). Trade estimates and those generated by this, 
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research put the value of used car sales from retail 
outlets in 1988 at between .6 and £8 
billion per year. 
The characteristics of the second-hand car market make 
calculation of the total number of second-hand cars very 
difficult. Despite the size of the second-hand car trade 
it has received very little attention because of a lack 
of statistical data and the fragmentary nature of 
second-hand car distribution. In this distribution 
channel consumers appear as both market suppliers and as 
final consumers, and sellers may in some circumstances 
also operate as buyers. This situation makes the 
marketing channel extremely confused and difficult to 
analyse. 
3.3 The Supply of New and Used Cars 
The motor industry is perhaps one of the most globally 
orientated production industries. Consequently the new 
cars sold in the UK come from a number of different 
countries. Domestic manufacturers supply their cars 
direct to the domestic retailer network based upon a 
franchise system. Foreign manufacturers distribute their 
cars using a concession arrangement. The concessionaire 
is the representative of the foreign vehicle 
manufacturer in the UK. Usually retained on time limited 
contracts, concessionaires are responsible for the 
import and distribution of the vehicles to the retailers 
tied to the concessionaire by the franchise system. 
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Despite the introduction of a concession into the 
distribution channel for foreign new cars, whatever the 
source of the vehicle it has to be sold-through a 
franchised car dealer in the UK. 
The source of supply for new cars is restricted through 
the franchise system but for used cars the supply 
sources are more varied. The first point to note is the 
existence of dual players in the distribution channel. 
Consumers are the first set of dual players. All car 
dealers offer a trade-in facility where the dealer will 
discount the price of the car sold by the value of any 
car which the consumer trades-in or sells to the dealer. 
So the consumer acts as purchaser and as supplier 
because very often the traded-in car is retained by the 
dealer and sold onto another consumer. In this 
framework the dealer too is a dual player acting as 
seller and as buyer. In addition there is also a trade 
supply network which revolves around the car auction. 
Cars received through trade-in which are not retained 
are disposed of through the auction and these provide a 
second source of supply for dealers. There are a small 
number of consumers who purchase from this trade supply 
attracted by trade as opposed to retail price but 
without finance, service, or guarantee facilities and no 
legal rights of redress this is a particularly high risk 
source of supply for consumers. 
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3.4 The Distribution of New and Second-hand Cars 
The retailing of new cars is not typical of the 
retailing industry in a number of respects. The first 
and most important difference is that a potential new 
car seller (new car dealer) must obtain a franchise from 
a new car manufacturer before he can sell new cars. 
Manufacturers will not supply cars to retailers who do 
not hold one of their franchises. Each manufacturer 
issues only a limited number of franchises in a 
particular area. Consequently despite a limited move 
toward multi-franchise retailing, dealers do not offer a 
complete range of competing brands. From an individual 
consumer's point of view this involves a greater degree 
of physical search with a need to visit a number of 
retail outlets to be able to see the range of competing 
products. The franchise system and the conditions 
attached to franchises by the manufacturers present 
significant barriers to entry in the distribution of new 
cars with manufacturers holding tight control over 
supply and in many cases the operation of the retail 
outlets. 
New car retailing is closely associated with the after- 
sales service and repair function. This is reinforced by 
manufacturer's warranty and servicing requirements for 
the new cars sold, which tie the new car to the 
retailing garage for all repairs etc in the first one or 
two years. Emphasized by the franchise system, each 
franchised retailer is a specialist in selling and 
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maintaining a particular make of car. All franchised 
garages sell second-hand cars alonside new cars, there 
are no businesses which operate solely on anew car 
basis although there are businesses which operate solely 
on a used car basis. The only differences will be that 
some of the purchase facilities supplied by the car 
manufacturers such as low cost finance or extended 
warranties will not be available to the second-hand car 
purchaser. These facilities will be provided by the 
retailer or in the case of warranties by an insurance 
company. 
The first major difference between the retailing of used 
as opposed to new cars is that used car sales are not 
subject to the franchise system. Any dealer can sell 
used cars of whatever make and in whatever quantity. 
There are no barriers to entry in used car retailing. 
Consequently there are a variety of different forms of 
used car retailing outlet. The first type of outlet is 
the franchised dealer who sells new and used cars from 
the same premises with similar service provision for 
each. The second type of outlet comprises those dealers 
who do not hold a new car franchise and concentrate 
solely upon used car selling. These dealers vary from 
those who emulate the franchised dealer selling from 
showrooms, through the forecourt dealer selling from a 
caravan or small office, to the back street dealer very 
often selling from home. Because they are not managed 
through a franchise system they locate in high 
102 
population areas. One usual feature of the dealer who 
sells only used cars is the absence of service and 
repair facilities especially in the latter two 
categories of the forecourt or back street dealer. 
Finally if the consumer wishes to purchase a second-hand 
car they can buy the car direct from the seller without 
using dealers or auctions. This is the private sale 
usually through classified advertisements in local or 
national newspapers. The advantage of this type of sale 
is that the price is usually considerably lower because 
there are no business margins to support. There is more 
diversity in the retailing of second-hand cars than the 
retailing of new cars because of the control of the 
latter through the franchise system. 
The consumer is faced with a number of choices. In the 
first instance a decision must be made about whether to 
purchase a new or used car. If a new car is chosen this 
will determine the type of retail outlet the consumer 
approaches, based upon the preferred manufacturer. If a 
used car is chosen then a choice must be made whether or 
not to purchase privately (direct from another consumer) 
or from one of the many retail outlets. Because there is 
no franchise requirement for used cars, each make of 
used car could theoretically be obtained from each 
different type of outlet. To this extent the choice of 
outlet for a used car purchaser is considerably more 
varied than that for a new car purchaser. 
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In choosing a second-hand car the amount and quality of 
information required is greater than when purchasing a 
new car. This need for more information reflects the 
diversity of product and outlet and identifies the 
underlying problem for consumers in this market and will 
be considered in more detail below. 
3.5 Consumer Problems in the Used Car Trade 
The consumer's vulnerability in making purchase 
decisions in this market is particularly acute. There 
are substantial risks involved, including the financial 
risk of buying a car that is fundamentally faulty: the 
so-called 'lemon'. Consumers in this market are often 
keen to buy fairly quickly but the product is both 
complex and highly differentiated. When choosing a new 
car there is ostensibly no difference between particular 
cars within each model or manufacturer category. 
Evaluation takes place upon the basis of model and 
particular car. For a used car buyer, in addition to the 
make and model evaluation there is an added dimension 
which may or may not be recognised; that individual cars 
within make and model categories are also different. 
This increases the need for information for purchasers 
of second-hand cars. This is compounded by the fact that 
there are few if any reliable indicators of a car's 
relative value. 
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Widespread fraud and falsification also contribute to 
the increasing level of consumer complaints in this 
market which in 1988 amounted to 13% of all complaints 
received by Trading Standards and Citizens Advice 
Bureaux. However, estimates from the Office of Fair 
Trading and from this research indicate that less than 
10% of actual complaints to dealers are ever referred to 
these agencies so in reality the 85,000 complaints 
recorded could represent nearly a million per year. 
3.5.1 Consumer Purchase Behaviour 
To analyse the purchase of a second-hand car, purchase 
behaviour must be systematised so that comparison 
between different purchases can take place. This 
systematisation of consumer buying behaviour considers 
observable behaviour to be the result of a decision 
process comprising a number of distinct stages. The 
exact nature of these stages and the influences upon 
consumer behaviour at each decision stage are reviewed 
by Arndt(1986). 
The hypothesis of rational, pro-active and foresightful 
consumer decision making may be flawed in many respects 
as Foxall(1986) points out, yet as a framework for 
focussing study, the rational decision model is a useful 
vehicle. A simplified version of the model first 
presented by Engel(1966) appears as Fig 3.1. For each 
decision it is assumed that the consumer follows this 
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sequential process although depending upon the 
circumstances, the decision may display different levels 
of complexity. In this model complexity is dependent 
upon the level of personal involvement the consumer 
experiences in relation to the purchase. Where 
involvement is high the decision process is 
characterised by extensive information search, 
exhaustive evaluation of alternatives, and complex 
choice strategies. 
Figure 3.1 Schematic Model of Consumer Decision Process 
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For the purpose of this analysis the effect of 
establishing high involvement is to emphasize the 
consumer's need for information. Bloch and Richins(1983) 
identify involvement(importance) as being determined by 
two sets of factors in combination with the individual's 
personality; first, product characteristics and second 
the situational context in which the purchase is made. 
1. Product Characteristics: 
Time-commitment 
Price 
Symbolic Meaning 
Performance Risk 
2. Situational Context: 
Time Pressure 
Social Environment 
Physical Environment 
Purchase Situation 
Intended-Use Situation 
3.5.2 Product Characteristics 
The second-hand car exhibits a number of characteristics 
which suggest that the consumer's decision making 
behaviour would display all the features of a high 
involvement decision. The time commitment to a second- 
hand car is significant both in terms of the life of the 
product and, the pattern of usage. A second-hand car is 
also a high priced product and carries with it high 
levels of risk related to its performance both in terms 
of its potential safety and also the financial risk 
associated with a possible 'lemon'. The price/risk 
relationship in this market was investigated by Hjorth- 
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Andersen(1988). Finally, a car has a high level of 
symbolic meaning to the purchaser, it projects an image 
of the purchaser and an image of the purchaser's 
lifestyle for others to view. 
3.5.3 Situational Context 
Classification of a product as prompting either high or 
low involvement on the basis of situational criteria is 
inappropriate because while product characteristics 
remain relatively constant situational characteristics 
are multi-variate. However, two of the dimensions above, 
time pressure-and intended use situation, are"directly 
related to product characteristics. Time pressure at 
time of sale is likely in most cases to be minimal 
because of the amount of time allocated to the purchase 
as a whole, second, 'intended use' has close association 
conceptually with 'symbolic meaning'. 
3.5.4. The Role of Risk 
Involvement in this context and the associated need for 
information is highly associated with the degree of 
perceived risk and as Laurent and Kapferer(1985) point 
out this element of the purchase is a significant 
antecedent of involvement. 
When buying products and services consumers are often 
affected by the perception that the particular purchase 
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involves risk. The nature of the risk is the belief that 
the purchase has the potential to cause some kind of 
loss. This loss may be financial, for example the danger 
of losing money on the purchase because of product 
failure. It may be physical loss because the product may 
be unsafe and physically harm or damage the purchaser. 
The loss may be psychological, associated with the 
evaluation of the purchase by others, or the loss may be 
associated with time, for example the time spent 
responding to product failure and the cost of 
alternative provision. 
Bettman(1973) and Locander(1979) suggest that risk is 
associated with certain characteristics of the product 
and of the purchaser. Product features associated with 
high perceived risk are those with such properties as 
high price, high technological complexity and newness in 
terms of purchase frequency. Features of the purchaser 
associated with high perceived risk are inexperience in 
product purchase and the attachment of high importance 
to the product. The purchase of a used car displays 
these features and can be considered a purchase in which 
the consumer perceives a high degree of risk. The 
consumer response to risk is either to search for more 
information about the product or to look for indicators 
or clues which approximate more information and 
therefore reduce risk. In terms of both involvement and 
risk, the purchase of a second-hand car requires 
considerable information. 
109 
Where information is unavailable consumers respond by 
invoking the risk reduction strategies. While these are 
primarily directed at the product the consumer may use 
non-product information as proxy. Both of these 
information strategies have limited capacity for 
reducing actual risk in this market because of both 
product and situational factors. 
3.6 The Consumer Information Problem 
The crux of the problem faced by used car purchasers is 
information asymmetry between the buyer and the seller 
which was a concept first introduced by Ackerloff(1970). 
In the context of the second-hand car market this is 
characterised by a situation where the person selling 
any second-hand car has much more information about its 
use, condition and probability of future performance 
than the buyer. Because communication between buyer and 
seller is organised and initiated mainly by the seller, 
the exact nature of the information communicated is 
determined by corporate objectives and not by consumers' 
information needs. Corporate objectives can be best 
served in the second-hand car market by restricting 
detrimental information. 
Information about a car can come from a number of 
sources. However two generalised sources can be 
identified; its physical condition and information which 
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is associated with the product. The physical attributes 
of the car consist of both seen and unseen elements or 
more formally visible and verifiable attributes such as 
the colour, the number of doors, the vehicle make. In 
addition there are also invisible and unverifiable 
physical attributes such as condition of engine parts or 
performance of components. 
The associated information can be thought of as either 
mandatory information or discretionary. Mandatory 
information would include ownership documents, MOT 
certificates and Road fund Tax. Discretionary 
information would include details of the previous owner, 
repairs and maintenance carried out and also general 
impressions about reliability and the condition of the 
car and the circumstances of its purchase by the dealer. 
In the transaction between a seller, (a second-hand car 
dealer) and a consumer, information communicated by the 
attributes of the car both physical and non-physical can 
be manipulated by the dealer to alter the information 
communicated to the consumer. 
Physical attributes can be enhanced by cleaning, 
respraying, fitting new upholstery and body trim or even 
reducing the apparent mileage. Similarly negative 
attributes can be suppressed via short term engine. 
adjustments; underseal, body filler etc. The associated 
information provided about the car can also be filtered 
by prominent attention or by suppression. For instance, 
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concentration upon the good character of the previous 
owner, regular servicing etc and suppression of 
knowledge that the car was originally sold because of 
reliability problems or an indication that major repairs 
were imminent. The consumer is presented with a product 
information package in which very little information is 
not subject to possible filtering by the dealer in order 
to achieve corporate objectives. This situation can be 
represented diagrammatically as in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 Role and Properties of Dealer Information 
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In assessing the extent of information asymmetry in this 
market due to the filtering mechanism explained above, 
some standard must be established with which comparison 
can take place. The problem is in identifying precisely 
what consumers' information, needs are before any 
assessment can be made of available information and so 
the extent of the consumer information deficit. The 
problem of identifying these needs is well. documented. A 
number of studies, Morris & Bronson (1970), and Maynes 
(1976) and (1979) have attempted to measure the 
information deficit in terms of financial loss incurred 
by not buying products of the highest quality at the 
lowest price. An approach by Sepstrup (1981) and Resnik 
(1977) analyses the information content of advertising 
on the assumption that advertising is the main source of 
product information for consumers and that any 
information deficiency causes an information deficit for 
consumers. The approach taken by Grunert(1984) uses 
perceived risk as an indicator of information need on 
the basis that consumers search for information about 
specific products in an attempt to remove perceived 
risk. Grunert ranks a number of risks associated with 
buying a car where bodywork proneness to rust, engine 
proneness to defects, and limited durability are the 
highest ranked of 82ýrisks. The common feature of these 
risks are that they all relate to future performance of 
the car and this is where information is most deficient 
for consumers. With little or no expertise, consumers 
must rely upon visible verifiable information as well 
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the information provided by the dealer to make their 
pre-purchase evaluation. As such some information 
particularly in relation to invisible or unverifiable 
attributes such as mechanical condition, is not 
available to consumers unless provided by the dealer or 
paid for in the form of an independent survey. 
To approximate this information some attributes can be 
considered predictive attributes for consumers in 
relation to the car's future performance. It is the 
filtering of these predictive attributes which offers 
the car dealer the greatest opportunity to attain seller 
objectives. Each filtering incurs a cost and that cost 
can be recouped where the filtered predictive 
information leads to a reduction in perceived risk and a 
sale. 
only information with a sufficiently high predictive 
value would be subject to filtering because of the 
calculation of relative costs and benefits. Where the 
sign of the predictive attribute is negative, that is it 
indicates that the car will not perform adequately in 
the future, then the information is either suppressed or 
enhanced. If the sign of the predictive attribute is 
positive and it suggests that future performance will be 
adequate then the attribute is enhanced. Information can 
be categorised according to this predictive dimension 
and by the propensity for filtering. This is shown in 
Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 Predictive Value and Filtering Potential of 
Second-hand Car information 
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If this construction is accepted, by identifying those 
attributes which dealers alter most readily it is 
possible to identify those attributes which in the 
dealer's mind have the highest predictive value for 
consumers. Three attributes in*particular have a high 
propensity for alteration by the dealer: 
1. The Age/mileage ratio 
2. Visible physical condition 
3. Previous ownership 
3.6.1 The Age/Mileage Ratio 
It is generally accepted that an average mileage for a 
car is between 10 and 12,000 miles per year. 
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Consequently a one year old car with 30,000 miles 
displayed is deemed to be a high mileage vehicle. In 
general the higher the ratio between age and mileage 
(for cars of the same model) the lower the value of the 
car. Because mileage is used by both consumers and 
dealers alike to give some guide to value, one problem 
for consumers is the practice of 'clocking', turning 
back the odometer to increase the perceived value of a 
vehicle. This is especially prevalent in cars which have 
an exceptionally high mileage but which are relatively 
new in all other respects. It is estimated that reducing 
the mileage by 1000 miles adds £100 to the value of the 
car. There is no certain way of telling whether or not a 
car has been tampered with in this way except by 
contacting all the previous owners until a discontinuity 
is discovered. As a consequence this ratio is extremely 
unreliable on the mileage side of the ratio. The Office 
of Fair Trading estimated in 1979 that as many as 50% of 
ex-company cars had been 'clocked'. In 1987, estimates 
by ITSA suggest that 22% of second-hand car sold by 
dealers will have been clocked at some stage in their 
history. 
3.6.2 Condition of Bodywork and Interior 
This is the most superficial of ways to asses the value 
of a second-hand car. It is anticipated that a second- 
hand car which has been 'looked after' will look like 
new, in particular with an absence of rust, dented 
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bodywork panels, and damaged upholstery. It will be 
characterised by shining paintwork and chrome with clean 
and fresh upholstery. Unfortunately it is this visible 
part of the car that can be so easily changed. Dents can 
be filled, rust sprayed over with paint, upholstery 
cleaned with chemicals that smell of new car upholstery. 
This source of information is also unreliable and 
capable of manipulation. 
3.6.3 Previous Owner 
Second-hand cars are still sold on the basis of 'one 
lady owner' and undoubtedly the character of the . 
previous owner is associated with particular levels of 
car care. consumers are suspicious of company cars 
because of the supposed lack of care exercised by non- 
owner drivers and the high-mileage and high speeds. 
Traditionally preference was for the private, 'preferably 
female, previous owner on the basis that women were more 
careful drivers. This information about the previous 
owner can also be manipulated against the interests of 
the consumer. Fleet cars can be registered in the name 
of the dealer selling the car, or in the name of the 
person who used the car rather than the company. However 
increasingly dealers and consumers are experiencing a 
reversal in preference with company cars favoured over 
those privately owned on the basis of the regular 
servicing and care received by company owned as opposed 
to privately owned cars. 0 
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3.7 Substitute for Information 
It has been established so far that objective 
information about second-hand cars is not only limited 
but may be subjectýto manipulation by sellers. As a 
consequence the search for more information to reduce 
risk makes little absolute contribution to risk 
reduction even though it may be perceived by-the 
consumer to be beneficial. An alternative strategy to 
searching for more information is to search for clues 
which provide summary information. These clues can be 
considered substitutes for actual information. 
Roselius(1971) has suggested that consumers-reduce-risk 
by using risk relievers, such as buying only well known 
brands, or buying products which have been bought 
previously and found to be satisfactory. In the second- 
hand car market these risk relievers, substitutes or 
proxies of product information, are as likely to consist 
of an evaluation of the dealer in terms of premises, 
types of cars sold or elements which constitute dealer 
reputation as of the car itself. 
The absence of complete and reliable information about a 
second-hand car and the existence of the information 
filter controlled by the seller puts a great onus upon 
the integrity of the dealer. Situational factors also 
become part of the evaluation process for consumers. For 
instance whether or not the business is 'reputable', 
whether faults will be disguised and whether complaints 
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or faults will be dealt with if they arise after 
purchase. The evaluation of these situational risks by 
consumers is difficult to assess because individual risk 
perception may be based upon previous personal 
experiences and word of mouth communication. 
In summary, consumer problems in this market hinge upon 
access to reliable information. The infrequency of 
purchase, the high degree of product differentiation and 
complexity, coupled with the high financial cost 
characterise a market viewed by many consumers as a 
lottery. The inadequacy of information on the consumer 
side of the transaction also presents an opportunity for 
the unscrupulous through fraud and deception. Finally 
consumers may face problems in obtaining redress if 
their purchase proves unsatisfactory but this involves a 
discussion of the market and non-market responses to 
these problems which follows. 
3.8 Market and Non-Market responses to Consumer 
Problems in the Buying of Second-hand Cars 
There have been a number of market and non-market 
responses aimed at providing consumers with both more 
information to improve the efficiency of their choices 
and protection from deception and fraud to reduce the 
perceived risk associated with the purchase. In both 
market and non market responses there are elements of 
information provision and protection. 
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3.8.1 Market Responses 
The responses generated by the market are in a number of 
different forms but can be categorised as follows: 
a. Car buying Guides 
b. Warranty and Guarantee 
c. Inspection Services 
d. Code of Practice 
3.8.1(a) Car Buying Guides 
In response to market demand for more information about 
second-hand cars a number of car buying guides have 
emerged. For the most part these guides concentrate upon 
comparing cars on the basis of cost, size or performance 
because this data is relatively easy to collect. This 
information is providing the basis for computerised 
information retrieval systems based upon reported stock 
and consumer preferences on a network basis, see 
Brockhoff(1985). The 'Which? ' car buying guides went 
further by using data on personal experiences to compare 
cars on reliability and maintenance costs. Research 
conducted by Friedman(1987) suggests that this type of 
, aggregate experience information 
is reliable in 
predicting future experiences with particular models of 
car for particular problem areas. Information in buying 
guides also provides information on what to look for 
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when buying a second-hand car, some of the 'tips of the 
trade'. In many cases these are based upon the 
information contained in car buying guides so that 
particular points are identified in relation to 
particular makes or models of car. The specialist 
information sources are complemented by press and media 
coverage of a more general nature. However it should be 
pointed out that the number of consumers who consult 
these sources of information before purchase is 
extremely small and indeed, given the nature of the 
product most of this information may be of limited 
practical use. 
3.8.1(b) Warranty and Guarantee 
To reduce the risk associated with the purchase of a 
second-hand car all dealers now offer some form of 
guarantee that the car will perform satisfactorily fora 
specified period of time. This has proven particularly 
attractive to consumers as it provides some degree of 
security in purchase reducing the potential cost of a 
bad choice. However the details of a guarantee, what 
type of product failure is covered by the promise to 
repair or rectify, are based upon those components which 
are statistically less rather than more likely to fail. 
The offer of this type of security is a logical market 
response to consumer apprehension but is entirely 
voluntary. This is different to the mandatory warranty 
121 
requirements in the US which were investigated by 
Metzger(1983) and subsequently by Mason(1986). 
3.8.1(c) Inspection services 
As outlined above the consumer is disadvantaged by not 
having the necessary expertise to gain access to the 
unseen part of the vehicle. The market has responded to 
this by providing expertise. The inspection services are 
available by hiring independent professional car 
inspectors either directly or more usually through one 
of the main motoring organisations. Inspection services 
by the Automobile Association and the Royal Automobile 
Club. have proved to be successful because they are 
perceived to be independent of the motor trade. However 
the cost of such an inspection discourages general usage 
and is still restricted to under 10% of second-hand car 
purchasers in the UK. In a recent move some second-hand 
car dealers are now paying an independent examiner to 
inspect all their second-hand cars for faults before 
they are sold. This forms part of the risk reduction 
strategy characterised in the main by warranties and 
guarantees. It is a feature of the second-hand car 
market that consumers are not equally 'lemon' averse and 
that the use or non-use of these facilities are 
dependent upon their evaluation of the actual costs and 
perceived benefits. 
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3.8.1. (d) Code of Practice 
The code of practice is perhaps the most comprehensive 
and far reaching market response to consumer problems in 
the motor trade. Because the code of practice goes much 
further than controlling just information, it includes 
controls over complaint handling and dealer integrity. 
As an alternative to a non-market response, codes of 
practice have a number of advantages both to the trade 
participants and to the consumer. A code of practice is 
a set of trading rules by which a group of businesses 
within an industry agree to abide. The group usually 
comprises members of a trade association who agree as a 
condition of their membership to observe a code of 
trading practice. The purpose of the codes are to 
increase standards of service and product quality, to 
provide an effective means of handling consumer 
complaints and to ensure that consumers are provided 
with at least a minimum of product information. The 
content-of a code of practice is vetted to ensure that 
it promotes consumers' interests and not just those of 
participants. From a market point of view the existence 
of a code-of practice offers an opportunity to avoid 
legislative control by central government. For the trade 
association the existence of a code can encourage new 
members since for participants there are marketing 
advantages to be gained from advertising compliance with 
the code. For consumers, code of practice membership is 
a means of reducing the amount of information required 
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by providing a standard of consistent if. not higher 
levels of service and information. 
Observance of the motor industry code of practice is 
required of all members of the three main motor trade 
associations in the UK, the Retail Motor Industry 
Federation(RMIF) formerly the Motor Agents 
Association(MAA), the Scottish Motor Trade 
Association(SMTA) and the Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders(SMMT). The code provides for minimum service 
standards for repairs, the provision of comprehensive 
car warranties, an independent system of arbitration for 
consumer complaints and the provision of pre-sales 
information in relation to second-hand cars which 
details any faults found with the vehicle and any 
repairs carried out. 
However codes of practice in general and the Motor 
Industry Code of Practice in particular have been 
criticised for failing to achieve any improvement in 
trading standards. This assumes that an improvement can 
be measured in this context, a problem highlighted by 
Cousins and Pickering(1979). This general criticism 
raises issues about the suitability of trade 
associations to administer the codes. First, the only 
sanction for non-compliance by members is expulsion from 
the association which conflicts with the recruitment 
objectives of a trade association. Very few companies 
have ever been expelled from a trade association. 
Secondly those companies within the trade association 
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and observing the code are often not those whose trading 
behaviour would be improved by code compliance. Those 
outside the trade association are either unable to 
fulfil entry requirements or unable to meet the demands 
of code compliance. Moss and Richardson(1984) point to a 
general failure of codes of practice to promote product 
and service quality, provide adequate complaint handling 
systems or to achieve majority support from industry 
members. A review of the code by the Office of Fair 
Trading(1986) pointed to many inadequacies but 
concentrated upon low compliance rates. Tala(1987) 
suggests that the weakness of this type of 'soft law' is 
based upon difficulties in organisation and supervision. 
To this perhaps should be added compliance which is 
severely undermined without adequate enforcement and 
sanction. 
3.8.2 Non-Market Responses 
Non-market responses to consumer problems in the second- 
hand car market have concentrated upon intervention with 
respect to legal rights and intervention to set 
standards and have not been concerned with any mandatory 
disclosure of information by sellers or control over 
market entry. 
3.8.2(a) Legal Rights 
The legal rights with respect to second-hand cars are 
the same as those with respect to any goods purchased in 
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the UK. There are no special legal rights associated 
with the purchase of second-hand cars. These rights are 
contained in statute and by virtue of government 
authority are effectively written into every consumer 
transaction, between a private individual and a business 
and cannot be removed. Because these rights apply to 
such a wide variety of goods they are predictably vague 
and this inexactitude has meant that the protection they 
afford in this market is marginal. The Sale of Goods Act 
1979 makes it a requirement that all goods sold to 
consumers should be of merchantable quality, fit for the 
purpose intended and as described. A failure in any of 
these conditions causes the sale to become 'voidable' on 
behalf of the consumer. This means that the consumer may 
reject the goods and reclaim the cost or be entitled to 
compensation. At first sight these would appear to be 
substantial legal rights held by consumers. However upon 
examination they begin to look less robust and because 
they are 'post event' and based upon redress have little 
direct impact upon the market offering. 
The first problem is that they apply to sales between 
business and consumers. In the second-hand car trade 
there are a number of small back street businesses which 
do not declare their business status. As such the 
consumer is deceived into thinking that they are buying 
from another consumer and so are deceived into thinking 
that the rights are not applicable. The second problem 
is in the interpretation of the terms contained in the 
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legislation. Merchantable quality is particularly 
nebulous and has caused problems for the courts as well 
as consumers in seeking-a clear understanding in 
practical terms. For instance is a car which needs 
repairing 14 times in 9 months merchantable? At present 
the courts believe that it is because the construction 
of the legal right is that it applies at the time of 
sale or reasonably soon after. Similarly the right to a 
product fit for its purpose and as described has been 
the subject of different interpretations all of which 
have diluted the use of legal rights by consumers in 
this market. It is also a feature of English law (though 
not Scottish) that the consumer should beware. 'Caveat 
emptor' is used to put the onus upon consumers' 
evaluation of products rather than the sellers' 
disclosure and as a consequence it is notable that there 
is no right to any information about products from the 
seller, only that any information supplied is reasonably 
accurate. This is in contrast to the situation in a 
number of other countries where there is a legal right 
for consumers to certain information about the car. 
These 'disclosure' laws, most prominent in the United 
States, have also come under some criticism by 
Grossman(1981), Pratt and Hoffer(1986) and Nicks(1987) 
who all failed to find evidence that they have 
contributed to any overall increase in product quality. 
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3.8.2(b) Standards 
The second area of non-market response is the setting of 
standards. These apply both to the information supplied 
to a second-hand car purchaser and also to the condition 
of the vehicle. All descriptive material applied to 
goods in a transaction between a private individual and 
a business must be truthful. This control is contained 
in the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. If information 
applied to a product either written, verbally applied by 
the seller or even implied by the seller is false, then 
the person who communicates the information commits a 
criminal offence. For instance the mileage which appears 
on a car is deemed to be a description. Consequently if 
the mileage has been falsified then the dealer is 
liable. Similarly if a car is described as having had 
'one lady owner' when in fact the owner was the Queen 
and it was driven by the armed forces, the description 
is false and the person who communicated that to the, ' 
seller can be prosecuted. All information supplied by a 
business to a consumer in relation to goods and some 
services is covered by this legislation. But again this 
control over quality only applies to information 
disclosed voluntarily by the seller and some descriptive 
information available from the product. 
The standard applied to the goods in this market is that 
the second-hand car be roadworthy. The Road Traffic Act 
1961 requires that all vehicles used on the road should 
have passed a Ministry of Transport test and that they 
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remain roadworthy. While it is clear that a car which is 
unroadworthy is also unmerchantable it is not clear 
whether a car that is roadworthy is merchantable. 
3.8.2(c) Enforcement and Advice 
Private legal rights must be enforced by the individual 
and those offered by the Sale of Goods Act(1979) for 
instance, rely totally upon an individual consumer 
obtaining enough evidence to take court action against a 
seller. This area of consumer law is complex and the 
pursuit of redress becomes daunting. In recognition of 
this, government through local administration offer free 
advice to consumers on whether their legal rights have 
been infringed and the various routes of redress open. 
This is supplemented by private legal advice from 
solicitors and independent advice available from 
Citizens Advice Bureaux which is both central and local 
government funded. The non-market responses by 
government are also enforced by local government 
officers and by the police both of whom prosecute on 
behalf of the state. 
3.9 Conclusion 
In total, the measures to protect consumers in the 
second-hand car trade have provide some degree of 
protection given the particular circumstances of the 
market. The feature of-consumer protection in this 
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market is that the non-market responses have been 
applied not to this specific sector but to all sectors 
of the economy and all goods. The only market specific 
(product specific) intervention is the code of practice 
which is market generated. However, all the present 
forms of control both market and non-market generated 
have inherent deficiencies. The information responses, 
either in requiring disclosure or controlling the 
quality of voluntarily disclosed information, have 
proved of little use to consumers because of the lack of 
adherence in provision. A monitoring survey by the 
OFT(1986) found a significant lack of adherence to the 
pre-sales information provision by observers of the 
code. Similarly where information is provided for 
instance in the form of a pre-sales inspection report, 
it is often of little use because of deficiencies in the 
way consumers make use of it. This was one of the main 
findings of Pratt and Hoffer(1986) in their study of 
used vehicle disclosure laws in the United States and is 
also remarked upon in Anonymous(1984). There is also 
some debate about the possible information overload 
caused by requiring product information disclosure, see 
Grossman(1981). Controls over the quality of the second- 
hand car-are equally ineffectual since they give an 'as 
is' assessment which does not reliably predict future 
performance or past history. Because both government 
and the industry have generated their own responses to 
consumer problems in this market and with different 
rationales, while the volume of control is significant, 
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the substance of the control is undermined by its ad-hoc 
nature. In response there have been a number of 
suggested ways in which both market and non-market 
responses can be consolidated. The duty to trade fairly 
and safely is one suggested OFT (1987), but this again 
is economy wide and its effectiveness in dealing with 
specific markets and specific sets of problems may be 
limited. In Scotland in 1982 a system of licensing was 
introduced for second-hand car dealers which at the time 
of its introduction was heralded as a solution to the 
consumers' problems in the second-hand car market by 
both government and industry. The evaluation of this 
claim forms the basis for the following chapters 
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Chappter, 4 Licensing as a Form of Market Intervention 
4.1 Introduction 
In responding to consumer problems in the second-hand 
car market, a number of different policies have been 
pursued by government. These have been non-market 
responses via direct intervention in the form of 
legislation and the encouragement of market responses 
such as the recognition of voluntary codes of conduct. 
The following discussion considers occupational 
licensing as one approach which has the potential to 
provide a unifying framework for consumer protection in 
the second-hand car market. This form of control is 
government regulation of the market for private 
services. Its application in Scotland to second-hand car 
dealers is the first of its kind in Europe although a 
number of non-European countries have adopted licensing 
for this type of activity. Such an approach has a number 
of appeals such as the control over product quality and 
service standards and the provision of more information 
for consumers. However licensing also has some 
undesirable consequences including the restriction of 
competition and the protection of monopoly power which 
may outweigh the advantages for consumers. 
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4.2 Definition of Licensing 
Licensing is a term which has a number of connotations 
and is used in a variety of contexts. Licensing can be 
operated by businesses who allow other businesses to 
produce their products usually in another country. The 
originator of the product by giving a licence is 
signalling assent or permission for the licence holder 
to undertake a particular activity. Similarly, licensing 
can be used by governments to permit the development of 
natural resources such as oil and gas or to allocate 
resources such as airline routes and radio wavelengths. 
The power of licensing is that the permission is 
specifically limited to the licensee and as such the 
body issuing the licence(s) may restrict the number 
issued and so restrict the permission to undertake an 
activity. It is a very specific form of control. The 
focus of this chapter is upon the licensing of 
occupations and considers the framework for the 
licensing of second-hand car dealers in Scotland. 
Occupational control by government is a specific 
constraint upon the practice of a specific profession 
introduced by government or its agencies. It is a form 
of government control although in many cases the 
authority is delegated to the professional group itself 
possibly in the form of a professional association or a 
professional licensing board. 
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4.3 Occupational Control by Government 
occupational control in the UK is undertaken by both 
Government and by professional organisations. The 
substance and nature of the controls vary from one 
occupation to another. Friedman(1962) makes a 
distinction between three different types of 
occupational control: registration, certification and 
licensing. Each of the three types is characterised by 
different levels of control where registration displays 
the least and licensing the most control. 
4.3.1 Registration 
Registration is a process where the individual is 
required to enter their name on a register held by a 
central organisation either public or private. The 
addition of the name does not require any test of 
competence and its use is primarily for the registering 
body to maintain a list of those practising an 
occupation rather than to control or restrict in any way 
who should be able to register. Registration on a 
voluntary basis is rarely used since it has little 
benefit to participants. For the registering body 
compulsory registration may be desirable in the 
interests of keeping taxation or other centrally held 
records complete. In some professions such as those 
operating in the public health arena, 'registered' 
practitioner implies some test of competence such as 
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registered nurse. Where there is any test or criteria 
used to prevent registration this is not a registration 
system but a certification or possibly a licensing 
system. 
4.3.2 Certification 
Certification is a process by which authority is granted 
to an individual to use some kind of title which implies 
recognition by the certifying authority. This is on the 
basis that the individual has achieved some pre- 
determined level of competence. This competence could be 
achieved by serving time as an apprentice or passing a 
set of examinations. Certification does not preclude or 
bar anyone who is not 'certified' from practising a 
particular occupation although those who are may be 
given higher status. For instance in the UK there is 'a 
distinction between an accountant and a chartered 
accountant on the basis of certification. 
The effect of certification is to provide information to 
consumers as to the competence of an individual. It 
achieves this by grading providers into at least two 
categories, certified and uncertified. Information about 
relative degrees of competence adds to market 
information and can enhance competition by allowing 
smaller providers to compete in quality terms with 
larger providers. In addition Wiscusi(1978) and 
Ackerlof(1970) suggest that in markets characterised by 
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quality uncertainty, high quality providers may be 
driven out unless there is some means such as 
certification which allows them to differentiate their 
product. 
However, certification also has a number of weaknesses, 
in particular the assumption that the achievement of an 
educational standard ensures an improved quality of 
delivery fora considerable period of time after 
certification. In addition there is no mechanism for 
ensuring that the certified provider is competent across 
all tasks at all times. 
4.3.3 Licensing 
Licensing is a process whereby authority is granted to 
an individual to practice a particular occupation. The 
issuing of the licence implies some satisfaction of pre- 
determined conditions set by the licensing authority. An 
important distinction between licensing and 
certification is that under licensing those persons who 
do not hold a 'licence are prevented from participating 
since the licensing body uses-its authority to prevent 
unlicensed practice. A further distinction is that under 
certification the recognition cannot be removed whereas 
under licensing, permission to practice may be withdrawn 
and the licensee may have to re-apply periodically for 
permission to continue to undertake the licensed 
activity. At present, in the UK there are two distinct 
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forms of licensing control. These have been termed 
positive licensing and negative licensing. In the former 
arrangement, a person must possess a licence from a 
licensing body in order to trade and if the licence is 
withdrawn or refused then the person will have to cease 
trading. The licensing scheme operated under the 
Consumer Credit Act 1984 by the OFT is an example of a 
positive licensing system. By contrast The Estate Agents 
Act 1979 introduced a negative licensing system. Each 
practising Estate Agent is deemed to hold a notional 
licence to practice. New entrants are also deemed to 
hold a notional licence. However the notional licence 
may be withdrawn or suspended in circumstances of fraud 
or malpractice. If this occurs then the person is barred 
from participating in the occupation. 
Once in place a positive licensing system relies upon a 
set of sanctions to ensure compliance. These sanctions 
range from the mild, such as a small fine or even being 
reported to the licensing authority, to the severe which 
is ultimately the withdrawal of the licence to trade. In 
practice withdrawing a licence may be difficult to 
justify. If withdrawal will bar the individual or 
company from continuing to operate completely, there may 
be social costs to take into consideration. In most 
practical applications licensing operates on the basis 
of deterrence. There is always a possibility that the 
licence could be withdrawn. It should not be implied 
that there is a high degree of turnover in existing 
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licensed provision through licence withdrawal. It has 
been suggested that this deterrent effect motivates 
businesses to maintain quality and resolve disputes with 
customers informally and so contributes to meeting 
licensing objectives. There is no evidence to support 
this assertion. 
4.4 Rationale for occupational Licensing 
Occupational control in Europe has its roots in the 
medieval guild system which required tests of competence 
before individuals could pursue a trade in any of the 
recognised crafts. In'West Germany this still exists 
with a classification of skilled trades for which a test 
of competence is required. Licensing has developed into 
one of the most powerful tools of control by government 
over business activity. It has proliferated throughout 
Europe, Australia and the USA and is now applied to a 
variety of occupations and professions and is 
administered by a variety of organisations on the basis 
of delegated authority. 
In the UK licensing has been far less frequently used by 
government than in the USA or Canada where there has 
been a phenomenon described by Gellhorn(1976) as 'the 
rising new professions'. In his critique of the 
proliferation of licensing, Gellhorn identifies 
collections of people employed in semi-skilled or 
specialised jobs such as hair dressing, undertaking, or 
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librarianship who aspire to professional status. 
Licensing is seen as a means to achieve this 
professionalism, not only because historically entry to 
the professions was licensed but also because those 
already practising could enhance their own status by 
insisting upon entry conditions which they themselves 
could not meet. There has been less pressure from 
'aspiring professions' for licensing in the UK and so 
there has been little impetus for any proliferation of 
the licensing of occupations by government over and 
above that which has a considerable tradition. There are 
some notable exceptions such as the introduction of 
licensing of individuals who sell alcohol, the licensing 
of doctors, pharmacists and others concerned with 
health. But in the*UK, in common with other developed 
economies licensing has also been applied to other more 
diverse occupations such as taxi-drivers and market 
traders. 
The rationale for government engaging in the licensing 
of occupations rests upon the argument that licensing 
contributes to public welfare or more colloquially 'is 
in the public interest'. This is a dominant theme in 
Moore(1961), Rose(1979), Jaffe and Corgel(1984)"and 
Pazderka and Musondo(1984) who all present variations on 
the public interest argument. Obviously, the exact 
meaning of 'the public interest' is debatable but when 
applied to a policy it can be seen as signalling that 
such a policy (a) achieves a just balance among all the 
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relevant interests that should be taken into account and 
(b) that the policy is consistent with generally 
accepted principles fundamental to the economic, 
political and legal system. The common thread is that 
public welfare however defined can be served through the 
resolution of specific market failures which relate to 
consumer transactions in identifiable markets. In this 
way a just balance is achieved between the relevant 
interests and the resolution is consistent with the 
pursuit of market efficiency. 
4.5 Arguments in Favour of Licensing 
Licensing those who participate in an occupation is a 
mechanism to achieve the resolution of specific market 
failures over a specified category of transactions. 
There are three arguments in favour of this solution 
mechanism; First that the provision of information by 
suppliers can be controlled both directly through 
specific requirement and implicitly through the 
imposition of entry requirements on the occupation. The 
second argument relates to the setting of quality 
standards which improve the overall quality of 
provision. Finally, licensing offers consumers 
protection from the provision of goods and services that 
would do them physical or economic harm. 
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4.5.1 Improved Information 
The argument that licensing improves information. 
provision rests upon the assertion that in some markets 
consumers have insufficient or inadequate information 
upon which to bass their purchase decisions. As a 
consequence the decisons reached are sub-optimal and so 
contribute to market failure. This is as a result of the 
information asymmetry referred to in Chapter 3. The 
effect of licensing in this context is to improve 
overall provision both directly and indirectly. The 
direct contribution is achieved through the existence of 
entry requirements which set a common minimum standard 
for practitioners. This can be construed as either an 
increase in overall information provision' implied by 
consumer knowledge of the entry standard or as a 
reduction in consumers' need for information necessary 
to assess different offerings. In either case there is 
an overall improvement in information provision in the 
market. 
The existence of entry requirements may also have an 
indirect impact upon the quality of information. It is 
argued that because licence holders may have to satisfy 
entry requirements and are subject to the sanction of 
licence withdrawal they will be less likely to provide 
misinformation to consumers. In addition, the licensing 
authority may decide to require licence holders to 
provide certain relevant information to consumers as a 
141 
condition of holding a licence such as the derivation of 
fees. The licensing authority may also be able to make 
use of economies of scale in information attached to 
their position by using the information provided by 
licence holders during application and re-issue for 
their own monitoring purposes. This could be used to 
improve market information or be fed back into re- 
defining the entry requirements. 
4.5.2 Improving The Standard of Provision 
The second argument in favour of licensing is the 
improvement in the standard of provision. This argument 
was most recently put forward by Dorsey(1980) and Carrol 
and Gaston(1981) and points to improvements in the 
quality of service achieved through licensing. it is 
argued that wherever the licensing standard is set above 
the level of the lowest quality offered, the average 
level of quality is improved because the lower quality 
provision will be excluded. Leland(1980) estimates that 
the exclusion of the bottom 22% of the quality 
distribution will increase overall welfare by 9%. in 
Figure 4.1 a normal quality distribution is assumed with 
a quality mean xl. With imposition of a licensing 
standard above the minimum already available the mean 
quality moves to x2 resulting in a net improvement. 
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Figure 4.1 Effect of Licensing upon Quality Distribution 
A further argument is that consumers are unwilling or 
unable to correctly evaluate quality because of the 
information deficiencies associated with asymmetry. In 
the first case where consumers are unwilling there may 
be both third party effects and a contribution toward an 
overall reduction in public welfare, although the second 
case is more closely associated with asymmetry. The 
impact of failure to discriminate between low and high 
quality is that low quality standards displace higher 
quality standards because the price buyers are willing 
to pay converges toward an average price across all 
4 
Low Quality X1 X2 High Quality 
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quality levels in the market. As a result of this 
average price in relation to the total quality 
dispersion, the high quality providers are not 
adequately rewarded-for their offering andýas a result 
either leave the market or reduce the quality'of their 
offering in line with the average available. This 
phenomenon identified by Ackerloff(1970) as 'adverse 
selection', explains the impact of information asymmetry 
although it must be stressed that this argument rests 
upon the existence of a quality/price relationship. The 
consequence of licensing is to maintain a level of 
quality above that attainable in a competitive market 
which displays information asymmetry. The impact of 
licensing upon quality may be emphasised by 'weeding E 
out' those who feel that they would be unable to meet 
the standards applied before a system is fully 
operational. This may have the effect of improving mean 
quality before licensing is introduced. 
4.5.3 Improving Consumer Protection 
One of the most widely voiced arguments in favour of 
licensing is that it protects consumers from: 
'incompetent, dishonest, financially irresponsible, 
unsafe and unsanitary provision'. 
Rose(1979) page 190. 
Whatever the precise nature of the entry standards set 
for licence holders, honesty and other measures of good 
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character are implicit if the public interest rationale 
is pursued. Licensing would provide protection for 
consumers against incompetent provision which may injure 
or damage them and the setting of standards for 
providers rather than for transactions economises upon 
enforcement costs. This argument rests upon the 
reduction of social costs achieved by licensing. 
Continued transgression of practice standards could be 
prevented by withdrawing a licence and thereby barring a 
participant. Without licensing any transgressor could 
write off the cost of being fined or punished by the 
state against any benefits accruing from the activity in 
the knowledge that they could continue to practice. 
Finally, licensing could provide for easier resolution 
of complaints by consumers. Specifically, licence 
holders may be motivated toward settling disputes with 
customers informally rather than provoking formal 
complaint to the licensing body or seeking recourse from 
court action which in turn could jeopardise their 
licence. 
In addition to the benefits to consumers presented by 
licensing there are also benefits which accrue to 
government.. Licensing can generate a substantial amount 
of information about the occupation through the 
generation of complete lists of practitioners and 
knowledge about some of the more detailed elements of 
the occupation. This may be of value in future policy 
design. 
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4.5.4 Summary of Licensing Benefits 
The rationale for the licensing of an occupation is 
therefore to ameliorate market failure within an 
identifiable market by: 
i. Improving the overall provision of information 
in the market. 
ii. Improving the quality of provision by the use 
of minimum quality standards. 
iii. Protecting consumers from provision that would 
injure them physically or economically by 
virtue of insufficient information and low 
quality provision. 
I 
The only rigourous empirical examination of the argument 
that licensing serves the public interest by 
ameliorating these specific market failures has been 
presented by Leffler(1977) in his study of the American 
medical profession. This work was echoed by Leland(1978) 
in the results of his theoretical analysis of the impact 
of licensing. Leffler found that the imposition of 
varying minimum quality standards through licensing was 
as a direct result of differences in consumer demand for 
quality and not explainable by the activities of the 
profession themselves. As such he establishes a link 
between quality demanded by consumers and the effects of 
licensing. His conclusion was that licensing did 
increase public welfare in a number of cases by reducing 
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the effects of market failure. Leffler asserts that 
minimum quality standards of the type associated with 
licensing are socially desirable where information 
asymmetry is apparent because these markets reach 
equilibrium at sub-optimal quality levels. Conceptual 
exposition of the benefits of licensing have attraction 
in that consumer problems seem to be addressed directly. 
However, there is also a body of literature which is 
critical of licensing and casts doubt upon the 
attainment of these theoretical benefits. 
4.6 Criticisms of Licensing 
Associated with the advantages accruing to individuals 
and social welfare through the use of occupational 
licensing there are also a number of disadvantages. In 
particular the rigidity which is introduced into the 
market. On the 
social costs, 
innovation. on 
will over time 
configurations 
unable to keep 
supply side this may impose serious 
for instance by creating impediments to 
the demand side, changing consumer demand 
call for different types, standards and 
of provision. A licensed market may be 
pace with the necessary adjustments. 
A further argument is that licensing is pursued not in 
the public interest but in the interests of the 
practitioners of the occupations. Licensing is used to 
create a monopoly situation by reducing occupational 
provision. As such licensing contributes to, and does 
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not correct market failure. This would be particularly 
acute where the demand for the profession was inelastic 
due to either the absence of alternatives or if the 
cross-elasticity of demand for alternative provision 
were close to zero. 
Arguments which focus upon the negative effects of 
licensing can be summarised under the following 
headings: 
(i) Substitution effects 
(ii) Barriers to entry 
(iii) A reduction in the mobility of practitioners 
(iv) Restrictions on Information 
(v) Cost of administration. 
The effects of (i) and (ii) and (v) are tenable 
arguments against all forms of licensing, the arguments 
associated with (iii) and (iv) are not necessarily 
associated with all forms of licensing but have been 
cited as criticisms of particular licensing systems and 
as such are worthy of inclusion. 
4.6.1 Substitution Effects 
The operation of a licensing system assumes that 
entrants satisfy the entry requirements and 
corespondingly provide higher quality provision than 
those who cannot satisfy the entry requirements. However 
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consumers may still use unlicensed services. The choice 
facing the consumer is to buy the service provided by 
the licensed provider, to dispense with the service 
entirely (perhaps on the basis of increased cost), or to 
use some substitute service that falls outside the 
licensed domain. It is not clear whether the'net result 
of these substitution effects will be provision higher 
in average quality than if the licensing did not exist 
at all. 
4.6.2 Barriers to Entry 
Barriers to entry operate by the imposition of costs to 
potential entrants. As such they have a monopoly effect 
upon the licensed activity. These costs can be direct 
costs such as the licence fee or indirect costs such as 
the cost of meeting licence conditions. In all cases in 
the UK (with the exception of the negative licensing of 
estate agents) a licence has attached to it a licence 
fee. The fee could be a minimal charge or a substantial 
sum, but it does impose a direct cost on the new 
entrant. Direct costs have also been identified in 
situations where the profession require certain 
equipment or premises to be held. Indirect costs are 
associated with the meeting of any standards before the 
licence is issued. There is considerable evidence that 
indirect costs of entry are manipulated by the licensing 
authority. Gellhorn(1976) points to the use of residency 
requirements, which in the US were used in the 1930s to 
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exclude European immigrants from certain occupations. 
Maurizi(1974) in his study of doctors in California 
found evidence that examination pass rates were . 
manipulated according to demand and supply fluctuations 
in the market for the occupation. Padzerka(1984) 
analysed the earnings of 20 professions and identified a 
level of monopoly earnings among licensed practitioners 
lending support to the monopoly affect of barriers to 
entry. 
4.6.3 Reducing the Mobility of Licence Holders 
An argument put forward by Pashigan(1969) and 
Holen(1965) is that licensing can lead to a reduction in 
occupational mobility. In their studies of interstate 
occupational mobility in the US they found evidence that 
the lack of reciprocal recognition of licences between 
states meant that there were barriers to entry in 
operation within each licensing area. Shepard(1978) 
examined a similar occupational licensing structure and 
found evidence that where there was'non-reciprocity', 
the occupations operating within the protected 
environments had significantly higher fees. 
4.6.4 Restrictions on Information 
Where a particular occupation is prevented through 
licensing from advertising this has a negative impact 
upon consumers. Without' advertising consumers are likely 
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to be aware of a limited number of practitioners. This 
increases their search costs. This may also constitute a 
barrier to the entry of new individuals or businesses 
because the new entrant needs a long time to establish a 
viable customer base through reputation. Any restriction 
on advertising may also contribute to an increase in 
price dispersion such as that identified by Benham 
(1972) in his study of American optometrists. 
4.6.5 Administrative Costs 
The one practical consideration for government in 
deciding whether to introduce licensing, is the cost of 
the administration of the system. In many cases where 
the professional association will become the 
administering body this consideration of cost can be 
passed on for the profession to consider in relation to 
its own evaluation of benefits arising from the scheme. 
The determination of whether this cost is passed on to 
consumers or funded through fees is indeterminate. Where 
government is to administer the system, especially where 
it is a national licensing system as in the case of 
consumer credit licensing, a considerable administrative 
bureaucracy is needed. The cost of this administration 
would have to be carried either by government or by the 
licensees through the licence fee. The'balancing of 
public interest and private interest rationales by 
government may also include another element which is the 
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desirability of a large and costly administrative 
structure which may be politically unacceptable or 
conflict with government philosophy. 
The argument about whether or not licensing is effective 
from either the practitioner or consumer view point 
rests upon an evaluation of the balance between the two 
competing sets of arguments. Undoubtedly licensing has 
elements of both consumer interest and practitioner 
interest. On balance the empirical studies which have 
been carried out tend to give weight to the argument 
that the effect of licensing is to contribute toward the 
monopoly interests of the profession rather than the 
consumer interest although there are some informational 
benefits to consumers. There has been no systematic 
attempt to weigh these costs and benefits on a market 
basis. 
The existence of a large number of occupational 
licensing schemes around the world, especially in the 
USA could lead to the conclusion that government has 
been able, on balance, to establish that licensing 
offers some benefit to consumers. However it would 
appear that there have been few attempts by regulatory 
bodies to assess the impact of licensing on either the 
licensees or consumers. Further there is little apparent 
consensus on an optimal system design. 
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For this research licensing systems administered by the 
state are taken to possess the most clear expression of 
licensing objectives, first because licensing as an 
intervention in the market has a rationale albeit 
disputed. Secondly, those licensing schemes which are 
administered or operated by government or its agents are 
assumed to be operating on the basis of public welfare 
which in this context is the promotion of consumers 
interests. The purpose is to examine whether or not 
licensing by government can deliver the consumer 
benefits which it theoretically offers. 
4.7 Government Licensing in the UK 
In the UK, licensing conflicts with much of present 
government ideology. The accepted rule is that business 
should be free to set up without any form of government 
prior approval and operate with the minimum of 
interference. There are a number of exceptions to this 
general approach to regulation for instance where public 
health is at stake as in the case of Doctors, Dentists, 
Nurses and opticians. The rationale for licensing public 
health professionals is clearly one of public safety. In 
addition there are a number of other licensing schemes 
which operate such as taxis, market and street trading. 
Most of these licensing systems are operated by local 
government on the basis of local by-laws. Central 
government has been happy for these to continue but has 
not promoted their extension to other activities. 
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The Monopolies Commission(1970) published the results of 
its enquiry into the restrictive practices associated 
with the provision of goods and services by professions. 
This was the first detailed examination of occupational 
control by central government. In respect of licensing 
it identified situations where the monopoly effects were 
a danger but also where licensing could be defended on 
the grounds of public interest. This was the first 
statement of the criteria government used to weigh=the 
arguments for and against licensing. The Commission 
accepted that licensing was sometimes necessary-to 
protect consumers where the nature of the skills 
required for practice were such that minimum standards 
were desirable on the grounds of public safety. It 
concluded in Part 1 of the report, that restrictions 
based upon educational qualifications or training were 
equally unobjectionable. Certain kinds of character 
tests were acceptable because public interest could be 
endangered if a whole profession or occupation were 
brought into disrepute by the activities of a few. 
Restrictions on prices were considered the most 
dangerous feature of occupational control since they had 
the effect of raising prices unnecessarily. Complete 
freedom to advertise was considered to be a bad thing 
because consumers could fall into the 'trap of the 
incompetent' but to prevent price dissemination was 
adverse to public welfare. 
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In total the report was a, rather ambiguous statement but 
it appeared at the time to suggest that licensing was a 
viable policy for government to pursue. The report of 
the Crowther Commission(1971) into the credit industry 
recommended licensing as a way of improving upon 
existing consumer protection. It commented; 
"The protective measures in existence at present are all 
concerned with individual transactions... The more 
unscrupulous type of credit grantor may well take the 
view that the occasional check on his malpractices by a 
determined consumer in an isolated transaction is not a 
serious deterrent and is outweighed by the financial 
advantages he may derive from evading the law. " 
Volume 1 p255 
After the passing of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 which 
introduced a national licensing scheme, there have been 
brief periods of activity when licensing again seemed to 
provide a solution to pressing consumer protection 
problems such as those in the motor trade, insurance and 
estate agency. 
Since then, government ideology has changed to a 
position characterised by a reduction of government 
involvement in business activity. Indeed the Burdens on 
Business Report(1985) urged government to abandon all 
control over business. More specifically a recent report 
by the Adam Smith Institute(1989) recommends the 
dismantling of all current state licensing including 
that applying to the credit industry. The present 
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political climate is therefore not conducive to the 
introduction of licensing. 
4.8 Licensing for the Second-hand Car Trade 
Because of the prominence of the second-hand car trade 
in the type and volume of its consumer problems, 
licensing has been perceived by those outside government 
as means of providing consumer protection in this 
market. The present framework for consumer protection 
concentrates upon regulating outputs, such as rights of 
legal redress and criminal sanction. This type of 
approach is person specific and has a number of flaws. 
For instance, the negative outcomes from a transaction 
may be insufficient to take action, or the consumer may 
lack the information to know that they have the grounds 
for a civil or criminal action. The specific attraction 
of licensing is that it is a form of input regulation 
which is a more efficient form of control in meeting 
market wide problems. 
Specifically, licensing provides a framework within 
which dealers could be required to provide more 
information about cars sold and in addition a mechanism 
which would protect consumers from practitioners who 
would do them economic harm by manipulating information 
asymmetry. The proponents of this argument point to 
Australia where all states have legislation directly 
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concerned with the motor trade. In New South Wales the 
Motor Traders Act 1974 introduced a licensing system for 
second-hand dealers. The system provided for an entry 
qualification which is a reference to police criminal 
records to establish whether any criminal record exists 
which may compromise performance. There is also a 
financial test of the business to ensure that the dealer 
could meet the requirements of a statutory guarantee 
which is also in force. This requires the dealer to 
provide a guarantee on all vehicles sold for which the 
business is responsible and bear the cost of guarantee 
claims. There has been no published evaluation of how 
successful the scheme has been. 
Licensing for second-hand car dealers has also been 
applied in the USA in the state of Wisconsin. In this 
application of licensing the dealer is required to 
comply-with the Federal Trade Commission rules on 
disclosing known defects. The response has been to 
provide specific information about cars usually in the 
form of an inspection sheet which itemises the main 
components of the 'car and whether they have been 
replaced or repaired. Licensing authorities can require 
specific information disclosure as a condition of the 
licence. This system has been evaluated by McNeil(1979) 
who studied the impact of disclosure on low income 
purchasers and by Nevin and Trubeck(1977) although both 
studies suggested that the regulatory framework in 
Wisconsin had some severe shortcomings in both the 
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quality of disclosed information and in the 
administrative arrangements associated with its 
operation. In both cases there was a lack of data to 
explain the issues raised. 
The attraction of applying licensing to the second-hand 
car trade is closely associated with the solution of 
consumer problems identified in the previous chapter. 
Licensing may be able to contribute to consumer 
information by providing minimum standards in the market 
and may also be used to provide more direct information 
via information disclosure rules. At least in principle 
it can meet the major consumer protection objectives in 
this market. Entry requirements have an important role 
as they serve a dual function. The provision of more 
information to the market via this route may reduce the 
information burden upon consumers. In addition entry 
requirements may exclude those dealers considered most 
likely to distort or manipulate information from 
entering. 
4.9 The Application of Licensing to the Second-hand Car 
Market 
0 
Consumer Difficulties in the Used Car Trade(1980), a 
report published by the Office of Fair Trading 
highlighted licensing as a possible solution to consumer 
problems in the second-hand car market but it did add a 
rider: 
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A major factor .... has been the need to avoid 
creating public or private sector 
bureaucracies. We consider that any special 
licensing or registration regime designed 
specifically to meet the problems of the used 
car trade would have to show that there was no 
effective alternative means of control 
available, that adequate public or private 
sector resources were available to operate it 
and, of course, that it was likely to work" 
(P14 ) 
It is apparent that licensing did not have much support 
in the OFT and this is consistent with the general view 
of government that there had to be good reasons to 
institute such a scheme. 
A further report by the OFT in 1985 examined consumer 
problems associated with car servicing and repair work. 
This report again canvassed the idea of a licensing 
system for the motor trade: 
A licensing scheme for garages of the kind 
considered.. would ensure that all (or some, as 
the case may be) of the staff of a garage had 
minimum training qualifications or experience; 
that the garage had the minimum prescribed 
diagnostic equipment and that'the garage 
subscribed to certain commercial standards.. " 
(P23) 
Yet again the suggestion of licensing held a rider that 
the costs of such a system in terms of administration 
would outweigh any benefits. Since these reports from 
government, licensing has not been seriously pursued. 
Government has flirted with the idea but never acted 
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upon it because there was insufficient evidence that 
licensing would work set against substantial evidence 
that licensing would be expensive to administer. "In the 
1985 report the OFT commented upon a piece of 
legislation which had recently been passed in'Scotland: 
" Under Sections 9 and 24 of the Civic 
Government (Scotland) Act 1982, district 
authorites in Scotland may require second-hand 
dealers including car dealers to be 
licensed.... The exercise of the powers by some 
Scottish local authorites could therefore 
provide an opportunity to test the 
effectiveness of a licensing scheme as a means 
of raising standards.. and the Office will be 
watching these developements with interest" 
para 7.18 p(26) 
Despite the government attitude toward licensing between 
1980-85 which can be inferred from the above, 
legislation had been introduced which allowed for the 
licensing of second-hand car dealers in Scotland. It is 
clear from the above that the Government was unsure 
about licensing, but nevertheless had introduced a 
system in Scotland 1n 1982. 
4.10 The Licensing of Second-hand Car Dealers in 
Scotland 
The Civic Government(Scotland)Act 1982 cannot be 
considered a piece of consumer protection legislation. 
The Act contains a range of parts specifically designed 
to 'tidy up' the powers of local government in Scotland 
with respect to a variety of administrative operations, 
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for example the control of sex shops, minor offences, 
public processions and property of persons in police 
custody. In many cases these activities had been, in 
operation before the passing of the Act but on the basis 
of local by-laws. This legislation codified all existing 
laws into a single Act of Parliament. However the 
codification included a number of optional parts in the 
Act and this prevented local government from taking on 
board all the new powers contained in the legislation 
automatically. The first two parts of the Act concerned 
the licensing of specific activities. These included 
taxis and hire cars, second-hand dealers, metal dealers 
and a number of miscellaneous activities such as boat 
hire business, window cleaners and street traders. These 
activities were all identified as activities which could 
now be licensed. The category relevant here is the 
activity of second-hand dealing. 
Scottish local government operates upon a two tier 
system. The largest administrative units are regional 
councils of which there are nine. Each comprises smaller 
administrative units of local government known as 
Districts. Both Regions and Districts within them are 
elected bodies and operate with both shared and separate 
responsibilities. There are 53 District and 3 Island 
authorities in Scotland. For the purposes of this part 
of the Act all district and island councils in Scotland 
have the same status although in reality the island 
authorities also undertake some regional activities. 
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Under the legislation all district-and island 
authorities became licensing authorities. However, to 
activate the powers the district council had to pass a 
resolution to adopt them and in the case of second-hand 
dealing must specify within this category of activity 
which precise types of second-hand dealing now require 
to be licensed. It is through this mechanism that the 
licensing of second-hand car dealers was introduced in 
Scotland. Were it not for some specific references in 
the Act to features of the motor trade it could be 
argued that the licensing of second-hand car dealers was 
not the intention of Parliament yet the licensing of 
this occupation was clearly an anticipated consequence 
of the legislation. 
4.11 The Administrative Framework for Licensing second- 
hand Car Dealers in Scoltand 
Having adopted the powers to licence second-hand dealers 
by resolution and specified second-hand car dealing as a 
licensed activity the district must then design the 
licensing system. The legislation contains certain 
design characteristics which had to be incorporated in 
any system. These design characteristics are related to 
the documentation, procedural and operational 
activities. 
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4.11.1 Documentation 
Schedule 1 section 1 of the Act requires that the 
application for the issue of a licence should be 
received by the local authority in a specific form and 
it details the type of information required of the 
applicant. This includes details of the person 
(prospective licence holder) and details of the 
business. 
4.11.2 Procedural 
Once the local authority has received a licence 
application with the appropriate fee, a copy of the 
document must be sent to the Local Chief Constable and 
in most circumstances to the Fire Officer. At the same 
time the applicant has to display a public notice at the 
premises in which the business will take place stating 
that the application has been made. Similarly the local 
authority must give public notice that a licence 
application has been received. The purpose of this is to 
encourage objections or representations from the public. 
The local authority has a set period of time in which to 
process the application and arrive at a decision as to 
whether or not a licence should be issued. In reaching 
the decision the authority must consider whether or not 
the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold the 
licence. This applies to individuals, managers or 
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officers of'a company. -In addition other criteria have 
to be considered such as the suitability of the 
premises, and questions of possible public nuisance, 
public order or safety. In the event that the licence is 
not issued then the Act identifies a procedure for an 
applicant to appeal against such a decision to the 
licensing board of the district council. 
4.11.3 Operational 
Licences are allowed to run for a maximum of three years 
and for any period up to the three year limit. When the 
licence expires the authority must renew the licence or 
give reasons for not renewing it. This may be because 
the circumstances upon which the original issue decision 
was made have changed. For each licence issued or 
applied for there is a fee payable. The fee must be set 
such that the costs of operating the system are met but' 
should not be used to create a profit for the authority. 
The district can increase their licence fee at any time 
to keep pace with the increasing costs of providing 
administration. 
The Act also describes a set of conditions which must be 
applied to all licences issued. Second-hand dealer 
licence holders are required to keep records about the 
goods they handle. The detail' about precisely what 
information is required maybe specified by the local 
authority. However, for second-hand car dealers as a 
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specific category of second-hand dealer, the licence 
holder must keep a specific record of the vehicle 
mileage. 
Enforcement of these licence conditions is undertaken by 
'an authorised officer of the district council'. Any 
contravention of the licence conditions or any trading 
within a licensing area is a criminal offence punishable 
by a fine of £200. In addition, for dealers who 
contravene licence conditions or who are convicted of 
other offences which make them no longer 'a fit or 
proper person to hold a licence' the licensing authority 
has the power to suspend and/or withdraw a licence. This 
would have the effect of making the licence holder 
unlicensed and therefore unable to continue in business. 
This action also has a specified appeals procedure. 
4.11.4 Non-Statutory Characteristics 
The documentation, procedural and operational 
characteristics described above are common to all 
licensing carried out by district councils. In addition, 
there is facility in the legislation for districts to 
introduce a. number of their own design features, in 
particular the exact nature of the procedure used to 
judge applicants 'fitness' and the attaching of 
additional conditions to licences issued. The test of* 
any-procedure or condition introduced by the district 
council is that it be 'reasonable', This provides - 
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enormous scope for districts to design a licensing 
system that mirrors their own policy objectives. 
4.12 Conclusion 
The second-hand car market has been presented as a 
market in which consumer interests, especially with 
respect to information can be compromised. Licensing as 
a possible solution to problems faced by consumers in 
markets with asymmetric information has a number of 
attractions. However it may also introduce a number of 
anti-competitive effects. The establishment of a 
statutory licensing system for second-hand car dealers 
in Scotland is a form of occupational licensing by 
government even though the power to licence has been 
delegated to a local agency. Since the impetus for 
licensing has come from government such a licensing 
scheme should provide for the protection of consumers, 
complementary to the pursuit of the public interest 
" rationales for government intervention. 
The compulsory licensing of an occupation as a'policy 
option for government has the ability, in theory at 
least, to alleviate the problems presented. However 
there is also a potential cost to consumers of the 
reduction in competition which the adoption of licensing 
implies. The licensing system in Scotland for second- 
hand car dealers provides an opportunity to examine the 
impact of occupational licensing upon the second-hand 
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car market for both consumers and practitioners. In 
addition it allows for an examination of the efficacy of 
the administrative process for delivering licensing in 
the market and any problems associated with the legal 
framework identified in the legislation. 
167 
Chapter 5 Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an explanation of 
the methodological approach adopted in assessing the 
impact of second-hand car dealer licensing upon 
consumers in Scotland. The first part of this chapter 
lays the philosophical foundations of the method, 
drawing heavily on the realist approach to social 
science. The second part of the chapter applies the 
method to second-hand car dealer licensing in Scotland, 
in particular identifying the major features of the 
structure in relation to the realist approach. Finally 
individual methodologies will be developed associated 
with a number of identified elements of the licensing 
structure. 
5.2 Philosophical Foundation 
According to Williams(1981) the major philosophical 
debate in social science is between proponents of the 
idealist and realist positions. Each position has clear 
ideas about the acquisition of knowledge and the nature 
of reality as applied to social science research. The 
most influential statement of the idealist approach to 
knowledge and reality in this context is positivism. 
168 
Science is the method through which individuals try to 
understand, rationalise and predict events in the 
world around them. For the positivist, science and 
indeed social science can be condensed and summarised by 
a number of generalised statements or laws. These 
general laws attempt to explain relationships between 
separate, discrete events arising in the natural world. 
Explanation or prediction is the result of empirical 
testing or observation of these general laws. As 
Badcock(1984) states, 
" To explain something is to show that it is an 
instance of these regularities or laws; and 
predictions consist of the deducing of empirical 
consequences from such laws" p4. 
Observation by individuals is as Popper(1972) notes, 
dependent upon their own perceptions. Without the 
accumulation of bias free knowledge based upon 'pure 
observation' knowledge cannot be advanced further than 
the limitations of individual experience. 
The positivist therefore requires that pure unbiased 
observation (the cornerstone of scientific method) form 
the basis of knowledge. Positivists are not concerned 
with the mechanisms behind observable relationships 
believing that there are no logical or necessary 
connections in nature. 
The building blocks of the positivist approach to social 
science are the actions of individuals who operate 
independently in time and space. The aggregation of 
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individual action constitutes social phenomena. As 
Popper states: 
"All social phenomena and especially the functioning 
of all social institutions should always be 
understood as resulting from decisions and 
attitudes of participating individuals" 
quoted in O'Neil(1973) p187. 
This approach dominated social science methodology up 
until the late 1960's in the belief that by following 
the doctrine adopted by natural sciences the results of 
research would be credible given the prevailing 
philosophical approach. By the beginning of the 1970's 
positivism as applied to social science was being 
attacked on all sides. Three authors provide a summary 
of the main criticisms. Williams(1981) points to flaws. 
in the basic assumption that social science can be 
reduced to general laws on the basis that: 
1. Social structures do not operate independently of 
the systems which they govern. 
2. Social structures do not exist independently of the 
individual agent's conception of what they are 
doing. 
3. Social structures are relatively unenduring. 
Sayer (1984) in his criticism of positivist methodology 
points to deficiencies in the deduction of relationships 
from observed trends since this assumes a 'closed 
system' with the absence of externality. Finally 
Allen(1984) points to an untenable reliance of this 
method on the aggregation of individual events implicit 
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in the positivist approach. Events are added up with 
little or no consideration of the underlying 
relationships between them or why they exist. These 
criticisms make the use of a positivist approach to the 
study of policy unsatisfactory since government policy 
operates within a social structure, is subject to 
externality and does objectively affect individual 
behaviour. 
The opposing realist philosophy by contrast counters the 
criticisms levelled at logical positivism by providing a 
unifying framework within which social structures and 
the activity of individual agents can be accommodated. 
The realist approach put forward by Sayer(1984), 
Badcock(1974), Outhwaite(1979), and Bhaskar(1978) among 
others, is a significant shift in philosophy from that 
of logical positivism. The Realist approach is concerned 
with understanding the processes which have led to 
specific outcomes or events. This contrasts with the 
positivist approach which in search of a general rule 
concentrates upon using quantitative aggregation to 
identify broad trends, rather than seeking to identify 
the relationship between process and outcome. The 
realist approach does not deny the importance of 
aggregate data nor of quantitive analysis (indeed macro- 
analysis is an integral part of the realist methodology) 
but uses it to generate generalisations which are a 
necessary first step toward a more intuitive 
understanding. The realist methodology takes the broad 
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trends and through a process of abstraction seeks to 
identify mechanisms and causal processes which give rise 
to a particular event. This is in contrast to the 
positivist approach which attempts to determine the 
concrete from the abstract of an event. 
The effect of a mechanism from the realist perspective 
depends upon the conditions in which they work. A small 
change in conditions is enough to change the operation 
of a mechanism, ie the same mechanism can produce 
different results. The relationship between elements of 
process and outcomes relies upon the strength of 
causality. The realist view is that causality is not a 
relationship between discrete events (a simple cause and 
effect relationship) but the causal powers, or as Sayer 
calls them 'liabilities', of objects: 
"A causal claim is not about a relationship between 
separate things or events but about what an object 
is like and what it can do and only derivatively 
what it will do in any particular situation" 
Sayer (1984) p96. 
Whether such a causal power is activated depends upon 
the presence and configuration of conditions. In as much 
as objects have causal powers it is conditional as to 
whether they are activated or exercised. Further, when 
they are activated the effects will depend upon the 
conditions in which they work. The objects which 
constitute the conditions also have their own powers. 
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What is being described here is a method which consists 
of identifying an object, identifying its causal powers, 
then looking at the presence and action of conditions. 
upon the mechanism to explain events. It should be noted 
that this construction holds good only for the set of 
mechanisms and conditions which apply at a particular 
time. Implicit in this view is the recognition of 
process, events feedback into mechanisms although the 
time frame is not explicitly addressed. This approach 
has great attraction when considering the impact and 
operation of policy. 
5.3 Encompassing Methodology 
The realist perspective is particularly attractive in 
the analysis of a policy such as the introduction of 
licensing for second-hand car dealers in Scotland. Such 
an approach recognises the importance of conditions 
which mediate between policy objectives and policy 
outcomes which Kellas(1975) and Hunter and Wistow(1987 
and 1988) describe as policy 'means' and policy 'ends'. 
By contrast a positivist approach, while providing the 
necessary quantitative rigour common to both, cannot 
accommodate the roles of structure and mechanism which 
are so crucial in policy analysis. Using a realist 
framework presented in Figure 5.1 a methodology for 
asessing the impact of the introduction of licensing can 
be developed. 
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Figure 5.1 The Structure of Realist Causal 
Explanation 
Object Causal Power/ Conditions Events 
Liabilities 
p1# P2, P3i cl ---------- el 
x ----- ---------- c2 ---------- e2 
11 12 13 c3 ---------- e3 
1 cn en 
S 
Object X with 
Structure S... Possesses Causal 
powers p and Lia- 
bilities 1........ Under specific 
conditions c... 
will: 
(cl) produce no 
change ie 
not activated 
(c2) produce change 
of type e2 
(c3-n) produce change 
of type e3-n 
Source Sayer (1984) p98 
This approach is applied in order to develop an overall 
or encompassing methodology for this study. The 
important features of the realist framework are first 
the object. In the analysis of second-hand car dealer 
licensing it is licensing itself as a consumer 
protection policy which is the object under study. In 
recognising this, it is contingent that licensing exists 
within a structure consisting of all consumer protection 
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policy, -a series of policy approaches with common 
overall objectives which provides a foundation. 
Secondly, licensing as a specifc policy has a number of 
causal powers and liabilities. If the policy is 
activated and conditions correctly read, licensing has 
the power to achieve certain events. Conversely it must 
also be accepted that if conditions are not accurately 
read the policy may also have some unintended 
consequences. In this study it is the causal powers 
which will be assessed first and an analysis of 
liabilities at a later stage. 
As stated in chapter 4 licensing theoretically has the 
power to improve the provision of information, improve 
the quality of provision and protect consumers against 
injurious provision. The liabilities are the unintended 
consequences of licensing such as restricting 
competition in the market. Thirdly, there are a number 
of conditions which mediate between causal powers and 
the event. In this model these mediating factors impact 
upon the process of mechanism-event. In the context of 
licensing these conditions can be generalised to: 
(a) The district councils in Scotland who are given the 
power to licence and to design their licensing 
system. 
(b) The second-hand car dealers themselves in 
responding to the policy. 
(c) The activity of agencies other than district 
councils involved in the licensing process. 
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(d) The behaviour of second-hand car buyers in the 
Scottish second-hand car market. 
The event in this model is an impact upon the second-. 
hand car market in Scotland, which, at the outset of 
this study is an unknown. Having established the 
rationale and possible consequences of licensing second- 
hand car dealers, in a situation without mediating 
conditions the causal powers of the mechanism will lead 
to an event. By assessing the difference between the 
actual event and the anticipated event a measure of the 
difference can be arrived at. Such a difference 
intuitively leads to the conclusion that mediating 
conditions do indeed exist. The degree of difference is 
an approximation of the effect of the mediating 
conditions. In the specific context of licensing these 
conditions can be generalised and provide a focus for 
further investigation. This formulation can be shown in 
a revised version of Sayer's model above by keeping the 
structure but applying the detail (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Methodology for a Study of the Impact of Second 
Hand Car Dealer Licensing in Scotland 
(Object) (Causal Power) (Conditions) 
Licensing An improvement District. 
as Consumer in market councils in 
Protection information Scotland 
Policy 
The improved Second-hand 
quality of car market 
market T in Scotland 
provision 
Improved Action of 
protection involved 
from injurious Agencies 
provision 
Activities 
of second 
hand car 
purchasers 
in Scotland 
(Structure) 
Consumer 
Protection 
Policy 
(Events) 
Improved 
infor- 
mation 
Improved 
quality 
Greater 
protect- 
ion 
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5.4 Development of Approach 
Licensing as a consumer protection policy and the causal 
powers associated with it, ie the benefits as well as 
theoretical liabilities have been explained in Chapter 
4. In assessing the impact of licensing, the focus of 
attention is toward an analysis of the event in Sayer's 
structure which in this context is changes occuring in 
the consumer market place. In addition an analysis of 
the conditions which have mediated between the policy 
and the event which are outlined in Figure 5.2. 
Following this reasoning the methodology consists of 
four elements of primary research, each with separate 
methods to investigate the impact of the object 
condition on the mechanism of licensing. 
The four studies aimed at investigating the mediating 
conditions are: 
1. The design and operation of second-hand car dealer 
licensing by district councils in Scotland. 
2. The impact of second-hand car dealer licensing 
systems operated by district councils upon second- 
hand car purchasers 
3. The impact of second-hand car dealer licensing upon 
second-hand car dealers. 
4. The role of other involved agencies in the 
operation of second-handcar dealer licensing. 
Each of these provides the basis for a unifying 
framework in which to consider the combined operation of 
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mediating conditions and with which to understand and 
assess the impact of this policy upon the second-hand 
car market in Scotland. In keeping with this general 
approach it is important to recognise the 
interdependencies between the identified conditions. The 
four studies undertaken were not carried out at the same 
time but were part of a research process. The results 
from one study had an effect upon the detailed 
methodology for the subsequent studies. As a consequence 
each of the following chapters while 'standing alone' 
containing its own detailed methodology, survey design 
and analysis of results is linked by a developmental 
process which makes the order important. Once the four 
studies have been stated the subsequent chapter will 
provide a synthesis of each of the individual study 
chapters before presenting a final analysis of the 
impact of second-hand car dealer licensing. 
5.5 Limitations of Approach 
The limitations of this encompassing methodology are 
associated with the concepts of time, in particular the 
historical context of policy and the effects of time on 
the study. In addition are the identification and 
formulation of the generalised conditions which form a 
principal part of the analysis. Put simply, any policy 
does not operate in isolation. It may take time to come 
into effect and this is true not only of a newly 
implemented policy but also existing policy. Therefore, 
179 
in studying the impact of a particular policy, it has to 
be recognised that any causal effects identified have to 
be taken as a statement of 'what is' at a particular . 
time. The whole arena for this kind of study is dynamic, 
for it is part of a much larger process, that of social, 
political and economic change. In generalising the 
conditions applicable to this policy it is clear that 
they cannot provide a comprehensive statement of all 
things which impact upon this particular policy. The 
conditions for investigation have been chosen to provide 
as comprehensive a statement as possible within 
practical limitations. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Where there are four studies (as in this case) each of 
the components has to be taken as a series of separate 
statements about the nature and operation of conditions 
taken at different times in the process. Recognising 
this, a number of common themes have been built into 
each study which provide in some small part, a 
repetition of something appearing in a previous study in 
an attempt to assess the degree of change over time. In 
this way it is hoped that the process of abstraction 
which is at the core of this method will contribute 
toward a more detailed understanding of the licensing 
mechanism and allow time effects to be recognised if not 
controlled. 
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Chapter 6 Study 1: Licensing Systems Operated by 
District Councils 
6.1 Introduction 
In keeping with the overall methodology of the thesis 
the first requirement is to establish the nature of the 
conditions which mediate between the object and the 
event. The object in this case is the policy of 
introducing the licensing of second-hand car dealers to 
Scotland. The event is the improvement of consumer 
protection in the second-hand car trade through a change 
in the market conditions facing consumers. In this 
context, the first study is directed toward describing 
the framework for second-hand car dealer licensing in 
Scotland. The purpose is to establish the first level of 
implementation of the policy describing the transition 
from statute which is the embodiment of policy to 
administrative reality. 
The statute in question is the civic Government 
(Scotland) Act 1982 which came into force on the 23 
October of that year and gave district councils in 
Scotland the power to licence certain activities within 
their authority area including dealing in second-hand 
goods. Within the broad category of second-hand dealing 
including dealing in second-hand jewellery, clothing, 
furniture etc, districts could opt to licence second- 
hand car dealers. The Act gave district councils 
considerable discretion in the precise detail of the 
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second-hand dealer licensing system they introduced. 
This chapter reports upon a study of the ways in which 
district councils have applied the power to licence 
second-hand car dealers which is contained in the Act 
and investigates the ways in which licensing systems 
differ between district councils. Specifically the 
objectives of the study were: 
1. To establish which district and island councils in 
Scotland had adopted the power to licence and had 
decided to undertake the licensing of second-hand 
car dealers. 
2. To identify the range of licence conditions applied 
to licences issued in each district in addition to 
those defined in the statute. 
3. To investigate the administrative procedures for 
the vetting of applicants and the issue of licences 
including the level of fees. 
4. To identify enforcement arrangement's for ensuring 
compliance with-the local licensing system. 
6.2 Research Approach 
There are 56 district and island councils in Scotland, 
all of whom have the opportunity to undertake the 
licensing of those activities specified in the Civic 
Government (Scotland) Act 1982. The first aim of this 
study was to establish licensing practice throughout 
Scotland. This required that a census be conducted of 
every district and island council. There was therefore 
no sample but a census of all 56 local authorities in 
Scotland. This study provides the basis of all the 
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analysis in this thesis since it was in effect a 
statement of existing licensing practice in Scotland. 
6.2.1 Research Method 
The information about the licensing practice of 
individual district councils with respect to second-hand 
dealers was not held centrally in any form and as a 
consequence there were no secondary sources of data 
available from which to compile basic information on 
licensing activity. There had been no previous studies 
of the licensing practice of district councils in 
Scotland under this legislation and so the study 
required primary data collection. 
The type of information demanded a structured approach 
so that in aggregation, the information collected was 
comparable. Secondly, there was a need for detailed 
information especially on administrative structures and 
licence conditions. Thirdly, there was the question of 
time. As already' mentioned in the encompassing 
methodology time is an important criterion in the study 
of policy. This meant that although interviews would 
have been preferable they could not have been completed 
within a short enough time frame for the information 
collected to meet the time and space requirements of the 
method. The time taken to interview each authority would 
have meant that the situation was likely to have changed 
in the first district before reaching the last district. 
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What was required was a single 'snapshot' of licensing 
practice. A postal questionnaire was chosen as the most 
appropriate method for collecting the required data. 
In addition, because licensing practice is a key 
variable in the analysis of the other parts of this 
investigation it was felt that key information on 
licensing activity should be collected on a regular 
basis. To this end a regular six monthly reporting 
procedure was implemented at the same time as this 
survey was undertaken. This consisted of a short 
questionnaire which monitored district council activity 
by collecting information on the number of licences 
issued, changes in licensing practice and the withdrawal 
or suspension of licences. The survey letter also 
included a request for a copy of published licence 
conditions and a specimen application form. 
6.2.2 Questionnaire Design 
Following the objectives of this survey the design of 
the questionnaire aimed to identify systematically the 
important features of individual licensing systems. The 
first crucial piece of information was whether or not 
the district was in fact licensing second-hand car 
dealers and, if so, the number of licences which were in 
force at the time of the survey. A second group of 
questions concerned the conditions attached to the 
licences issued. These conditions were an important 
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means of assessing the relative 'strength' of licensing 
in terms of their direct impact upon licence holders. 
The final group of questions concerned the 
administrative arrangement for the receipt and disposal 
of licence applications and the information used at each 
stage of the procedure. The full questionnaire, the 
accompanying letter and the monitoring questionnaire can 
be found in Appendix 1. 
6.3 Survey Method 
The full questionnaire, an accompanying letter and the 
monitoring questionnaire were sent out to all district 
and island councils in Scotland during September 1986. 
Preliminary research had established that the licensing 
functions of district councils were operated from the 
administration department and so were addressed to the 
Director of Administration. 0f the 56 questionnaires 
sent out an initial response of 47 completed 
questionnaires was received. The missing responses were 
identified and one month after the questionnaire was 
sent, a follow up letter was posted to the Director of 
Administration for each missing district which prompted 
a further 9 replies. In total 56 completed and usable 
questionnaires were returned which is a complete census. 
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6.4 Analysis of Results 
The following sections describe the main features of 
second-hand car dealer licensing in Scotland. This 
chapter concentrates upon six features of second-hand 
car dealer licensing which form the basis of comparision 
between systems. These features are: 
1. The adoption of licensing powers 
2. Geographic location of licensing districts 
3. Administrative arrangements 
4. Licence cost 
5. Licence conditions 
6. Enforcement arrangements 
6.4.1 Adoption of Licensing Powers 
The licensing provisions of the Civic Government 
Scotland Act can only be activated after a resolution by 
the elected members of the District Council. The* 
resolution is minuted and specifies that the powers to 
licence second-hand dealers are being adopted and which 
activities within that category are to be licensed. At 
the time that this legislation was passed, local 
government was experiencing a reduction in funding from 
central government. In this financial environment and as 
a result of the optional nature of the licensing powers, 
there appeared to be little impetus for districts to 
adopt the licensing powers other than that generated 
from individual councillors or officials or external 
pressure from consumer organisations. The position of 
central government with respect to the adoption of 
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licensing was emphasised by a circular from the Scottish 
Office which stated: 
"The Secretary of state shares the view expressed in 
Parliament that licensing for the optional activities 
(of which second-hand car dealing is one) should be 
introduced only where it is shown to be necessary to 
prevent crime, to preserve public order or safety, or 
protect the environment. The purpose of licensing is not 
to restrict trade or competition. In the Secretary of 
State's view the only prima facie case of almost 
universal licensing is that of the taxi and hire car 
trades" 
Circular No 6/1983 Appendix A, Para 2.5 
Whether or not to adopt licensing was an individual 
decision for each district. In view of the circular from 
the Scottish office, the reduction in funding and the 
optional nature of the activity, the appearance of both 
licensing and non-licensing districts was predictable. 
At the time of the survey there were 24 district and 
island authorities who had adopted the licensing powers 
and who had applied licensing to second-hand car dealers 
in their area. There were a further four districts who 
had adopted the powers to licence in principle but had 
not identified to which activities licensing would be 
applied. Five authorities had adopted licensing and had 
systems in operation but did not include second-hand car 
dealing as a licensed category. The districts which have 
adopted licensing in principle but do not have an 
operational system and districts where there is 
licensing of second-hand dealing but not of second-hand 
187 
car dealing specifically, are assumed to be non- 
licensing districts. The full list of district councils 
in each of these categories appears as Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Scottish District Councils Licensing Status 
A. Districts Licensing Second-hand Car Dealers 
Aberdeen City 
Bearsden & Milngavie 
Clackmannan 
Clydebank 
Cunninghame 
Dundee City 
Dunfermline 
East Kilbride 
Eastwood 
Edinburgh City 
Ettrick & Lauderdale 
Falkirk 
B. 
C. 
Glasgow City 
Inverclyde 
Kilmarnock & Loudoun 
Kirkcaldy 
Midlothian 
Monklands 
North East Fife 
Nithsdale 
Renfrew 
Stirling 
Tweedale 
Western Isles 
Adopted Licensing but not identified Second-hand 
Car Dealers as Licensed Category 
Argyll & Bute 
Kyle & Carrick 
Nairn 
Orkney Isles 
Wigtown 
Adopted Licensing Powers but not Licensing 
Clydesdale 
Inverness 
Motherwell 
Perth & Kinross 
West Lothian 
D. Non-licensing Districts 
Angus 
Annandale & Eskdale 
Badenoch 
Banff & Buchan 
Berwick 
Caithness 
Cumbernauld 
Cumnock and Doon 
Dumbarton 
East Lothian 
Gordon 
Moray 
Hamilton 
Kincardine 
Lochaber 
Ross & Cromarty 
Roxburgh 
Shetland Isles 
Skye and Lochalsh 
Stewarty 
Strathkelvin 
Sutherland 
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'Those districts which had decided to licence second-hand 
car dealers were asked how many licences they had 
issued. Since licensing had been available since-October 
1982 it was anticipated that the number of licences 
issued would by now give a fair representation of the 
number of second-hand car dealers in each of the 
licensing areas. All districts in this survey had 
introduced licensing schemes prior to September 1984. 
Table 6.2 shows the number of second-hand car dealer 
licences issued by each licensing district at year end 
1986. 
Table 6.2 Second-hand Car Dealer Licences Issued By Each 
Licensing District 
District Council No. of Licences at end 
1986 
Aberdeen City 
Bearsden & Miingavie 
Clackmannan 
Clydebank 
Cunninghame 
Dundee City 
Dunfermline 
East Kilbride 
Eastwood 
Edinburgh City 
Ettrick & Lauderdale 
Falkirk 
Glasgow City 
Inverclyde 
Kilmarnock & Loudoun 
Kirkcaldy 
Midlothian 
Monklands 
NE Fife 
Nithsdale 
Renfrew 
Stirling 
Tweedale 
Western isles 
40 
3 
7 
13 
30 
96 
26 
6 
5 
55 
2 
10 
35 
21 
2 
66 
19 
4 
22 
7 
3 
4 
13 
6 
189 
The distribution of licences issued does not follow any 
significant pattern except that areas of high population 
density appear to have a higher number of licences 
issued. It was thought that there may be some political 
basis for the distribution. The argument was based upon 
a simplistic model that district councils dominated by a 
right of centre party would be less inclined to become 
involved in the direct regulation of business in their 
area, preferring a minimalist approach to business 
regulation in line with central government ideology. By 
contrast districts dominated by left of centre parties 
would be more sympathetic to licensing as a means of 
protecting consumers from the rigours of a market where 
consumer information was limited and the economic 
interests of consumers could be compromised. In fact, of 
the 24 district councils who operated systems at the 
" time of this study over 58% (14) had a Conservative 
majority. While this proportion has changed with a 
larger number of districts now having a left of centre 
majority party, there has been no significant expansion 
of licensing practice. Indeed the two districts who have 
adopted licensing since this study was completed are 
Conservative and Labour dominated respectively. 
6.4.2 Geographic Location of Licensing Districts 
Figure 6.1 shows the geographic distribution of 
districts operating licensing schemes for second-hand 
car dealers in Scotland. 
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Figure 6.1 Geographic Distribution of Licensing 
Districts in Scotland 
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Figure 6.2 Population Density Map of Scotland 
(per square kilometre 1989) 
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Compared to the population density map for Scotland 
shown in Figure 6.2, the distribution of licensing 
districts shows a clear concentration in the more 
heavily populated areas of Scotland. This covers the 
central population belt between Glasgow and Edinburgh, 
but also centred upon the major cities of Aberdeen and 
Dundee. There are exceptions such as Hamilton in Glasgow 
and East Lothian near Edinburgh. The mean population of 
licensing districts is 134,533 with a standard deviation 
of-153,046. For non-licensing districts the mean is 
59,390 with a standard deviation of 39,864. In the 
absence of any data on the volume of transactions 
involving second-hand car dealers, it is an assumption 
that these areas of high population density account for 
a higher than average number of used car transactions 
than for Scotland as a whole. Census data for car 
ownership is an imprecise indicator since it takes 
account of the residence of the owner and not where the 
purchase was made and consumers often travel to outside 
their district to purchase. However, it can be concluded 
that licensing would appear to be operative in the 
majority of areas where transactions between consumers 
and second-hand car dealers take place. 
6.4.3 Administrative Arrangements 
The administrative duties of the licence'authority are 
contained in Schedule 1 of the Civic Government 
(Scotland) Act 1982. There are a large number of 
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administrative duties contained here but those which 
relate to the disposal of applications and the 
suspension of licences are the most important. 
6.4.3(a) Disposal of Applications 
When an application is received by the district council 
on the correct form and with the required fee, the 
district must send a copy of the application form to the 
chief constable of Police. In addition, because-the 
activity relates to particular premises a copy of the 
application form must be sent to the local fire 
authority. The licensing authority must also give public 
notice of the receipt of the application for a licence 
in a local newspaper to allow for any objections or 
representations to be submitted. Copies of any 
representations or objections must be sent to the 
applicant and the authority can set up a hearing to 
investigate their substance. These administrative 
arrangements apply to all districts. 
in considering the application, the licensing authority 
may make any other enquiries they think fit and take the 
information received into account in deciding whether or 
not to issue a licence. The criteria that must be used 
in assessing an application is whether the authority 
believe that the applicant is a fit and proper person to 
hold such a licence. Licensing authorities were asked to 
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whom they sent copies of the application form or 
contacted in order to assess whether or not the 
applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a second- 
hand car dealers licence. The results appear in Table 
6.3 below. 
Table 6.3 Sources of Reference for Assessing Licence 
Application 
Own department to check 
for previous applications 83% 
Fire Authority to check the 
suitability of premises 88% 
Trading Standards Department 
of regional council 46% 
Planning Department to 
establish permission for 
business use 29% 
Local Police 100% 
Environmental Health Department 13% 
Local Councillors 8% 
All licensing authorities make use of the local police 
in assessing the fitness of the applicant to hold a 
licence in accordance with the duties laid down in the 
Act. What is surprising is the number of authorities who 
do not consult the fire authority, considering that 
second-hand car dealing does operate out of specific 
business premises. The use of local councillors to 
assess the fitness of an applicant is also worthy of 
note since this seems to be based upon a purely 
subjective assessment. It is also interesting to note 
the local environmental health department as a source of 
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information. This department does not have any 
responsibility for, or contact with, the motor trade. 
Finally trading standards departments are referred to by 
under half of the licensing authorities. These 
departments hold all records of consumer complaints and 
enforce all existing consumer protection legislation 
relevant to the second-hand car trade in Scotland. It 
would perhaps be anticipated that the information held 
by the trading standards departments would be relevant 
to the decision about whether or not to issue a licence. 
Once a decision about the application has been made the 
authority must send copies of the letter sent to the 
applicant to both the chief constable and where used, to 
the fire authority. 
6.4.3(b) Licence Suspension 
One of the principal sanctions available to a licensing 
authority is the ability to withdraw a licence to deal 
in second-hand cars at any time. In the Scottish system 
this can be done only in four circumstances: 
a) If the licence holder becomes an 'unfit person'. 
b) If the business is being carried on for the benefit 
of a person other than the licence holder who would 
be refused a licence. 
c) The activity has caused, is causing or is likely to 
cause undue public nuisance or a threat to public 
order or safety. 
d) If a condition of the licence has been contravened. 
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When one or a number of these criteria is met then the 
district has a right but not a duty to withdraw a 
licence. The first stage is to suspend the licence and 
if the grounds for licence withdrawal are met then the 
suspended licence is deemed to be withdrawn. The 
authority must give the licence holder an opportunity to 
be heard at a licence hearing where the chief constable 
and any other person relevant to the decision to suspend 
is present. The licence holder has a right of appeal to 
the High Court in the final instance. 
Licensing authorities in Scotland were asked how many 
licence applications had been'refused and how many had 
been suspended since the licensing system had been in 
operation. In only four cases had a licence been refused 
and these had been on the basis of previous convictions 
being brought to the attention of the district. No 
licences had been withdrawn and no suspensions had taken 
place up until September 1986. 
6.4.4 Licence Cost 
An important feature of any liven, 
of the licence. Where the cost is 
licence cost can be considered as 
entry. In Schedule 1 para 15, the 
guidance as to the calculation of 
councils. 
sing system is the cost 
prohibitively high the 
an attempt to restrict 
Act lays down broad 
cost by the district 
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"the licensing authority shall.... charge such 
reasonable fees as they may determine.... by 
reference to any factor or factors whatsoever" 
The only rider to this is that 
"the licensing authority shall seek to ensure that 
from time to time the total amount of fees 
receivable by the authority is sufficient to meet 
the expenses of the authority in exercising their 
functions" 
A number of licensing districts had introduced staged 
licensing systems which allowed the dealer to choose how 
long the licence would run with different fees for each 
period. Others had licences which ran for one year, 
others where the licence ran for three years. The cost 
of the licence to the dealer was calculated on a cost 
per year basis for ease of comparison. A full list of 
licensing authorities and the licence cost appears as 
Table 6.4. It can be seen that very few authorities 
charge the same for their licences on a yearly basis. 
The cost of the licence was analysed with respect to a 
number of different features to test for any 
association. Correlation between cost and total number 
of licences issued was investigated but a coefficient of 
-0.219 suggests a weak association. 
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Table 6.4 Cost of Licence on Yearly Basis 
District Council Cost of Licence 
per year 1986 
(Pounds per Year) 
Renfrew 40.00 
Glasgow City 38.30 
Bearsden & Milngavie 26.25 
Clydebank 26.25 
Nithsdale 25.00 
Monklands 20.00 
Clackmannan 18.30 
Dundee City 16.66 
Western Isles 16.66 
Stirling 16.25 
Falkirk 15.00 
East Kilbride 12.30 
Midlothian 12.30 
Kilmarnock 12.00 
Cunninghame 11.66 
Inverclyde 11.66 
Dunfermline 10,00 
Kirkcaldy 10.00 
NE Fife 10.00 
Eastwood 9.00 
Edinburgh 8.30 
Ettripk & Lauderdale 6.66 
Tweedale 6.66 
Aberdeen 1.60 
Mean = 15.86 
St. dev = 9.27 
Further analysis revealed that licence cost bore no 
association with the total number of licences issued, 
the extent of enforcement provision, the administrative 
time taken to process an application or the size of 
population of the district. It would appear likely that 
cost is determined with reference to a number of factors 
exclusive to the individual district councils. 
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6.5 Licence Conditions 
The conditions which a district council applies to the 
licences it issues are of crucial importance. It is the 
licence conditions which provide the mechanism for 
changing the trading behaviour of the second-hand 
dealers so as to improve the market conditions faced by 
consumers. The Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 
provides for three distinct categories of licence 
condition when applied to second-hand car dealing. The 
first category is the conditions which are contained in 
the Act and as such must be applied to all licences 
issued. The second category is those conditions which 
appear in the act but districts have discretion as to 
-whether or not, and to what extent, they wish. them to 
apply to licences issued. The final category is 
conditions which district councils generate themselves. 
The Act gives district councils the power to apply any 
reasonable licence conditions they think appropriate. 
Each of these categories will be considered below. 
6.5.1 Statutory Conditions 
There is only one statutory condition in relation to 
second-hand car dealer licences and it provides evidence 
of the clear intention that this legislation should 
apply to the second-hand car market. It states: 
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"A second-hand dealer acquiring a second-hand motor 
vehicle for the purpose of its resale in the course 
of his business shall keep a record of the mileage 
reading on the vehicle's odometer when he acquired 
it" Sect 24(5) Civic Government Act 1982. 
As this is a statutory licence condition it was a 
feature of the licensing system in all 24 licence 
authorities, each included it as a condition applied to 
all licences they issued to second-hand car dealers. 
This particular condition was one which attracted 
considerable support from consumer protection agencies 
during the passage of the bill. It provides a means for 
enforcement agencies to trace a vehicle's history. It 
also provides evidence of the vehicle mileage at each 
transaction making it easier to identify inconsistencies 
that would suggest that the mileage indication was 
untrue. 
6.5.2 Statutory conditions with Discretion 
The second category of licence conditions are those 
where the condition appears in the Act, but where there 
are either (a) facilities which allow the district 
council to waive the condition or (b) a general 
requirement only allowing the district to decide upon 
the detail. 
In the first case, section 25(1) requires that: 
"a dealer shall not dispose of any item of his stock in trade until the expiry of 48 hours (excluding 
my time on Saturdays or Sundays) after he acquired 
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Districts are given the discretion as whether or not to 
apply this condition in the case of second-hand car 
dealers by section 25(3) 
"A licensing authority may, on granting a second- 
hand dealers licence or at any time thereafter, on 
application by the dealer and after consultation 
with the chief constable, order that subsection (1) 
above shall not apply to-the disposal by the dealer 
of any item, or any specified item or class of 
items" 
Of the 24 licensing authorities 14 or 58% of the total 
had decided to make use of the power available in 
section 25(3) and have removed this condition from the 
licences issued to second-hand car dealers. The 
reasoning behind this move was that the licensing 
authority believed that the condition could restrict 
competition and disadvantage dealers in conducting their 
business. 
The second type of statutory condition with discretion, 
appears in general terms in the legislation, but allows 
detail to be decided by the individual licensing 
districts. Section 24(4) allows the licensing authority 
"to attach cohditions to a second-hand dealers 
licence requiring the keeping of records. " 
The section goes no further in defining the detail of 
this condition but allows the district to decide: 
f 
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(a) The information to be included in these 
records. 
(b) The form in which the records were to be kept. 
(c) The premises where the records are to be kept. 
(d) The period for which the records are to be 
kept. 
All 24 licensing authorities include as a condition of 
the licences issued a requirement for the second-hand 
car dealer to keep records of the vehicles they buy and 
sell. All districts had similar requirements as to form 
and the premises where the records must be kept. The 
major variations occured in relation to (a) and. (d) 
above, the precise nature of the information required 
and the period for which it is retained. 
in relation to (a) all 24 authorities require the 
following information: 
Date and time of purchase by dealer 
Registration number of vehicle 
chassis and engine number 
Name and address of purchaser 
Mileage at time of purchase by dealer 
Additional information required by only a proportion of 
the licensing authorities is: 
Name and address of supplier of vehicle to dealer 
(21 Districts) 
Colour, Make and model of vehicle 
(21 Districts) 
Date and time of sale 
(17 Districts) 
Mileage at time of sale 
(17 Districts) 
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In relation to (b) above, the time for which the 
required records must be retained, 4 authorities require 
the information to be kept for two years with the 
remaining 20 authorities requiring retention for three 
years. The key determinant of the length of time for 
which the information was to be kept, was the duration 
of the licence. 
6.5.3 Optional Conditions 
Schedule 1 Part 5 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 
1982 gives licensing authorities the power to attach any 
conditions to the licences they issue which they feel 
are appropriate. The only test of appropriateness is 
whether or not the condition is reasonable. It is in 
respect of these optional licence conditions that 
district councils have an opportunity to contribute 
directly toward the protection of consumers buying 
second-hand cars within their area. The nature of these 
optional conditions is a useful indicator of the 
attitude of the district toward the licensing of second- 
hand car dealers. Because of the large number of 
optional conditions applied (many of which were 
administrative details, for example the size of 
photograph to be submitted with the application) it was 
necessary to concentrate upon those conditions which 
directly affected the operations of the second-hand car 
dealer and potentially the experiences of consumers. As 
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such, administrative conditions which had an effect only 
at the time of licence application were excluded. This 
exclusion focussed study upon two main conditions which 
directly affected the day to day operations of the 
dealer. These were first, the requirement for pre-sales 
inspection reports to appear on vehicles for sale. 
Second, the requirement that licensed dealers comply 
fully with the Motor Industry Code of Practice 
regardless of whether they were members of the trade 
association or not. 
6.5.3(a) Pre-Sales Inspection Reports 
The pre-sales inspection report contains information 
about the condition of a car resulting from a dealer 
inspection. This report is then displayed with the car 
when offered for sale and a copy is usually given to the 
consumer at the time of purchase. The information 
contained is designed to highlight any faults found with 
the car and what action has been taken to rectify these 
faults or the likely cost of such repair work. It also 
itemises any other work that has been carried out by the 
dealer prior to the car being offered for sale. 
The pre-sales inspection report (PSI) is a feature of 
legislative control of second-hand car dealing across 
the world even though empirical evidence of its 
beneficial effect is limited, see Pratt and Hoffer 
(1985). The use of pre-sales information of this type 
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by second-hand car dealers in the UK has met with 
considerable resistance. Despite a requirement for the 
use of pre-sales inspection reports on all second-hand 
cars which appears in the Motor Industry Code of 
Practice members of the code have consistently ignored 
the requirement. The Office of Fair Trading(1986) in its 
monitoring survey for the Code found that only 20% of 
members always displayed such a report on second-hand 
cars for sale. 
The PSI report contributes to consumer information by 
decreasing buyer-seller asymmetry and is directed toward 
those areas of the car which require expert knowledge. 
Because the information is in standard form it can be 
used as the basis of any comparison between cars offered 
for sale. Also, in the event that after purchase, a part 
fails or repairs need to be carried out, this report can 
be produced as evidence to a court by either consumer or 
dealer of work carried out or components replaced. 
A total of 14 (56%) of district councils who licence 
decided to add the requirement for pre-sales information 
to their licence conditions using the optional 
conditions facility. In arriving at this decision the 
district councils took note of representations from the 
Scottish Consumer Council who encouraged districts to 
make full use of the optional facility and suggested 
this condition among others. The Society of Directors of 
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Administration (SoDA) also circulated a pro-forma for 
such information in an attempt to standardise the 
display if districts were to introduce such a condition. 
A copy of the pro-forma appears as Appendix II. 
6.5.3(b) Compliance with the Code of Practice 
One of the main disadvantages of codes of practice over 
legislation as outlined in Chapter 4 is the voluntary 
nature of the control. The only sanction available to 
the controlling Trade Association is expulsion which 
contradicts the aim of the association and will have 
little impact upon the individual member. 
The optional conditions facility in the legislation 
allows licensing authorities to by-pass the problem of 
voluntary compliance with the code by making compliance 
a condition of the licence. The inclusion of code 
compliance as a licence condition has been achieved in 
two different ways. The first is to make the condition 
unequivocal, for instance in this condition designed by 
Glasgow District Council: 
"The licence holder shall adhere to the relevant 
sections of the Code of Practice for the Motor 
Industry" 
The "relevant sections" refers to a separate part of the 
code which applies to second-hand car dealers (see 
Appendix III). The effect is to make voluntary 
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compliance compulsory since failure to comply with a 
licence condition can lead to a criminal conviction 
and/or the licence to trade being withdrawn. 
The second way in which the code of practice has been 
incorporated is less precise, for example in this 
condition designed by Stirling District Council: 
"Where the dealer is a member of a professional or 
trade association and that body has issued a code 
of practice, then the second-hand dealer shall 
comply with the conditions of that code of 
practice. " 
This wording is less restrictive. It allows for the 
condition to be ignored by giving up membership if 
already a member and provides no incentive to those not 
already members or those who. do not wish to be members 
to improve their trading behaviour by compliance. 
The first method of incorporating a voluntary control as 
a licence condition avoids the problem of voluntary 
compliance and provides a sanction for non compliance 
with the code. However it also presents a number of 
dangers not least that the nature of the code and 
therefore the licence condition could be altered 
externally by the trade association re-writing the code 
although this would have to be approved by the Office of 
Fair Trading. 
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One feature of both the optional conditions described 
above is that there is a degree of overlap. The code of 
practice also stipulates that pre-sales inspection 
reports must be displayed. This implies that pre-sales 
information reports would not need to be specified if 
compliance with the code was fully incorporated as a 
licence condition. The pro-forma for such information, 
issued by the Motor Agents Association, is different to 
that supplied by the Society of Directors of 
Administration. This could result in the information 
being presented in non-standard forms and the activity 
of the Society of Directors of Administration serves 
only to exacerbate this situation. 
6.6 Enforcement of Licensing 
Any form of regulation is dependent upon the use of 
authority to enforce compliance. As Hutter(1988) points 
out this should not be equated with prosecution but 
should embrace a much wider concept which defines 
enforcement as the whole process of compelling the 
observance of both the letter of the law and the broad 
objective. In the context of licensing it is fundamental 
that all those who deal in second-hand cars within a 
licensing area hold a licence. Secondly that those 
dealers who hold the licence comply fully with the 
licence conditions. The Civic Government (Scotland) Act 
1982 did not impose any specific enforcement duties upon 
the district councils but did provide powers for the 
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districts to identify. authorised officers. Once 
authorisation by the district had been given certain 
powers were afforded such as the right of entry to 
business premises and the power to inspect the records 
required to be kept by the Act and the licence. 
The licensing districts were asked to whom they had 
given the authorisation to enforce the provisions of the 
Act. The responses shown in Table 6.5 indicate a 
considerable variety of agencies involved in the 
enforcement of the licensing provisions and for some 
districts a number of different agencies had been 
authorised: 
Table 6.5 Number of Enforcement Authorisations by 
District councils 
Local Police 17 (71%) 
Licensing Department Staff 11 (46%) 
Trading Standards Officers 7 (29%) 
Fire Officers 7 (29%) 
Environmental Health Officers 3 (12%) 
The first feature of the authorisations is that 6 
district councils have not authorised anybody to enforce 
the licensing provisions of the Act. Secondly, the 
authorisations are interesting when considered in the 
context of jurisdiction. Trading standards officers 
operate at a regional level and as a consequence may 
only be authorised to enforce the Act within the 
district boundaries and not, as in the case of all other 
legislative duties within the boundaries of their own 
210 
region. Fire Officers and Police also operate at a 
regional level although they also have offices in 
smaller administrative units than districts. 
Environmental Health officers are the only district 
employees in the list of authorised staff who have an 
enforcement function and who could be considered as an 
enforcement agency at a district level. A full list of 
authorisations by district and region appears as Table 
6.6. The distribution of enforcement authorisations when 
considered in terms of regions emphasises the 
enforcement problems faced by regional staff, in 
particular knowing which districts are licensing, what 
conditions apply in each district and whether they are 
actually authorised to enforce them. 
Table 6.6 Authorised Enforcement Agencies for Second- 
hand Car Dealer Licensing 
REGION DISTRICT 
Borders Ettrick & Lauderdale 1,4 
Tweedale 1,3 
Central Stirling 3 
Clackmannan 1,2,3,4 
Falkirk 6 
Dumfries Nithsdale 1 
Fife NE Fife 1,3 
Kirkcaldy 1,2,3,4 
Dunfermline 1,2,3 
Grampian Aberdeen City 1,2 
Lothian Edinburgh City 1 
Midlothian 1,4 
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Tayside Dundee City 
Strathclyde Renfrew 
Monklands 
Kilmarnock 
Glasgow City 
Eastwood 
East Kilbride 
Inverclyde 
Cunninghame 
Clydebank 
Bearsden and Milngavie 
Western Isles 
1,2,4,5 
1,3 
1,3,5 
0 
1,2,3 
1,3 
5 
1,3 
0 
0 
0 
1,2,4 
Key: 0. No Authorisations 
1. Police 
2. Trading Standards Officers 
3. Licensing Department Staff 
4. Fire Officers 
5. Environmental Health Officers 
6. Specially Appointed Enforcement Staff 
A distribution such as that above demands a considerable 
degree of co-ordination among enforcement staff. If the 
various agencies operate within district boundaries 
without reference to each other there is little 
opportunity for uniformity in enforcement activity. 
6.7 Policy Implications 
A feature of the legislation which introduced the 
licensing of second-hand car dealers in Scotland is the 
discretion given to local administrative units. At a 
fundamental level, district councils can decide whether 
or not to adopt the powers. The effect, in the absence 
of any strong guidance from central government, is that 
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only a minority of districts have adopted the power to 
licence second-hand car dealers. This first level of 
variation in the application of the licensing policy is 
the existence of both licensing and non-licensing 
districts. 
Within each licensing district the legislation also 
gives discretion in the design and implementation of a 
licensing system. It allows the district to choose 
licence conditions on the basis of 'reasonableness'. 
The study established that there is considerable 
variation in the conditions applied to licences. These 
are the most prominent factor in mediating between 
policy objective and policy outcome in this context 
since they are the basis of any change in the behaviour 
of licence holders. 
The administrative arrangements also appear to show 
variation despite the administrative framework being 
contained in the legislation, in particular the persons 
to whom reference is made to establish the fitness of a 
licence applicant. Finally the number of licences issued 
shows considerable variation. This variation appears to 
be considerably greater than that accounted for by 
differences in the distribution of second-hand car 
dealers. The reason for this could not be explained 
using the information from this survey. 
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6.7.1 The Delivery of Licensing Benefits 
To re-state the arguments in favour of licensing as a 
consumer potection policy, three benefits were 
identified: 
1. An overall increase of information either directly 
by requiring provision by licence holders or 
indirectly through the imposition of entry 
standards which will reduce the information burden. 
2. An overall increase in the standard of provision. 0 
3. An improvement in the protection of consumers from 
the provision of goods and services which would do 
them physical or economic harm by preventing access 
to 'unfit' individuals. 
The legislative framework has led to a situation where 
there is a small set of common characteristics between 
the licensing systems and a large set of differences. 
What is required is to identify the ways in which these 
consumer 'benefits' are delivered to consumers. 
6.7.1(a) Improved information 
The provision of information to consumers has been 
improved directly in some districts by requiring dealers 
who hold licences to display a pro-sales inspection 
report on the vehicles they sell. This requirement 
appears both explicitly as a licence condition and also 
implicitly where the district requires the dealer to 
comply with the Motor Industry Code of Practice. The 
inspection report concentrates upon describing the 
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condition of vehicle parts which the ordinary consumer 
does not have the expertise or facilities to assess. The 
dealer would have this information available to him in 
respect of every transaction. This condition is designed 
to reduce the asymmetry of information in transactions 
between licensed dealers and consumers by improving the 
efficiency of individual choice. 
The indirect improvement in information is as a result 
of instituting the licensing system. The argument is 
that if consumers know that licensing is in operation 
then by buying from a licensed dealer they can reduce 
their information burden by accepting that the licensed 
dealer has been 'vetted' by the licensing authority and 
must comply with licence conditions. Further, that if 
the conditions are broken or his conduct does the 
consumer economic harm, the licence can be withdrawn. 
Therefore the knowledge that-licensing is in operation 
and that the dealer in a licensing area holds a licence 
is in itself an improvement in the provision of 
information to consumers. 
6.7.1(b) Increased Standards of Provision 
The contribution of licensing to increased standards of 
provision is through controlling the quality of inputs 
and the quality of outputs. The vetting of licence 
applicants is an input control. By refusing to issue 
215 
licences to individuals who are not deemed fit to trade, 
low quality dealers are elimimated which increases the 
overall level of quality. The only direct control over 
quality of outputs in this market is through the licence 
condition that requires compliance with the Motor 
Industry code of practice which does provide minimum 
standards of provision. It should, be noted that the code 
of practice has only received government approval by 
containing provisions which are considered able to 
contribute toward an overall increase in standards for 
consumers. Therefore, districts which require licence 
holders to comply with the Motor Industry Code of 
Practice are seeking an across the board increase in the 
standard of provision. 
6.7.1(c) Improved Protection 
This benefit is the most difficult to assess in this 
market since it must focus upon both the, product which 
is the object of the transaction and on the dealer. The 
first contribution by licensing to improved protection 
must be in the vetting of applicants to prevent new 
applicants or existing licence holders from providing 
cars which would contribute to the economic or physical 
harm of consumers. The second contribution is by 
providing for the withdrawal of a licence to trade in 
the event of non compliance or behaviour which is deemd 
to make the licence holder unfit to trade. The 
contribution to overall protection is contingent upon 
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the presence of some mechanism for ensuring compliance 
with licence conditions. 
6.8 Conclusion 
From the result of the survey of district councils it is 
clear that the implementation of the policy has allowed 
considerable variation in policy delivery within each 
district. This in turn suggests that second-hand car 
buyers will experience different policy effects. The 
intervening conditions which mediate between the policy 
contained in the legislation and the policy delivered to 
second-hand car buyers consist of two components. First 
the nature and degree of variation introduced by the 
district, second the extent to which second-hand car 
dealers change their behaviour. The combination of these 
two effects will dictate the extent to which the policy 
objectives are met. 
The next chapter concentrates upon second-hand car 
buyers to examine how the licensing of second-hand car 
dealers is affecting purchase experiences. Specifically, 
it assesses whether there were differences exhibited 
between buyers in licensing and non-licensing districts. 
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Chapter 7 Study 2: The Impact of Second-hand Car Dealer 
Licensing upon Second-hand Car 
Purchasers. 
7.1 Introduction 
So far, the argument has concentrated upon the form of 
the licensing arrangements contained in the civic 
Government (Scotland) Act 1982 and the take up of the 
licensing powers by district councils in Scotland. This 
chapter focuses upon the outcome of this policy, the 
'event' referred to in the encompassing methodology. In 
particular it discusses the effect of licensing upon the 
purchase experiences of consumers. By identifying the 
administrative structure for policy delivery (the 
object) in the previous chapter and identifying features 
of actual delivery (as experienced by consumers) in this 
chapter, it will be possible to identify the nature and 
the degree of any dysfunction between object and event. 
This will provide some parameters for an explanation of 
the mechanisms which cause any detectable difference. 
7.2 Developing a Typology of District Councils 
In the knowledge that some district councils operate a 
licensing scheme and others do not, it was felt that a 
comparative methodology would be appropriate to assess 
differences in consumer experiences between licensing 
and non licensing districts. However, because of the 
degree of variation between systems operated by 
different districts, it was felt that a greater degree 
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of discrimination was required. The licensing systems 
operated by some districts have a greater potential to 
alter the behaviour of licence holders than others. 
Therefore, it is necessary to discriminate between 
different types of licensing system. such a typology can 
then be used to disdriminate between observed effects in 
different licensing areas. This is particularly 
important for assessing the relative impact of licensing 
upon consumers' purchasing experiences. 
There are a number of possible ways in which to 
categorise districts, indeed one could take any of the 
variables identified in the previous chapter: cost of 
licence, number of licences issued, number of referents 
etc. What is required is a guide to the relative 
strength of a district's licensing scheme, a measure of 
its potential ability to change dealer behaviour. 
However the most direct impact of licensing upon 
dealers' trading behaviour is through the licence 
conditions with which dealers must comply. As a 
consequence, the typology selected is based upon the 
relative strength of licence conditions. 
Dealers who are trading within the licensing district 
will have passed the required test for fitness to hold 
the licence and complied with other administrative 
requirements such as paying the fee, submitting the 
application form etc. Whatever variations exist in 
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gaining a licence or in administering the licence 
system, the licence conditions will have the greatest 
detectable effect upon dealers' trading behaviour. 
The most onerous licence condition, and one which has 
the widest implications for trading behaviour, is the 
requirement for licence holders to comply fully with the 
Motor Industry Code of Practice regardless of whether 
they are members or not. This is a condition which does 
not appear in the legislation but is applied by 
individual districts. The code is designed to ensure 
minimum standards in vehicle preparation, display, 
purchase facilities and the handling of complaints post 
purchase. Districts which include this as a licence 
condition are categorised as having the highest level of 
licensing. By contrast districts who rely entirely upon 
the conditions set out in the Act, principally the 
requirement to keep records are categorised as having a 
minimum or lowest level of licensing. Between these two, 
are districts which have only applied a condition that 
pre-sales information be displayed upon cars for sale. 
This is a condition which does not appear in the Act but 
its effect is restricted and is not as broad as that of 
the most rigorous condition. These districts are 
considered to have middle or medium level licensing. 
The typology consists of four categories, non-licensing 
and three licensing categories. These are high level 
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licensing characterised by the existence of a licence 
condition requiring compliance with the motor industry 
code of practice including the pre-sales information 
component. Medium level licensing is defined as being 
where only pre-sales information is required in addition 
to the statutory conditions. Finally low level licensing 
is where only the statutory conditions apply. These 
three levels of licensing will be used in comparing the 
effects of licensing upon consumers with the experiences 
of consumers in non-licensing districts. 
The analysis will concentrate upon comparisons between 
purchase experiences of consumers in districts based 
upon both a dichotomous variable ie licensing/non- 
licensing which groups the three licensing categories 
together and a disaggregated variable displaying each of 
the four licensing levels (three plus non-licensing). 
7.3 Operationalising Benefits 
The argument in favour of licensing as a consumer 
protection policy hinges upon the three benefits 
identified in the previous chapter; improved 
information, improved standards and improved protection. 
What is required is a set of outcomes under each of 
these headings which are measurable. These outcomes can 
then be analysed with respect to licensing activity. 
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7.3.1 Improved Information 
The direct effect of licensing upon improved information 
in the second-hand car market is characterised by the 
provision of pre-sales inspection reports on cars for 
sale in licensing areas. As a consequence, the first 
measurable outcome of licensing will be the existence of 
pre-sales inspection reports on cars displayed'for sale. 
This information will appear upon cars purchased from 
second-hand car dealers in two categories of licensing 
area: first, where there is a specific requirement to 
provide pre-sales inspection reports ie in licensing at 
the medium level. In addition it will appear where the 
district specifies compliance with the Motor Industry 
Code of Practice as a licence condition. 
Even if pre-sales inspection reports do not. appear on 
the cars for sale, a copy of the report is required to 
be given to the purchaser. This provides a second 
measurable component of improved direct information. In 
addition it would be desirable to assess whether or not 
the information was in the appropriate-format or whether 
or not the information was of any use in reaching a 
decision to purchase. However it would not be practical 
to do so as in the first instance it introduces demands 
upon consumers' accurate recall and some knowledge of 
the required format. In the second instance, the 
assessment of the use of information in coming to a 
particular decision is at best subjective even without 
the period of elapsed time between survey and purchase. 
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In relation to improved direct information provided by 
licensing the following hypotheses apply: 
Hypothesis 1: In licensing districts which require the 
provision of pre-sales information either 
directly or indirectly purchasers in that 
area will see such a report displayed, 
and/or will receive a copy of such a 
report at the time of purchase. 
In addition to the direct information provided through 
licensing there is also an indirect information effect. 
This indirect-contribution to consumer information is by 
providing purchasers with the knowledge that the 
licensing system exists. In the context of the Scottish 
system this provides a choice as to whether to purchase 
from a licensed or unlicensed dealer. The effect of this 
indirect information is measurable by testing the degree 
of knowledge exhibited by the repondent about second- 
hand car dealer licensing. This would include knowing 
about existence of licensing per se, as well as some 
understanding of what licensing is or represents in 
terms of their own purchase choices. Because consumers 
purchase across district boundaries the second 
hypothesis can be stated as: 
Hypothesis 2: Consumers who purchase from dealers in 
licensing areas will display, 
significantly more information about 
second-hand car dealer licensing and have 
some knowledge of the existence of 
second-hand car dealer licensing within 
that district than consumers in non- 
licensing areas. 
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7.3.2 Improved Standards 
The second proposition put forward is that licensing 
will lead to an increase in the standard of provision. 
Standards are usually difficult to assess because of the 
absence of a basis for comparison in many consumer 
policy applications. This particular policy application 
is rare in having a structure which does allow such a 
comparison. In this methodology there are consumers who 
have purchased in both licensing and non-licensing 
areas. The experiences of individuals who purchased from 
dealers in non-licensing areas can act as an 
approximation for a control group. These can then be 
used as a means of assessing differences rather than 
actual standards. In establishing the criteria with 
which to measure the differences in the standard of 
provision it has to be recognised that in this context 
the standard will have to be related to both the dealer 
and to the car purchased. With respect to the dealer, 
included in the questionnaire were questions which asked 
about the degree of satisfaction with situational 
criteria such as the premises, the presentation of 
vehicles, and the helpfulness of staff etc. The purpose 
of these questions is to establish whether dealers who 
operate in licensing areas are associated with higher 
overall satisfaction scores on these situational 
criteria. Formally, in relation to standards of 
provision: 
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Hypothesis 3: Consumers who purchased from dealers in 
licensing areas will exhibit higher 
levels of satisfaction than consumers who 
purchased from dealers in non-licensing 
districts. 
The second component in assessing the standard of 
provision is the car purchased. There are two ways in 
which the standard of provision with respect to the car 
can be measured. The first, synonymous with the 
situational criteria above is to measure the overall 
satisfaction score with the car purchased. This was 
achieved using a seven point rating scale. However in 
addition, the incidence of complaint about the car can' 
also be used to approximate an objective measure of the 
standard of provision specifically related to the car. 
Indeed, any subsequent complaint is likely to have an 
impact upon the overall satisfaction scores and these 
need to be considered together. 
The use of complaint levels as a means of comparing 
standards of provision between districts has a number of 
disadvantages. The first, noted by Morris and Reeson 
(1977) and Olander(1977) is that voiced complaints may 
not be representative of the true level of 
dissatisfaction at a particular point in time, and 
therefore cannot be taken as representative of standards 
of provision over the whole market. The second is that 
the consumer who is dissatisfied with the service 
offered by the dealer will often not register a 
complaint but not return to the same dealer again in 
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future. Third, Morris and Reeson(1978) argue that the 
voicing of complaint may be due to the assessment by the 
consumer of the likely benefits of complaining, ie the 
perceived value of success versus the cost of 
complaining. However, the work by Pratt and 
Hoffer(1987), Maurizi(1974) and Leland(1979) among 
others, have all used complaint levels as an indicator 
of the standard of provision (or standard of detriment). 
In the absence of evidence to the contrary it would seem 
resaonable to assume that complaint voicing is normally 
distributed across districts. If this is accepted then 
relative complaint levels can form the basis of a useful 
comparison between districts. 
It has already been established that the second-hand car 
market is one with high levels of consumer complaint, 
and the incidence and handling of any subsequent 
complaint is one factor which is likely to have an 
impact upon overall purchase experience. This can be 
stated formally as: 
Hypothesis 4: There will be differences in the level of 
complaints associated with purchases from 
dealers in licensing areas as opposed to 
purchases from dealers in non-licensing 
areas. 
Hypothesis 5: The experience of complaining to a dealer 
in a licensing area will be qualitatively 
better than when complaining to a dealer 
not in a licensing area. 
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7.3.3 Improved Protection 
The degree of protection is difficult to assess without 
detailed information about individual complaint 
processes. Nevertheless there are general 
characteristics of a transaction in this market which 
can be adopted to approximate a measure of protection. 
These can then be used to assess differences between 
licensing and non-licensing areas. 
When considering consumer protection in a general sense, 
what is being assessed is protection from economic loss 
or injury. It could be argued that in the context of the 
second-hand car market a complaint is in itself a 
manifestation of economic loss or injury. Often, 
complaints are resolved by the dealer and the original 
loss is recompensed. Equally often, complaints are not 
resolved by the dealer and in this situation the 
consumer bears the full economic loss or injury. It 
should be also noted that complaints are very often not 
justified. Assuming that voiced complaints are normally 
distributed across districts and that justified 
compliants are equally normal in distribution across 
districts, one measure of protection is the number or 
incidence of complaints which are unresolved. As a 
consequence the following hypothesis can be stated: 
Hypothesis 6: The number of unresolved complaints will 
be lower where the dealer is operating 
within a licensing area than when the 
dealer is operating in a non-licensing 
area. 
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When using complaint resolution rate to assess the 
degree of protection, the existence and role of any 
guarantee or warranty provided with the car purchased 
must also be recognised. The warranty or guarantee 
provided with the second-hand car purchased is an 
important feature of the purchase for both the consumer 
and the dealer (see McNeal and Hise(1986) for a 
specification of exact benefits). A warranty (or 
guarantee) according to Feldman(1980) is an assurance 
made by the seller with respect to the quality of the 
goods he offers. By far the main reason for purchasing 
from a second-hand car dealer rather than buying 
privately is the provision of some kind of purchase 
security, usually in the form of a guarantee. This view 
is consistent with the work of Shimp(1982) who commented 
that a product guarantee has the effect of reducing the 
perception of risk. The exact form of a guarantee for 
second-hand cars is dependent upon the dealer unlike the 
situation for new cars where the manufacturer provides a 
guarantee package often including dealer specific 
elements. As such, a guarantee provided for a second- 
hand car is a valid measure of dealer determined 
protection. Fisk(1973) comments. that if a warranty is 
present it is for one or both of the following reasons 
(i) the dealer wants to encourage purchase of his 
product over others or (ii) he wants to minimise the 
legal liability to his consumers by specifying the 
precise limit of that liability. In the first instance 
the encouragement of purchase would be indicated by the 
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presence of a guarantee as well as its length and in 
what form it was given. Pursuit of the second reason, 
limiting liability, would be represented by the absence 
of a guarantee or a short, non-substantiable guarantee 
which is usually given verbally. 
The guarantee can vary in the context of this study in 
four ways: 
1. The guarantee may or may not be provided. 
In some circumstances dealers may refuse to guarantee 
the car. This is frequently associated with low cost 
cars or where the dealer knows that the car is likely to 
fail. The dealer is not legally obliged to provide a 
guarantee and if this is the case the consumer must rely 
upon an implied warranty contained in the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 that all goods sold to private individuals are 
fit for their purpose and of merchantable quality. 
2. The guarantee given can be given either verbally or 
in writing. 
Some dealers will guarantee the car only verbally and 
promise to deal with any complaints or repairs within a 
specified time period. This does not give a great deal 
of security to the purchaser because the dealer can 
renege on the promise and there is usually no evidence 
of the promise which can be used to pursue the dealer 
legally. As a consequence written guarantees are 
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" preferable since they specify what is and what is not 
covered and form a legal contractual document. 
3. The length of the guarantee may vary. 
Based upon the results of this study the length of 
guarantee applied to second-hand cars varies from 1 week 
to 24 months or in exceptional cases even longer. The 
longer the guarantee the greater security afforded to 
the consumer by the dealer or, alternatively it can be 
considered as the greater investment by the dealer in 
the quality of the car. 
4. The guarantee may or may not be free. 
Some dealers sell a guarantee and pass on the 
responsibility to a third party. Ideally any guarantee 
should be free to the customer although it is now common 
practice to include a guarantee facility nominally paid 
for in the price of the car. There is no clear 
indication that charging for the guarantee in this way 
is a positive or negative reflection upon the degree of 
protection afforded by the guarantee itself. Equally it 
is difficult to establish whether the purchaser actually 
paid for the guarantee through an inflated price or 
directly. As a consequence this variable is excluded in 
the analysis. It should be noted that charging for a 
guarantee either directly or indirectly is a means of 
230 
partially externalising responsibility, consistent with 
the second motivation identified by Fisk above. 
The fact that a warranty or guarantee is dealer specific 
allows some comparison between dealers in licensing and 
non-licensing areas as to the degree of protection 
provided by this means. The guarantee can be measured in 
terms of its form and its length to provide a subjective 
measure of how 'good' it is. In addition, the content of 
the guarantee can be assessed with reference to 
unresolved complaints ie in terms of whether it is 
sufficient to cover any eventual complaint about the 
car. With respect to guarantees, the following 
hypotheses can be stated: 
Hypothesis 7: The incidence of consumers receiving no 
guarantee with their car will be lower in 
licensing areas. 
Hypothesis 8: There will be a higher incidence of 
written guarantees given to consumers by 
dealers in licensing areas. 
Hypothesis 9: Guarantees given to consumers of any form 
will be longer in licensing areas than 
non-licensing areas. 
Hypothesis 10: The guarantees received by consumers in 
licensing areas will be associated with 
higher levels of complaint resolution 
than guarantees received from dealers in 
non-licensing areas 
231 
7.4 Research Method 
So far three benefits accruing to consumers from 
licensing have been identified. In addition three 
licensing levels have also been developed and are 
characterised as high, medium and low level licensing 
depending upon the nature of licence conditions. To 
assess whether consumer purchase experiences differ 
between licensing and non-licensing areas a number of 
data collection techniques were considered. Because 
there is no available secondary data which could be 
utilised in this study primary data collection was 
considered justifiable. 
The primary data collection techniques available were 
assessed in terms of the information required, the 
geographical location of the potential participants, 
ease of administration, likely response, rates and cost. 
On the first and second criteria, a postal survey of 
recent second-hand car purchasers appeared to be the 
most attractive method. However, response rates for 
postal surveys are rarely above 25% and it was felt that 
the motivation for the return of a questionnaire which 
asked about second-hand car complaints where such 
complaints are frequent, might bias the response and 
subsequently the resulting analysis. Telephone 
interviews also presented an opportunity but the 
facilities were not available to cope with the number of 
telephone. calls envisaged. In addition the question 
content and the length of the questionnaire were 
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considered inappropriate. Finally, on the basis of the 
information required and the expected response rate, an 
interview survey was chosen as the most appropriate data 
collection technique. However, in order to restrict cost 
and reduce fragmentation the scope of the survey was 
limited to the central population belt. This comprises 
the district councils constituting Fife, Lothian, 
Central and Strathclyde and Tayside regions. This was 
justified on the basis that this belt comprises the 
highest population density and a similar high density of 
second-hand car transactions. 
The next consideration and one relevant to the choice of 
technique above is'the identification of a sample. In 
this case there is no available list of second-hand car- 
purchasers in Scotland. The source of such information 
could only come from two sources. First, from the 
dealers themselves who hold details of their own second- 
hand car purchasers. Second, from the Driver and Vehicle 
Licensing Centre (DVLC) who would be notified of change 
of owner. This could conceivably be used as indicating 
that a sale had taken place. The first source would have 
involved the purchase of customer lists from the dealers 
which is prohibitively expensive and could be 
unrepresentative. The second source is unreliable since 
it is only dealer/consumer transactions which are 
required for this'study. Very few dealers register 
second-hand cars for sale as owned by them and so the 
previous owner remains on the ownership document until 
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the sale is complete. As a consequence, DVLC are not 
notified until the sale has been agreed and accordingly 
it is impossible to distinguish consumer/consumer 
transactions from the required dealer/consumer 
transactions. 
Both sources were rejected in favour of a preliminary 
street intercept to identify consumers who had purchased 
a second-hand car from a dealer within the previous 12 
months and who would agree to a future personal 
interview in their home on the subject. Because 
consumers do not necessarily purchase their second-hand 
car within the district in which they live, careful 
selection of the intercept points had to be made. Simply 
selecting a matched set of intercept points in licensing 
and non-licensing districts would not account for the 
travelling of consumers outside resident home towns. In 
addition the number of licensing areas exceeds that of 
non-licensing areas within the central belt. The 
greatest coverage was required for the least cost in 
terms of intercept hit rate, the unit of analysis is the 
individual consumer and the desired attribute is the 
purchase of a second-hand car from a dealer. The 
intercept points were chosen using the following 
criteria: population density, the number of cars per 
household and the licensing status of the district. 
Figure 7.1 shows the selected towns and cities: 
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Figure 7.1 Selected Intercept Points to Recruit Second- 
hand Car Purchasers 
Region Location House- Cars per 
holds 000s Household 
Strathclyde * Glasgow City 273 0.35 
* E Kilbride 23 0.43 
* Greenock 20 0.43 
Airdrie 14 0.57 
Cumnock 3 0.61 
Ayr 17 0.70 
Lanark 3 0.74 
* Kirkintilloch 10 0.81 
* Giffnock 11 1.00 
* Bearsden 8 1.19 
Fife * Buckhaven. 7 0.47 
* Kirkcaldy 17 0.61 
* Glenrothes 11 0.74 
Central * Falkirk 13 0.57 
* Alloa 9 0.62 
* Stirling 13 0.64 
Tayside * Dundee City 65 0.51 
Arbroath 8 0.57 
Perth 15 0.61 
Lothian * Edinburgh City 159 0.56 
Tranent 2 0.61. E 
Livingston 12 0.71 
* Penicuik 5 0.85 
* Locations in Licensing Districts 
Interviewers were given instructions to intercept over a 
period of three days approximately equivalent numbers of 
men and women over 18 years old. The intercept schedule 
asked for personal details and specifically whether a 
second-hand car had been purchased within the last 
twelve months by themselves or anyone in their 
household. If the criteria of a purchase of a second- 
hand car from a dealer was satisfied, the respondent was 
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asked to sign an agreement to a personal call for the 
purpose of interview at a later date. 
7.5 Limitations of Data 
While the sample produced by this method cannot be 
described as 'random' in terms of probability, the 
selection of sample points was designed so as to 
approximate on the best possible basis a random sample. 
Further, the selection of individual participants by 
professional recruiters, while outside the control of 
the author, was carried out over three days with no 
pressure upon recruiters to fill specific quotas. This 
too was in an effort to approximate randomness. Because 
the sample was drawn using a technique which could be 
termed 'non probability' this should not invalidate the 
data or the results. Indeed Green and Tull (1978) 
comment that one should not conclude that such samples 
are inferior to probability sampling or that the samples 
are less representative of the population under study. A 
number of techniques were investigated which would 
indicate how good the resulting sample was in terms of 
representing the population. 
The easiest method of obtaining a measure of how 
representative the sample was of the population of 
second-hand car buyers would be to compare a number of 
characteristics of the sample selected with identified 
characteristics of the population. In this case this 
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would determine whether the demographic characteristics 
of second-hand car purchasers in the sample were similar 
to those of the population. The census for 1981 
(Scotland) does not include information about the 
purchase of second-hand cars, nor do rate payer 
(community charge) registers. DVLC were contacted to ask 
whether a list of Scottish car owners could be provided 
but the request was rejected. In the absence of any 
other source of secondary information that is 'better' 
in the sense of randomness, the technique of random 
comparison is therefore unavailable. 
Another possibility is to incorporate a design factor 
into the analysis. This is defined by Kish(1965) as 'the 
ratio of the actual variance of a cömplex sample to the 
variance of a simple random sample of the same size'. 
Again there was no simple random sample of the same size 
detected and so a design effect could not be determined. 
Another limitation of the data is the effect of 
clustering on the sample caused by the use of intercept 
points. It could be argued that the purchasers selected 
using this method would only represent the specifc 
locality. However, the results of the survey suggested 
that consumers travel a mean distance of 10.46 miles to 
purchase a second-hand car. It was felt that this 
geographic dispersion of buying patterns while not 
providing overlapping clusters does significantly reduce 
this clustering effect. Accepting the limitations of the 
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data, in the following analysis it is assumed that the 
sample approximates a random sample, therefore 
statistical inference will be made on an approximating 
basis. 
The final limitation associated with this study is the 
effect of time. As expressed in previous chapters, 
policy analysis of any kind has to take place within a 
framework determined by what polices have already been 
applied to the object of the study. The fact that the 
code of practice exists, even though it is not observed 
fully presents a problem in detecting the effects of 
code compliance through licensing. The existence of the 
code of practice with which trade association members 
must comply means that there is already structural 
differentiation in the offering. Consumers may purchase 
from second-hand car dealers or from dealers in new and 
second-hand cars. Both categories of dealer are eligible 
for membership of the trade association and would be 
required to observe the code of practice. In relation to 
the three licensing benefits it would be expected that 
the dealers who are trade association members would 
already provide a higher level of service. Unfortunately 
whether or not the dealer is a member of the trade 
association is difficult for the consumer to assess. 
Using the SMTA membership list, the location of member 
dealers across the districts under investigation was 
closely associated with population density. A higher 
number of member dealers were located in high population 
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density areas. It is assumed that the distribution of 
members and non members of the code between licensing 
and non-licensing districts is dependent upon population 
and that the sampling procedure using intercepts chosen 
on the basis of population density controlled for this. 
While the existence of members of the code may reduce 
the extent of any detectable impact from licensing, the 
. 
fact that non compliance has already been identified as 
.a significant problem should minimise 
this effect. 
However it must be recognised as a limitation at this 
stage even though the results in later chapters clarify 
the position. 
7.6 Survey Method 
Between 21 February 1986 and 27 February 1986 a total of 
1230 contacts were made across the selected intercept 
points. These were screened for error, wrong contact and 
lack of agreement. Of this number, 1012 individual 
second-hand car purchasers were contacted during the 
last two weeks in April 1986. There were 627 successful 
first time interviews and 385 non-contacts which 
includes 63 refusals. The non-contacts were subsequently 
sent a postal reminder which resulted in a further 127 
responses of which 12 were unusable. These were added 
to the first time responses making a total of 785 or 
78.5% of the selected sample. 
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7.6.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire is divided into five sections. The 
first is designed to collect background information 
about the individual and the context in which the 
purchase took place. The second part of the 
questionnaire deals with the components of purchase 
including details of the guarantee offered and details 
of information available about the car purchased. The 
third part of the questionnaire was covered by a filter 
question to establish whether or not the consumer had 
returned to the dealer with a complaint about the car 
purchased. This section collected details about the 
nature of the complaint, the process of complaining and 
how the complaint was handled by the dealer. The fourth 
. part of the questionnaire 
dealt exclusively with 
consumer knowledge of licensing and is used in relation 
to indirect information provision. Finally, the last 
section contained questions of detail about respondents 
and their purchase. This included the necessary 
demographic variables and details of the car, the form 
of payment and the address of the dealer. The latter was 
used to categorise the dealer into different districts. 
In some cases local street maps and district boundary 
maps had to be used where the dealers premises were 
close to district boundaries. A copy of the interview 
schedule appears as Appendix IV. 
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The completed questionnaires were checked and double 
coded on to coding sheets to detect error. The checked 
data was then entered into a data file for analysis. 
This was carried out on a VAX machine running VMS using 
SPSSX release 3 and HP9000 running UNIX. 
7.7 Sample Description 
Before considering the results of the analysis some 
elementary sample description is required. This 
information summarises the key demographic and 
geographic information about the sample. 
Figure 7.2 Shows the respondents' purchase location and 
distinguishes between purchases in (a)licensed and 
(b)non-licensing areas. The majority of the sample 
purchased their second-hand car from a dealer operating 
in a licensing district. This is consistent with the 
number of licensing districts in the central population 
belt. As anticipated, purchases took place outside this 
area mainly in adjoining districts to where the 
consumers live. 
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Figure 7.2(a) Frequency of Purchase Location of Sample 
Respondents in Licensing Districts 
District Frequency % total sample 
Aberdeen 1 .1 
Bearsden 7 .8 
Clackmannan 16 2.0 
Clydebank 1 .1 
Cunninghame 5 .6 
Dundee 29 3.7 
Dunfermline 10 1.3 
East Kilbride 8 1.0 
Eastwood 5 .6 
Edinburgh 83 10.6 
Ettrick 1 .1 
Falkirk 20 2.5 
Glasgow 185 23.6 
Inverclyde 39 5.0 
Kilmarnock 22 2.8 
Kirkcaldy 31 3.9 
Midlothian 13 1.7 
Monklands 24 3.1 
NE Fife 9 1.0 
Nithsdale 1 .1 
Renfrew 15 1.9 
Stirling 31 4.0 
(5.55) (70.7) 
Figure 7.2(b) Frequency of Purchase Location of Sample 
Respondentsin Non-licensing Districts 
District Frequency % total sample 
Angus 15 1.9 
Annandale 4 .5 Berwick 1 .1 Clydesdale 2 .3 
Cumbernauld 8 1.0 
Cumnock 4 0.5 
Dumbarton 28 3.6 
East Lothian 17 2.2 
Hamilton 8 1.0 
Kyle and Carrick 31 3.9 
Motherwell 23 2.9 
Perth 36 4.6 
Stewarty 1 .1 
Strathkelvin 9 1.1 
Sutherland 1 .1 West Lothian 41 5.2 
Wigtown 1 .1 
(230) (29.3) 
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While only 21 intercept points were used the 
distribution of respondents covers 39 districts, some a 
considerable distance from the central population belt. 
The demographic profile of the second-hand car purchaser 
based upon this sample is described in Figure 7.3 
Figure 7.3 Demographic Profile of Second-hand Car 
Purchasers in sample 
Licensing Non-licensing %Total per 
Districts% Districts% variable 
Age under 25 12 3 15 
25 to 40 36 16 52 
41 to 60 20 9 29 
over 60 2 1 3 
TOTAL 70 30 100 
Sex Male 55 24 79 
Female 15 6 21 
TOTAL 70 30 100 
Price Upto £1500 19 8 27 
1501 to 3500 34 15 49 
3501 to 6000 13 6 19, 
over £6000 4 1 5 
TOTAL 70 30 100 
Dealer Franchised 48 20 68 
Non Franchised 22 10 32 
TOTAL 70 30 100 
As anticipated the majority of purchasers are between 25 
and 40 years of age, predominantly male, paying between 
£1500 and £3500 for their second-hand car. The 
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proportion of'purchases from franchised as opposed to 
non-franchised-dealers does not show any 
disproportionate distribution across the sampled 
districts. The distance between the purchaser's home and 
the dealer puts the majority of consumers within 10 
miles of the dealer's premises although over 8% 
travelled in excess of 20 miles. 
7.8 Analysis of Results 
The analysis of results is presented under the three 
headings outlined above. These examine the extent of 
information provision, the extent of any increase in 
standards and the extent of any increase in protection. 
Because the data collected is categorical, the 
statistical analysis used to investigate relationships 
is Chi-square. It should be noted that Chi-square 
cannot determine causal relationships only relationships 
which cannot be-explained on the basis of the expected 
probability of cells in a table. The significance of the 
chi-square statistic is shown as a 'l-'figure, ie >95% 
significant is indicated by values <0.05. 
In some of the tables below a correction factor is 
applied to alter the chi-square calculation. The Yates 
correction, (Yates 1934), reduces the absolute value of 
the difference between expected and observed frequencies 
by 0.5 before squaring. The purpose of the correction is 
244 
to adjust the calculation to cope with a binomial 
distribution and improves the accuracy of the chi-square 
statistic. In all 2x2 contingency tables the Yates 
correction will be applied unless otherwise stated. 
Other non parametric statistics are appropriate to 
determine whether a significant Chi-square is indicative 
of a specific relationship and the direction of such a 
relationship. Cramers V gives an adjusted Chi-square 
which accounts for the number of cells and has a value 
in the range 0.0 to 1.0 and has the same Chi-square 
distribution, this is an alternative formulation of the 
Chi-square statistic. Cramer's V is similar to Phi 
except it avoids the restriction applied to Phi, that it 
can only be used on 2xn contingency tables, as such 
where there is a2xn table, Phi-square will be used as 
the appropriate statistic, otherwise Cramer's V will be 
used. In addition, Lambda will be used where appropriate 
to give an approximation of the strength of any 
relationship and by calculation with respect to 
different dependent and independent variables, an 
indication of direction. 
Because the data is categorical the analysis is limited 
to that based upon contingency tables. However, the 
analysis is based upon comparisons of groups of 
consumers each exhibiting different purchase 
characteristics and each purchase taking place within a 
district which also has a number of licensing features. 
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in order to investigate the likelihood of 
multidimensional interactions a loglinear regression 
model was also used before detailed analysis of the 
contingency tables. The full details of this technique 
are given in Bishop, Fienberg and Holland(1975), as well 
as Gilbert(1981) and Fienberg(1977). The purpose of 
using the loglinear approach is to identify interactions 
at a partial level which may be masked in a normal 
contingency table. Although individual contingency 
tables can be broken down into a number of partial or 
conditional tables, in an analysis of this type the 
number of tables is enormous. Any detected association 
between two variables in any particular partial 
contingency table may be due to the interaction of a 
third or possibly a fourth term involving interactions 
between pairs of variables, combinations of pairs, as 
well as all of the variables. The use of a loglinear 
model allows the identification of significant 
combinations by using an iterative proportional scaling 
technique. Using four variables, licensing status, the 
incidence of complaint, satisfaction level and knowledge 
of licensing a four dimensional model was developed on 
SPSSX. Using the G square statistic which has a similar 
distribution to Chi-square, no significant interactions 
were detected among these variables. As a result it was 
safe to make assumptions based upon the results of the 
two dimensional contingency tables with respect to each 
of these four variables without the danger that 
important underlying interactions were undetected. 
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7.9 Information Provision 
7.9.1 Direct Information 
It was hypothesized that there would be a detectable 
increase in direct information associated with consumers 
who had purchased their second-hand car in licensing 
areas which require licensees to display pre-sales 
information. Specifically they will have seen a pre- 
sales inspection (PSI) report displayed on the car when 
on display and/or received a copy of the pre-sales 
inspection report at the time of completing the 
transaction. 
Using contingency tables the display of information and 
the receipt of the information were first analysed with 
respect to the licensing status of the district. The 
licensing status variable is categorical and defined as 
having two categories; non-licensing and licensing with 
PSI required (ie high and medium level licensing). The 
areas where licensing was in operation but the condition 
to display pre-sales inspection reports was not present 
were excluded. The result is shown below in Table 7.1 
Although the Chi-square is significant, both Cramer's V 
and Lambda suggest that the association between the 
licensing status of the district council (requiring pre- 
sales inspection reports) and pre-sales information 
actually being seen on the car is weak. 
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Table 7.1 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (PSI Required/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Pre-sales Information 
Displayed on Cars' (n=574) 
Licensing with Non-licensing 
PSI Required 
YES 4.9% 12.4% 
PSI 
Displayed 
NO 95.1% 87.6% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 
348 226 
Chi-square = 10.67 with 1 df (sig . 00108) Cramers V=0.136 (sig . 00108) 
Lambda = . 048 (with District dependant) 
The most notable result from this contingency table is 
the higher incidence of pre-sales inspection reports in 
non-licensing areas than in licensing areas where it is 
a licensing requirement. The small cell residual can 
possibly be explained by a higher number of code of 
practice members complying with the code in non- 
licensing areas. 
This result suggests that either the dealers are not 
displaying the required information or that respondents 
were unable to recognise the report. To test the 
likelihood of the latter case, the number of consumers 
seeing a PSI report is combined with those who had seen 
any kind of descriptive information about the condition 
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of the car displayed. A total of 348 people (44%) of the 
sample purchased their car in areas where PSI was a 
licence condition. In total 29% of consumers who-had 
purchased from dealers who are required to display this 
information actually saw a pre-sales information sheet 
or any other information describing the condition of the 
car. It would seem that the former scenario is the more 
likely that dealers in licensing areas are not 
displaying the required information. 
The pre-sales inspection report, while not displayed 
could be given to the consumer at any time during the 
transaction. This presents a second opportunity to 
assess whether licensed dealers are providing direct 
information. The results are shown in Table 7.2 
Table 7.2 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council(PSI Reuired/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Pre-sales Information 
Received' (n=270) 
Licensing with Non-licensing 
PSI Required 
YES 3.8% 13.2% 
PSI 
Given to 
Consumer 
NO 96.2% 86.8% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 
156 114 
Chi-square - 8.04 with 1 df (sig . 0021) Cramers V=0.029 (sig . 0021) Lambda = . 01 (with status dependent) 
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Respondents who had purchased from licensed dealers were 
asked whether they were given any written information 
about the condition of the car they had purchased. 34% 
of the sample (270) indicated that written information 
was supplied of which 17% (46) identified it as a form 
of pre-sales inspection report. Of this number only 3.8% 
(6) respondents had purchased from a dealer in a 
licensing area where a copy of a pre-sales inspection 
report was required to be given. 
From both these results it is clear that the pre-sales 
inspection reports are not being displayed upon cars 
sold in licensing areas where it is required to be 
displayed. Of the 479 consumers who purchased from 
dealers in licensing areas only 2% of purchasers saw the 
report displayed and received a copy at the time of 
purchase. In terms of the hypotheses, licensing appears 
to have had no impact on direct information provision. 
7.9.2 Indirect Information 
The second form of information provision through 
licensing is the reduction in the information burden 
upon consumers by the introduction of a minimum standard 
(considered below). This is an indirect form of 
information provision to the market where the fact that 
licensing exists may be seen as a summary of positive 
dealer attributes by consumers. In investigating this 
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view, the degree of knowledge about the system is 
assessed first on the basis that not all purchasers can 
be assumed to know of the system. Second, attitudes to 
licensed dealers are measured to assess whether the- 
attitude is positive or negative. Finally whether the 
consumer knew whether or not that the dealer was 
operating within a licensing area is identified as a 
means of assessing whether this was relevant to the 
choice of dealer. 
From the total sample, 38% of second-hand car purchasers 
indicated that they knew about the system of licensing 
second-hand car dealers operating in Scotland. When 
asked about the policy of the district in which they 
purchased their own second-hand car 65% of this group 
correctly identified the district council as either 
licensing or non-licensing. All respondents were asked 
to rate a licensed dealer against a non-licensed dealer. 
The results of this question are shown below in Table 
7.3. 
Table 7.3 Consumer Evaluation of Licensed Second-hand 
Car Dealer 
A much better dealer 13% 
A better dealer 40% 
Same as others 39% 
A Worse dealer 0.3% 
A much worse dealer 0.2% 
Don't Know 8% 
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Predominantly, the attitude toward licensing is positive 
with respondents viewing licensed dealers as better than 
other dealers. It could be argued that purchasers who 
did not know of licensing but who answered this question 
would give significantly different answers to those who 
did know of the system. However both groups were similar 
in the distribution of answers, although respondents who 
knew of licensing were more likely to rank licensed 
dealers as better rather than much better than other 
dealers. 
As a more general test respondents who knew of licensing 
were asked whether they would prefer to purchase from a 
licensed as opposed to an unlicensed second-hand car 
dealer. 77% of this group indicated that they would 
prefer a licensed dealer with 20% indicating no 
preference and only 0.4% preferring non licensed. 
The fact that relatively few purchasers knew about the 
licensing system casts doubt upon the contribution of 
licensing in terms of the indirect information benefit. 
Nevertheless, if those consumers who knew of licensing 
consciously chose to purchase from a licensed dealer 
then some marginal benefit may be apparent since 
attitudes towards licensed dealers was positive. Table 
7.4 shows the result of the crosstabulation between 
knowledge of licensing and whether the purchase occurred 
in a licensing area. 
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Table 7.4 Contingency Table for Variable 'Whether 
Consumer Purchased From a Dealer in a 
Licensing Area' by 'Respondents Knowledge of a 
Licensing System' (n=785) 
Purchase from Dealer 
in Licensing Area 
YES NO 
Knew of 
Licensing 
System 
YES 36.3% 41.5% 
NO 63.7% 58.5% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 
554 231 
Chi-square - 1.73 with ldf (sig = 0.18) 
Cramers V= . 047 (sig - 0.18) 
Lambda - 0.0 
The attitude of the respondents from the previous 
results were predominantly positive toward the licensed 
dealer. In addition the majority of respondents would 
prefer to purchase from a licensed dealer. If licensing 
was having an impact upon purchase location it would be 
expected that knowledge of licensing would be a good 
predictor for purchase within a licensing area. However, 
the result of the crosstabulation does not suggest any 
relationship between knowledge of licensing and purchase 
within a licensing area. There is some dysfunction 
between attitude and behaviour in this context, some 
intervening variable which prevents consumers with 
positive attitude and positive preference from 
purchasing from a licensed dealer. Possible explanations 
are that precise information about licensing is limited 
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and so the perceived benefits of purchasing from a 
dealer in a licensing area are not sufficiently salient 
to alter behaviour. Or, it may be the case that licensed 
dealers are difficult to identify. In the absence of 
detailed information upon choice criteria in relation to 
dealer and how this is related to choice of specific car 
this cannot be investigated further. 
It has been established that some districts are 
licensing and some are not and also that some consumers 
know of the licensing system and others do not. 
Respondents have positive attitudes to licensing and 
toward licensed dealers which suggests that purchase 
behaviour would be affected by this information. 
Specifically, respondents would gravitate toward 
licensing areas. However, there is no evidence to 
support this contention. Even among respondents who were 
aware of the system their purchase patterns do not 
appear to be affected by the licensing policy of the 
district in which the dealer operates. 
Both of these results suggest that improved market 
information ascribed to licensing policy is not in 
evidence in the Scottish system of licensing second-hand 
car dealers. However that is not to say that other 
benefits, specifically improved standards of provision 
or improved protection are not present. 
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7.10 Standard of Provision 
The following factors will be considered in relation to 
the standard of provision with respect to licensing: 
In relation to the Dealer: 
(1) Satisfaction with dealer service 
In relation to the Car: 
(2) Overall satisfaction with car 
(3) Incidence of complaint 
7.10.1 Satisfaction with Dealer Service 
The method used to assess the quality of service in 
relation to the dealer was a measurement of overall 
satisfaction. This was operationalised using seven 
dealer specific criteria. Respondents were asked to rank 
seven criteria: attention by staff, range of vehicles on 
offer, vehicle presentation, garage facilities, 
knowledge of staff, overall service and after sales 
service were used. Each of the criteria was rated using 
a Likert type scale from 1 to 7 (where 1 was very happy 
and 7 very unhappy). Individual cross-tabulations 
between each individual criterion and the licensing 
status of the district produced no, significant 
associations. It was decided to combine individuals' 
scores across all criteria to generate a total 
satisfaction score. The score ranges from 7 (which is 7 
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items rated 1 for very satisfied) to 49 (which is 7 
items rated 7 for very unhappy) This new variable was 
recoded for analysis using contingency tables into four 
categories to give a nominal very high satisfaction (7- 
12), high satisfaction(13-24) low satisfaction(25-36) 
and very low satisfaction(37-49). The results of 
crosstabulation using the variable total satisfaction 
score divided in to four categories tabulated against 
the variable licensing status (dichotomous and four 
levels) are shown in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6. 
Table 7.5 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Total Satisfaction Score' 
(n-785) 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
Very 40.4% 42.9% 
High 
Satisfaction High 41.3% 39.1% 
Score 
Low 14.7% 15.3% 
Very 3.6% 2.7% 
Low 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
554 231 
Chi-square - 1.576 with 3df sig - 0.664 
Cramers Va0.064 (sig 0.664) 
Lambda - 0.012 (with Status dependant) 
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Table 7.6 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (High, Medium, Low 
and Non-licensing)' by 'Total Satisfaction 
Score' (n=785) 
Licensing Status 
Non Lic Lo Lic Med Lic Hi Lic 
Very 42.9% 46.3% 37.1% 35.8% 
High 
Satis- High 39.1% 47.8% 44.6% 46.8% 
faction 
Score Low 15.3% 4.8% 15.0% 16.3% 
Very 2.7% 2.0% 3.1% 1.0% 
Low 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
230 207 159 190 
Chi-square - 10.759 with 9df sig - 0.292 
Cramers V-0.097 (sig 0.292) 
Lambda - 0.021 (with Status dependant) 
The distribution of total satisfaction scores using both 
variable formats for licensing status show no 
significant differences between purchasers in licensing 
and non-licensing areas or between different levels of 
licensing. Over 80% of purchasers were either happy or 
very happy with the seven dealer specific criteria 
selected which suggests overall a high degree of 
satisfaction in this sample. 
The satisfaction variable was disaggregated and based 
upon the assumption that satisfaction could be 
considered an ordered rather than nominal variable. The 
mean scores of purchasers in licensing areas were 
compared with the mean satisfaction scores of purchasers 
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in non-licensing areas. The difference was tested using 
a F-test and following Robson(1979) and Blalock(1978) a 
one tailed test was used since it is hypothesized that 
the licensed satisfaction score will be higher than the 
non licensed score. The results of the F-test appear in 
Figure 7.4 below 
Figure 7.4 F-test for Differences in Mean 
Satisfaction Scores 
Mean St. D 
Satisfaction Score (licensed) 1.75 . 775 
Satisfaction Score (non-licensed) 1.76 . 741 
F value= 1.09 
One tail probability= 0.283 with 783 df (non 
significant) 
The critical value of F at the 0.05 level is 1.31 and 
the F value does not exceed this. It can be concluded 
that the difference in means is not significant or more, 
formally that the two selected groups in all probability 
are drawn from the same population ie not two different 
populations; licensed and non licensed. 
On the dealer spi 
differences have 
purchased from a 
to consumers who 
proposition that 
to the dealer is 
scific criteria selected, no significant 
been detected between consumers who 
dealer in a licensed area when compared 
purchased in a non-licensing area. The 
the quality of provision with respect 
higher in licensing areas, based upon 
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the selected criteria and the validity of the analyses, 
has to be questioned given the lack of evidence. However 
it may be that the dealer is less important in terms of 
standard of provision than features of the cars which 
they sell. This is investigated using two car specific 
criteria associated with complaint. 
7.10.2 Satisfaction with Car 
The second measure of the standard of provision is the 
degree of satisfaction indicated by purchasers with the 
car purchased. Preliminary analysis indicated that the 
level of satisfaction was significantly associated with 
whether or not any complaint was made to the dealer and 
whether or not such a complaint was subsequently 
resolved. In addition, satisfaction with the car was 
significantly associated with the type of dealer from 
whom the car was purchased which in turn was dependent 
upon the price paid for the car. The complexity of the 
cross-tabulations in selecting out different groups of 
consumers and investigating the series of co-variates to 
assess the impact of licensing suggested that F-tests 
would be more appropriate in assessing significant 
differences in scores on the basis of the licensing 
status of the district. However, Blalock(1978) warns 
against using a series of F-tests on groups, suggesting 
a limitation when used in conjunction with a single 
paired comparison. As a consequence the analysis is 
limited to a single comparison; the mean satisfaction 
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score of consumers who purchased in licensing areas 
compared with those who purchased in non-licensing 
areas. The results of this comparison are shown in 
Figure 7.5 
Figure 7.5 F-Test for Difference in Means, 
Satisfaction Grouped by Licensed and Non 
Licensed Purchase 
Mean St. D 
Satisfaction Score (licensed) 2.17 1.53 
Satisfaction Score (non-licensed) 2.22 1.42 
F value= 1.17 
One tail probability- 0.075 with 783 df (non 
significant) 
The F value is not significant at the 95% level and the 
hypothesis that these two mean scores are derived from 
different populations has to be rejected. There is no 
significant difference between the satisfaction scores 
between purchasers of cars in licensing as opposed to 
non-licensing areas. 
7.10.3 The Incidence of Complaint 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they 
had complained to the dealer about the second-hand car 
they had purchased. A comparative analysis was conducted 
of complaint frequency in each of the different district 
types using contingency tables. It was hypothesized that 
a higher incidence of complaints will be associated with 
a lower quality of provision. In terms of the study, 
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licensed dealers will be associated with lower complaint 
levels. However it must be recognised that the 
relationship is equivocal. If licensed dealers provide 
more information about the cars they offer, or 
contribute to a situation where consumers are more 
knowledgeable about their legal rights, it is possible 
that licensed dealers would be associated with more 
rather than fewer complaints. Therefore, as a 
preliminary stage the incidence of complaint was cross- 
tabulated with the existence and display of pre-sales 
information to identify consumers who were associated 
with more than normal levels of information. Second, the 
incidence of complaint was cross-tabulated with the 
reason for buying from a dealer rather than buying 
privately. This was done to identify consumers who knew 
that their rights to redress were substantially more 
when buying from a dealer rather than buying privately. 
In both cases there was no association present and it 
was considered valid to reject the argument about the 
effect of provided information and the level of 
knowledge about statutory rights in favour of the 
original assertion. 
In keeping with the structure used in previous parts of 
this chapter the incidence of complaint was analysed. 
with respect to two forms of the licensing status 
variable, characterised by the dichotomous variable 
licensing/non-licensing, and the four ordered categories 
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of licensing. The results of this analysis appear as 
Tables 7.7 and 7.8 below. 
. Table 7.7 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing Status of District Council (Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Returned to Dealer with 
Complaint' (n=785) 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
YES 50.1% 47.4% 
Complained 
to Dealer 
NO 49.9% 52.6% 
(TOTAL)* 100.0 100.0 
555 230 
Chi-square - 0.372 with ldf sig - 0.5419 
Cramers V-0.0 
Lambda = 0.0001 
Table 7.8 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (High, Medium, Low, 
Non-licensing)' by 'Complaint to Dealer' 
(n=785) 
Licensing Status 
Non Lic Lo Lic Med Lic Hi Lic 
YES 47.4% 52% 55.1% 44.7% 
Complained 
to Dealer 
NO 52.6% 48% 44.9% 55.3% 
(TOTAL) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
230 200 145 210- 
Chi-square 4.649 with 3df sig 0.199 
Cramers V 0.0769 
Lambda - 0.059 (with Compliant dependent) 
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Although both tables do not show a significant 
difference between complaint frequency and licensing 
status, what is surprising is the high number of total 
complaints to dealers in the sample. It appears that 50% 
of second-hand car purchasers in the sample have 
returned to the dealer with a complaint. However the 
tables are almost symmetric indicating that the 
incidence of complaint is not different from that which 
would have been expected. On the basis of this result 
the hypothesis that dealers in licensing areas are 
associated with a lower incidence of complaint has to be 
rejected. Accepting the limitations of this variable as 
a measure of the quality of provision, licensing appears 
to have had no impact upon the standard of provision in 
this market. 
7.11 Improved Protection 
To investigate the third proposition that licensing will 
contribute toward improved protection, two criteria were 
assessed; (1) the nature of any guarantee or warranty 
provided with the car, and (2) the incidence of 
unresolved complaints as a measure of economic loss. 
7.11.1 Nature of Guarantee or Warranty 
Each of the three included variables: (a) existence, (b) 
form, and (c) length will be analysed with respect to 
the differing licence status of the district in which 
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the dealer operates to assess any differences in 
provision. 
7.11.1(a) Existence of Guarantee 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they had 
received any form of guarantee with the car they had 
purchased. The incidence of guarantee provision was 
cross-tabulated with the type of district using both 
forms of the status variable. First the districts were 
grouped and divided into licensing and non-licensing 
districts. Second the district variable was 
disaggregated to show non-licensing and the three levels 
of licensing. Table 7.9 shows the results of the first 
cross-tabulated set, ie using licensing status as a 
dichotomous variable. 
Table 7.9 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Guarantee Given on Car' 
(n=784) 
Licensing Status 
of District 
Licensing Non-licensing 
Any YES 83.9% 83.5% 
Guarantee 
Given on 
Car NO 16.1% 16.5% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0% 
554 230 
Chi-square - . 00172 with ldf sig - 0.96 Cramers V= . 005 (sig 0.96) 
Lambda - 0.0 
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Whether or not a guarantee was given with the car 
purchased, in either written or verbal form, is not 
associated with the licensing status of the'district in 
which the dealer operates. This result would suggest 
that the dealers in licensing areas are not providing 
more guarantees or warranties than dealers in non- 
licensing areas. The analysis was repeated using the 
second form of the licensing status variable. The 
results of this analysis can be seen in Table 7.10. This 
allows for much greater discrimination in investigating 
possible differences between licensing areas. 
Nevertheless there are no significant differences 
detected when using the redefined licensing status 
variable. 
Table 7.10 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (High, Medium, Low, 
and Non-licensing)' by 'Guarantee Given on 
Carl (n=783) 
Licensing status 
Non Lic Lo Lic Med Lic Hi Lic 
YES 70.8% 74.8% 67.3% 64.2% 
Guarantee 
Given 
NO 29.2% 25.2% 32.7% 35.8% 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
233 198 143 210 
0 
Chi-square - 5.912 with 3df sig = 0.1157 
Cramers Va . 085 (sig 0.1157) Lambda = 0.014 (with status dependant) 
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Both tables suggest no significant difference between 
licensing status and the provision of guarantees for 
." second-hand cars. As such, licensing cannot be said to 
be increasing the quality of provision in this respect. 
It is notable that 16% of second-hand car purchasers did 
not get any form of guarantee with their car. If 
anything the tendency was for areas with high level 
licensing to give fewer guarantees. Further analysis of 
the data, with respect to the price of the car and the 
type of dealer, did not provide any additional 
information except that guarantee provision is not 
dealer type, price or location specific. 
7.11.1(b) Form of Guarantee 
The second variable with respect to guarantee or 
warranty is the form of the guarantee, specifically 
whether it is a written guarantee or a verbal guarantee. 
In terms of quality, the written guarantee is superior 
since it cannot be altered at some later date. It 
defines the nature of the guarantee offered and forms a 
contractual obligation upon the dealer to honour the 
guarantee since it is part of the contract of sale. It 
was hypothesized that dealers in licensing areas will 
offer significantly more written guarantees. The form of 
the guarantee was cross-tabulated with the licensing 
status of the district. This was carried out as above 
for both the dichotomous licensing status variable 
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licensing/ non-licensing (Table 7.11) as well as for the 
variable which consisted of four categories (Table 
7.12). It should be noted that in those licensing areas 
which require compliance with the code of practice, the 
code states that written guarantees must be given. 
Table 7.11 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Form of Guarantee Given' 
(n=656) 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
Form of 
Guarantee 
Written 82.3% 85.2 
Verbal 17.7% 14.8% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
452 194 
Chi-square - . 555 with ldf sig = 0.456 
Cramers V- . 0008 (sig 0.456) 
Lambda Q 0.0 
The results suggest that there is no association between 
the two variables and as such the proposition that 
dealers in licensing areas offer more written as opposed 
to verbal guarantees has to be rejected. The analysis 
was repeated, using the second licensing status. The 
result shows that the four category variable has no 
effect on the result above. Non-licensing and low level 
licensing areas show a tendency to give more written 
guarantees than other licensing areas. 
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Table 7.12 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (High, Medium, Low 
and Non-licensing)' by 'Form of Guarantee 
Given' (n=663) 
Licensing status 
Non Lic Lo Lic Med Lic Hi Lic 
Written 85% 85.6% 71.8% 82.2% 
Form of 
Guarantee 
Given 
Verbal 14.9% 14.4% 27.2% 17.8% 
(TOTAL) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
194 174 126 169 
Chi-square - 5.912 with 3df sig - 0.1157 
Cramers V- . 085 (sig 0.1157) 
Lambda - 0.014 (with Status dependant) 
Both tables suggest that there is no significant 
association between the licensing status of the district 
and the type of guarantees given to car purchasers. This 
is consistent with the results in relation to whether 
the guarantee was given at all. Standard of provision as 
measured by the form of guarantee is not affected by 
whether the. dealer operates in a licensing area. 
7.11.1(c) Period of Guarantee 
The third variable with respect to the guarantee given 
with the car is the length of cover that is offered. In 
a general sense a longer guarantee period represents a 
higher level of provision than a shorter guarantee 
period. It is on this basis that the following analysis 
should be considered. Without detailed information about 
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the content of the guarantee it is not possible to come 
to any conclusions about the quality of cover offered. 
Nevertheless it was hypothesized in accordance with the 
thesis of an improved standard of provision that dealers 
operating in licensing areas would provide longer 
guarantees of whatever form. 
Analysis had established a significant association 
between the form of the guarantee and the length of the 
guarantee ie written guarantees were significantly more 
likely to be longer than verbal guarantees. As a 
consequence, two groups were selected on the basis of 
the type of guarantee received to control for this 
type/length effect. The first sub-group was selected 
consisting of those purchasers who had received a 
written guarantee. The length of guarantee received by 
the members of the group was cross-tabulated with the 
licensing status of the district defined in terms of 
licensing/ non-licensing and in terms of the four levels 
of licensing activity. 
This analysis was repeated using a variable consisting 
of those purchasers who had received a verbal guarantee. 
The results of the analyses are shown below in Table 
7.13 and Table 7.14. 
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Table 7.13 Contingency Table For Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council(Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Period of Guarantee Given' 
Controlling for Variable 'Received Written 
Guarantee' (na549). 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
<1 Month 37.5% 3.6% 
1 month to 
6 months 51.5% 32.7% 
Period of >6 months 
Guarantee <1, Year 7.3% 58.8% 
>1 year 3.6% 4.8% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
384 165 
Chi-square - 2.93 with 3df sig a 0.402 
Cramers v- . 072 (sig 0.402) 
Lambda a 0.0 
The result of the cross-tabulation does not show a 
significant difference between licensing status and the 
period of the guarantee. given by the dealer. The 
majority of consumers receive a written guarantee 
lasting up to 6 months. There is no evidence that 
dealers in licensing areas as a group give longer 
written guarantees. The analysis is repeated below using 
the licensing status variable with four values. 
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Table 7.14 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (High, Medium, Low, 
and Non-licensing' by 'Period of Guarantee' 
Controlling for Variable 'Written Guarantee 
Received' (na549). 
Licensing Status 
Non Lie Lo Lie Med Lie Hi Lie 
<1 month 3.6% 2.0% 
1 month to 32.7% 34.0% 
6 months 
>6 months 58.7% 56.4% 
to 1 year 
3.0% 5.7% 
35.7% 42.4% 
51.0% 46.7% 
>1 year 4.8% 7.4% 10.2% 5.0% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
165 147 98 139 
Chi-square a 10.867 with 9df sig a 0.284 
Cramers V= . 0812 (sig 0.284) 
Lambda = 0.026 (with Status dependant) 
The repeated analysis shows no significant distinction 
in the length of guarantees provided between districts 
characterised by the four levels of licensing activity. 
However the existence of Lambda at 0.026 suggests a weak 
although directional relationship using the licensing 
status to predict guarantee length. The causal 
relationship is weak and the association non-significant 
so no conclusions can be drawn from this. in both cases, 
there is no significant difference between the length of 
written guarantee between districts of different 
licensing status. 
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The analysis was repeated controlling for those 
purchasers who had received a verbal guarantee, again 
using both forms of status variable. The results-of the 
analysis appear in Table 7.15 and Table 7.16. 
Table 7.15 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Period of Guarantee' 
Controlling for Variable 'Received Verbal 
Guarantee' (n=108). 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
1 Month 16.2% 14.2% 
1 month to 
6 months 50.0% 60.7% 
Period of >6 months 
guarantee <1 Year 31.2% 21.4% 
>1 year 2.5% 3.5% 
(TOTAL) 100.0 100.0 
80 26 
Chi-square - 1.284 with 3df sig - 0.728 
Cramers V= . 109 (sig 0.728) 
Lambda a 0.0 
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Table 7.16 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council(High, Medium, Low, 
and Non-licensing)' by 'Period of Guarantee' 
Controlling for Variable 'Verbal Guarantee 
Received' (n=108). 
Licensing Status 
Non Lic Lo Lic Med Lic Hi Lic 
<1 month 14.3% 0.0% 25.9% 20.7% 
1 month to 60.7% 50.0% 44.4% 55.1% 
Period 6 months 
of 
G'tee >6 months 21.4% 50.0% 29.6% 17.2% 
to 1 year 
>1 year 3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 6.9% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
28 24 27 29 
Chi-square 15.697 with 9df sig - 0.074* 
Cramers V- . 22 (sig 0.074) 
Lambda a 0.113 (with Status dependant) 
* 50% of cells had Expected Frequency of 
less than 5 
Consistent with the results for the length of written 
guarantees given to the second-hand car purchasers there 
is no association between the length of verbal 
guarantees given and the licensing status of the 
district in which the dealer operates. It is notable 
that the majority of verbal guarantees given were for a 
period of between 1 month and 6 months whereas for 
written guarantees the majority were for a period of 
between 6 months and 1 year. There are no indications 
that protection in licensing districts as measured by 
details of the guarantee is significantly different to 
non-licensing districts. 
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7.11.2 Incidence of Unresolved Complaint 
The second variable used to assess the relative amount 
of protection afforded through licensing is an 
approximate measure for the quality of the guarantee or 
warranty offered. This is achieved by assessing whether 
there are any differences in the number of unresolved 
complaints between districts of different licensing 
status. 
The first stage is to establish whether the form of the 
guarantee has any impact upon complaint resolution as 
this would need controlling for in any analysis of 
complaint resolution. Finally the experiences of those 
consumers who were not given a guarantee or for whom the 
guarantee did not cover the complaint are assessed since 
this is the true test of dealers' commitment to 
resolving consumer complaints. 
The two forms of guarantee, written and verbal were 
selected and analysed using a contingency table with 
respect. to the resolution of the complaint. The results 
of the analysis are shown in Table 7.17 below. 
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Table 7.17 Contingency Table for Variable 'Form of 
Guarantee' by 'Complaint Resolved' (n-359) 
Form of Guarantee 
Written Verbal 
Complaint 
Resolved 
YES 73.8% 55.4% 
NO 26.2% 44.6% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
294 65 
Chi-square= 7.86 ldf sig=. 0052 
Phi = 0.155 
Lambda 0.00 
There is a significant association between the type of 
guarantee received and the resolution of the complaint. 
Analysis of the residuals suggests a higher proportion 
of resolved complaints in the written guarantee category 
than would have been expected. This result adds weight 
to the earlier assumption that written guarantees are 
'better' guarantees. Having established that there is a 
difference between resolution rates and the different 
forms of guarantee, the distribution must now be 
controlled for in analysing differences between 
districts, the purpose being to assess differences in 
the content of the guarantees given, either written or 
verbal. 
The first group of respondents was selected on the basis 
of the type of guarantee they received when purchasing 
their second-hand car. The complaint resolution rate was 
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then cross tabulated with the licensing-status of the 
district. The purpose of the analysis is to identify 
whether there were significant differences in the 
complaint resolution rate across licensing and non- 
licensing districts associated with one specific form of 
guarantee. Using the dichotomous variable for licensing 
status Table 7.18 shows the results of this analysis for 
purchasers who received a written guarantee with their 
car. 
Table 7.18 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status' of District Council (Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Complaint Resolved' 
Controlling for Variable 'Written Guarantee. 
Received' (n=294) 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
YES 71.9% 78.6% 
Complaint 
Resolved 
NO 28.1% 21.4% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
210 84 
Chi-square= 1.05 ldf siga. 3045 
Phi = 0.201 
Lambda 0.00 
Despite the larger number of resolved complaint in non- 
licensing districts the difference between districts on 
this basis is not significant. Even though the type of 
276 
guarantee has been controlled for (to eliminate any 
differences in the distribution of different forms of 
guarantee), dealers in licensing areas do not appear to 
give substantially better written guarantees than 
dealers in non-licensing areas. The analysis was 
repeated but on the second selected group of consumers 
who had received a verbal as opposed to a written 
guarantee. The results of this analysis are shown below 
in Table 7.19 
Table 7.19 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Complaint Resolved' 
Controlling for Variable 'Verbal Guarantee 
Received' (n-65) 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
Complaint 
Resolved 
YES 55.6% 55.3% 
NO 44.4% 44.7$ 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
18 47 
Chi-square= 0.00 ldf sig=1.0 
Phi = 0.002 
Lambda 0.00 
The results of the analysis using the verbal guarantee 
group show a table tending toward symmetry with expected 
and observed frequencies nearing equality. This 
indicates that there is very little difference between 
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complaint resolution rates across licensing and non- 
licensing districts. Both sets of analysis were repeated 
using the four category variable for licensing status. 
In keeping with the results above, no significant 
differences were detected between the four status 
categories despite a tendency for higher level licensing 
districts to exhibit lower resolution rates for both 
types of guarantee. 
On the basis of the assumptions made above dealers in 
licensing areas are not providing purchasers with 
guarantees which are 'better' in the sense that they are 
more likely to result in a satisfactorily resolved 
complaint. As a consequence, the proposition of improved 
protection measured through improved guarantees cannot 
be substantiated. 
The final part of this analysis is to investigate a 
third group of second-hand car purchasers who so far 
have been ignored. These are purchasers who did not 
receive any form of guarantee yet returned to the dealer 
with a complaint. The absence of a time limited 
guarantee adds an-extra dimension to the analysis since 
it is likely that in the absence of any formal guarantee 
the dealer would be more willing to resolve complaints 
the sooner after purchase it is communicated. This is 
because liability is easier to establish for the - 
consumer. As a result of this, consumers who were not 
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given guarantees, who subsequently had to complain and 
who complained within one month of purchase were 
selected. Using an analysis similar to that above, this 
group's resolution rate was assessed with respect to the 
licensing status of the district. The result of this 
analysis is shown below in Table 7.20 
Table 7.20 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District Council (Licensing/Non- 
licensing)' by 'Complaint Resolved' 
Controlling for Variable 'No Guarantee 
Received' (n=26) 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
Complaint 
Resolved 
YES 50.0% 66.7% 
NO 50.0% 33.3% 
TOTAL 100.10 100.0 
20 6 
Chi-square= 0.06 ldf sig=0.80 
Phi = 0.142 
Lambda 0.00 
Despite the small size of this group the results of the 
analysis does not suggest that dealers in licensing 
areas are any more likely to resolve a complaint without 
a guarantee than dealers in non-licensing areas. Because 
of the small number of consumers in the selected group, 
a number of expected cell values in this 2x2 contingency 
table were close to 5. With expected cell values of less 
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than 5, Chi-square becomes unreliable. This analysis 
was repeated using the licensing status variable with 
four'levels but the number of reliable cells was-less 
than 40%. The proposition that licensing improves the 
level'of protection afforded to consumers cannot be 
defended based upon the above results. 
7.12 Conclusion 
Following the encompassing methodology, the purpose of 
this chapter was to establish the extent to which there 
are observable outputs from the licensing system which 
was instituted by the Civic Government Scotland Act 
1982. The methodology in this chapter is based upon 
comparing consumer experiences in licensing and non- 
licensing areas. Three propositions were presented which 
have been used to promote licensing as a viable 
contribution to the well being of consumers in other 
markets. These three propositions when tested in the 
second-hand car market cannot be substantiated. The 
assessment of each benefit suggests that there are no 
differences between the purchase experiences of second- 
hand car purchasers in licensing and non-licensing 
districts. 
The absence of any differences, despite data 
limitations, suggests a serious dysfunction between the 
the theoretical benefits associated with this form of 
market intervention and its market impact. This result 
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points toward an intervening effect between the policy 
as envisaged at its introduction and its delivery. It 
was anticipated that there would be some dysfunction 
between policy and outcome but the failure to identify 
any outcome whatsoever in relation to the theoretical 
benefits was surprising. As a consequence the next stage 
in the analysis, in keeping with the overall methodology 
is to investigate the mediating effects in an attempt to 
assess their importance in understanding and explaining 
the marked difference between desired and observed 
effects. The identified mediating structures are the 
dealers, the outside agencies involved in vetting and 
enforcing as well as the district councils themselves. 
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Chapter 8 Study 3 --The Impact of Second-hand Car Dealer 
Licensing upon Second-hand Car 
Dealers 
8.1 Introduction 
The methodology in Chapter 5 identified three 
interdependent components, the object, the event and an 
intervening mechanism. So far the object and the event 
have been investigated. The results suggest that the 
intervening mechanism consisting of the dealers' 
response to'licensing and the operation of, the licensing 
system by the districts, is providing an obstacle, as 
yet undefined, to the desired event. As a consequence 
this chapter investigates the first of these intervening 
mechanisms or structures between the object and the 
event ie the second-hand car dealers. By identifying two 
necessary conditions for the policy to operate, the 
chapter will be structured around an investigation of 
whether these conditions are met in the Scottish 
application. In addition it will assess dealers' 
experiences and attitudes toward second-hand car dealer 
licensing. 
8.2 Necessary Conditions 
In order for licensing to operate certain necessary 
conditions must be fulfilled. These conditions are 
applicable to all licensing systems. 
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1. All dealers within a licensing area must hold a 
licence. 
2. All licensed dealers must comply fully with the 
licence conditions. 
These two necessary conditions will form the basis of 
the first part of the analysis and are considered in 
more depth below. 
8.2.1 Comprehensive Licence Possession 
To deliver the benefits of a licensing scheme, the local 
authority must first direct resources to producing and 
maintaining comprehensive licence possession. A 
fundamental feature of any occupational licensing system 
is that only licensed providers are legally entitled to 
supply the market with their services. It is this 
condition which defines a framework within which the 
policy of licensing can operate effectively. This is 
through the application of licence conditions for 
licence holders and through the vetting procedure to 
exclude those who are not considered fit to trade. 
Specifically, comprehensive licensing: 
(a) Defines a framework in which administrative control 
can take place. 
(b) Defines a framework within which the identifiable 
benefits to consumers can be delivered. 
The existence of dealers who operate within a licensing 
area without holding a licence presents a number of 
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problems for the administering district. First, it is 
difficult to impose authority where there appears to be 
no sanction. The existence of non licensed dealers 
removes the deterrent effect of licence withdrawal, (or 
refusal to issue) which should theoretically debar 
practising within the licensing area. This removal of 
sanction from the licensing authority reduces the 
ability to impose licence conditions among holders who 
have the real option of ignoring any mandatory changes 
to their trading behaviour. In addition, it increases 
the enforcement burden because of the extra cost of 
identifying licensed dealers who need to comply with 
conditions. Finally it reduces the administrative 
benefits of centralised and comprehensive information. 
The presence of non-licensed providers within a 
licensing area also has implications for consumers. This 
is specifically in relation to the three benefits 
identified in the previous chapter. The notion of 
improved information as a result of licensing through 
the direct provision of information is still tenable 
even if only some dealers comply. However in relation to 
indirect information, the presence of non-licensed 
provision increases rather than reduces the information 
burden upon consumers. Purchasers would have to know 
which dealers are licensed and which are not in order to 
make some assessment of whether the minimum quality 
-standard implied by licensing applied in practice. 
Second, in relation to the standard of provision, 
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depending upon the extent of unlicensed dealing, the 
quality dispersion could increase. This would drive out 
those dealers required to provide improved quality 
through licensing due to unfair competition from lower 
quality unlicensed providers. Finally in relation to 
improved protection, those consumers who do not have the 
necessary information to distinguish between licensed 
and unlicensed provision may assume a minimum standard 
of provision where none is present and thereby suffer 
economic loss. This is a situation where unlicensed 
dealers are free riding upon quality perceptions in the 
market. 
8.2.2 Comprehensive Compliance with Conditions 
Comprehensive licensing will go some way toward the 
. 
improvement of standards of provision by eliminating 
'unfit' dealers. However there is a further requirement. 
This is the application of controls over trading 
behaviour which provides an additional mechanism for the 
delivery of benefits to purchasers depending upon the 
nature of the controls applied. As such the arguments in 
support of the first condition which are based upon the 
negative effects of inconsistency can equally apply 
where there are differences in compliance with licence 
conditions, even though the overall standard may be 
marginally higher. 
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Licence holders who do not comply with the controls over 
trading behaviour may be able to supply at a lower cost 
or lower quality by not complying with licence 
conditions. Specifically, there is an additional cost to 
licence holders incurred through variations in 
compliance. Similarly, for consumers, variation in 
compliance implies an increase in required information 
in order to discriminate between licence holders who are 
complying fully and those who are not. 
8.3 Aims of Study 
These two necessary conditions form 
study of how licensing is affecting 
dealers and whether local licensing 
necessary conditions-to deliver the 
licensing to the consumer. specific 
need to be addressed: 
the basis of the 
second-hand car 
systems exhibit the 
benefits of 
ally three questions 
1. To what extent are second-hand car dealers 
participating in the local licensing system ? 
Following the statement of the two necessary conditions 
above, this question implies a three stage process, 
first to investigate the incidence of unlicensed trading 
within the licensing areas, second to establish whether 
dealers who hold a licence know of the licence 
conditions which apply to them. The third is whether 
those who are licensed and know of the conditions are 
complying with them. At each stage in this process it is 
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I 
important to identify the reasons for any lack of 
knowledge or compliance. 
2. To what extent are licence conditions having an' 
impact upon the trading behaviour of licence 
holders ? 
This question requires an examination of changes in 
trading behaviour as a result of licensing. Depending 
upon the level at which the standard is set dealers will 
experience differing degrees of modification to their 
trading behaviour. If the level is set below the 
standard which already pertains in the market dealers 
will not have to alter any aspects of their trading 
behaviour. This in itself would go some way to 
explaining the lack of observable differences between 
consumer experiences-in the different districts. If on 
the other hand the standard is set higher than that 
which pertained in the market before licensing was 
introduced, there should be some detectable changes in 
trading behaviour specifically in relation to the 
operations specified by licence conditions. It is 
anticipated that some modification in trading behaviour 
will be detected and that the greatest change will be in 
those districts displaying high level licensing. 
3. What are the attitudes of dealers toward the 
licensing system ? 
The final question is an attempt to evaluate dealer 
attitudes toward a licensing system. This must include 
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attitudes of dealers who have first hand experience of 
licensing as well as those who have no experience. It is 
anticipated that the nature and degree of any 
differences in attitude between these two groups will 
provide an indication of the extent to which licensing 
has affected dealer perception of this form of 
regulatory control. 
8.4 Research Method 
In order to answer the above questions, a survey of 
second-hand car dealers was considered the most 
appropriate data collection technique. in keeping with 
the encompassing methodology it was important to make 
the survey as comparable as possible to the preceding 
consumer survey. As a consequence the unit of analysis 
was the same central population belt comprising of the 
regions Central, Lothian, Fife, Tayside and Strathclyde 
and all the included district councils. 
The selection of the data collection technique was made 
with reference to the geographic dispersion of the 
sample and the nature of the information requested. On 
the first criteria a postal questionnaire appeared to be 
the most appropriate. However it was anticipated that 
the type of information required, which could be 
considered information about contravening a piece of 
legislation, made the response rate a critical issue. As 
a consequence a high number of postal questionnaires was 
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traded for a lower number of personal interviews in the 
belief that the total response rate would be 
significantly improved. 
8.4.1 Sample Selection 
The identification of the dealer population for the 
sample presented similar problems to that of the 
consumer survey. There are a number of incomplete lists 
of second-hand car dealers such as those who subscribe 
to Yellow Pages, as well as business rates information 
and the list of members of the trade association. These 
sources were rejected as the basis of a complete second- 
hand car dealer list but retained as reference material. 
The regional trading standards departments of the 
identified regions were approached for help in 
identifying second-hand car dealers within their areas. 
The rationale was that second-hand car dealer premises 
are the subject of routine inspection by trading 
standards staff to check compliance with other pieces of 
consumer protection legislation. As such they keep and 
maintain registers of all business premises within their 
areas. These registers are catalogued according to 
business type of which motor trader is one. 
The lists of dealers were secured and 'overlaid' (to 
identify duplicate names) with information from the 
three incomplete sources referred to above. The sample 
population consisted of 879 names and addresses of 
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separate second-hand car dealer businesses within the 
central population belt. Companies which operated 
outlets in a number of different districts were 
identified and the main or head office was selected. To 
take account of the differences in the concentration of 
dealers in each district, a stratified random sampling 
method was used to select 360 names and addresses of 
companies. 
The interviews with sales directors, owners or partners 
took place during December 1986 and January 1987 at 
dealers' premises. These interviews produced 253 
completed schedules representing a 70.2% response rate. 
When non-contacts due to business closure are ignored 
the response rate improves to 85.4%. The non-response 
was entirely due to dealers' refusal to be interviewed 
on this subject. 
8.4.2 Design of Interview Schedule 
The design of the schedule had to take account of the 
possibility that dealers would have varying degrees of 
knowledge of the national system and the system operated 
locally. In addition, a test of knowledge had to be 
applied to dealers in both licensing and non-licensing 
areas. To cope with differing degrees of knowledge a 
three stage filter was incorporated to achieve a 
selected group of dealers who had first hand experience 
of licensing. The first filter investigated whether the 
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dealer had knowledge of a licensing system in Scotland. 
If the respondent did not, it was logical to assume that 
they would not know of more detailed information. The 
second filter asked for knowledge of their local 
licensing system and finally the third filter asked 
whether they actually held a licence. Groups were 
separated for specific questioning on licensing and then 
re-formed for general prompted questions on attitudes 
toward licensing and questions to identify a description 
of the business in terms of size, age, turnover, 
proportion of new to used cars etc. These variables were 
included in order to assess the effects of size and 
volume of cars sold upon responses. The filtering 
process can be represented diagramatically in a 
schematic, this is shown in Figure 8.1. The principal 
filter stream is the main vertical axis with exit 
questions which selected the unlicensed or 
unknowledgeable group. On each axis the number of 
respondents following the route is given in brackets. A 
copy of the questionnaire appears as Appendix V. 
0 
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Figure 8.1 Schematic of Dealer Questionnaire Filters 
Do you sell second- 
hand cars? NO Terminate 
YES (253) 
Did you ' know that the licensing of second-hand car dealers 
takes place in Scotland? NO 36) 
YES(217) 
I 
Does your local authority 
licence second-hand car dealers? NO 86) 
YES(131) 
Do you hold a second-hand car 
dealers licence from your local 
authority? NO 27) 
YES(104) 
Knowledge of Main Conditions 
General Licensing Practice 
General section on licensing 
(253 
Dealer classification 
(149) 
Unlicensed dealers 
and dealers with 
no knowledge 
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The completed schedules represented 23 district council 
areas. The majority. of districts within the central 
population belt are licensing districts and this is 
reflected in the sample of dealers. Table 8.1 shows the 
districts from which the respondents were drawn, the 
frequency of responses associated with each district 
area and the proportion of the total sample. 
Table 8.1 Origin of Respondent Dealers by District 
Frq % Total 
Clackmannan 11 4.3* 
Clydesdale 2 0.8 
Cunninghame 5 2.0* 
Dunfermline 10 4.0* 
E Kilbride 2 0.8* 
E Lothian 9 3.6 
Eastwood 3 1.2* 
Edinburgh 36 14.2* 
Ettrick 1 0.4* 
Falkirk 21 8.3* 
Glasgow 29 11.5* 
Hamilton 11 4.3 
Inverclyde 5 2.0* 
Kilmarnock 7 2.8* 
Kirkcaldy 19 7.5* 
Kyle & Carrick 9 3.6 
Midlothian 12 4.7* 
Monklands 6 2.4* 
Motherwell 12 4.7 
NE Fife 9 3.6* 
Renfrew 15 5.9* 
Stirling 3 1.2* 
West Lothian 16 6.3 
Total 253 100.0 
* Indicates licensing district 
The interview asked for the exact location of the 
business and the address was used in conjunction with 
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post code maps to identify in which district council 
area the dealer operated. From this information a 
licensing status code was added to each scheduleýto 
reflect the level of licensing operated by the local 
district. The data from the completed interview 
schedules was double coded on to coding sheets and then 
checked. After verification the data was-double entered 
into a VAX data file for final checking and validation. 
Analysis was carried out using SPSSX release 3 running 
on VAX and HP9000. 
8.5 Analysis of Results 
The analysis of the results will be based upon the three 
main aims identified above in 8.2. The first is dealer 
participation, which concentrates upon licence 
possession, knowledge of, and compliance with licence 
conditions. Second, is the impact of licensing upon 
trading behaviour for licence holders and specifically 
any modification of trading behaviour. Finally there are 
dealer attitudes toward licensing and the licensing 
system as applied in Scotland. 
Each of these broad areas of investigation contain a 
number of more specific questions which will be 
considered in turn. In each case a number of descriptor 
variables was used relating to the size of the company 
in terms of volume of cars sold, value of cars sold and 
number of staff employed. Where these are relevant to 
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the analysis they will be included. The data, in most 
cases is categorical and therefore is analysed using 
contingency tables and appropriate statistics. In 
contrast to the previous consumer survey the analysis is 
not concerned primarily with assessing differences 
between dealers in licensing and non-licensing areas. As 
a consequence statistical analysis will be applied only 
where the data is appropriate and interpretation 
meaningful. 
8.5.1 Dealer Participation 
8.5.1(a) Licence Possession 
The first item in this part of the analysis is the 
assessment of the degree of knowledge displayed by 
dealers about the system of licensing second-hand car 
dealers in Scotland. It was anticipated that a policy 
such as this would be well known to car dealers because 
of its potential to regulate directly their activities. 
91% of car dealers interviewed indicated that they knew 
some district councils operated licensing schemes for 
car dealers. The surprising feature of this result is 
that 9% of dealers had never heard of licensing and many 
of them operated within licensing areas. The survey took 
place within a relatively concentrated area and the 
number of non-licensing districts is small. The group 
who did not know of licensing were identified to 
investigate whether they were drawn from the non- 
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licensing areas. The results of the cross-tabulation can 
be seen below in Table 8.2 
Table 8.2 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District (Licensing/Non-licensing)' 
by Variable 'Knowledge of Licensing System in 
Scotland' (n=253) 
Licensing Status 
Knew of 
System 
Licensing 
YES 89.7% 
NO 10.3% 
TOTAL 100.0 
194 
Non-licensing 
72.9% 
27.1% 
100.0 
59 
The results in Table 8.2 indicate a greater level of 
awareness about licensing among dealers who operate in 
licensing areas. However there are also dealers who do 
not know of the system operating within licensing areas. 
This is an indication of some serious deficiencies in 
the first of the two necessary conditions. Whether or 
not the dealer knew of licensing was independent of the 
size of the company in terms of employee numbers, volume 
or value of second-hand cars sold. 
The group of dealers who did not know of licensing were 
separated out into a another question stream. The 
remaining group of 217 dealers who did know of licensing 
were then asked to indicate whether their local district 
council operated such a licensing scheme. Again the 
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responses to this question were analysed with respect to 
the licensing status of the district in which they 
operated. The results of this analysis are shown below 
in Table 8.3 
The results show that the majority of dealers can 
correctly identify the licensing status of their local 
district council. What is most significant from this 
table is the relatively large proportion of dealers who 
either do not know the licensing status of their 
district council or-categorised it incorrectly. Of 
dealers operating in licensing districts 31.8% could not 
identify the status of the local district. Similarly 36% 
of dealers in non-licensing areas could not correctly 
say whether the district licensed or not. 
Table 8.3 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District (Licensing/Non-licensing)' 
" by Variable 'Licensing System in Operation 
Locally'. (n=217) 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
YES 68.2% 16.0% 
Is 
System NO 15.6% 64.0% 
Operating 
Locally Don't Know 16.2% 20.0% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
173 44 
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The level of knowledge about licensing among dealers 
casts serious doubt upon the achievement of the first" 
and by definition the second necessary condition. 
The dealers who could correctly identify the status of 
their district as a licensing district were then 
selected to answer more specific questions about'the 
operation of their local system. The most important 
question of this group is to establish whether or not 
they actually hold a licence. The answer will establish 
whether there are dealers operating within a licensing 
area, with knowledge of the system yet without a 
licence. The results of the question are shown below in 
Table 8.4 
Table 8.4 Contingency Table of Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District'By Variable 'Hold a Second- 
hand Car Dealers Licence' (n=131) 
Licensing Status 
Licensing Non-licensing 
Hold 
Licence 
YES 83.9% 42.9% 
NO 16.1% 57.1% 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
124 7 
The result provides evidence that the first necessary 
condition for licensing, comprehensive licence holding 
has not been met. 16% of the dealers interviewed did not 
hold a licence to deal in second-hand cars even though 
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they knew that they operated within a district which 
required them to hold such a licence. 'A small number of 
dealers, although a substantial percentage of the total, 
respönded that they did hold a second-hand car dealer 
licence when in fact the local authority did not operate 
such a system. A possible explanation is that they knew 
of the existence of licensing in Scotland but not in any 
detail and were guessing at the question sequence. From 
a total of 194 second-hand car dealers operating within 
licensing areas 104 or 54% actually held a licence. 
The group who operated within the licensing district 
without a licence and knew that they required one were 
asked why this was the case using an open ended question 
which was unprompted by the interviewer. The results are 
shown below in Table 8.5 1 
Table 8.5 Frequency Distribution of Responses for 
Variable 'Reasons for not holding a licence 
(n=90) 
Thought I was exempt 36% 
No one else has one 20% 
No one told us to get one 20% 
Its voluntary not legally required 16% 
Never Felt I needed one 8% 
None of the dealers reported that they were actively 
boycotting the system. All the above reasons for not 
holding a licence suggest confusion and lack of 
information about the system being operated. This 
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related specifically to the extent to which licensing 
covered their operations and the legal status of 
licensing, whether it is voluntary or mandatory. These 
responses point to some serious deficiencies in the 
system being operated. These were the lack of knowledge 
about the local system, the apparent lack of enforcement 
visits and an assessment that other dealers do not hold 
a licence. 
On the evidence produced by this part of the 
questionnaire the first condition which characterises 
dealer participation through the holding of a licence 
has not been met. This provides an initial explanation 
of the failure in the consumer survey to detect 
differences in purchase experience among consumers. 
The second identified necessary condition is that the 
dealers who hold a licence must also comply fully with 
the licence conditions. As a consequence the group of 
licensed dealers went on to answer specific questions 
about their knowledge of and compliance with licence 
conditions. This series of questions provides a second 
method of assessing dealer participation. 
8.5.1(b) Knowledge of and compliance with Licence 
Conditions 
In order for licensing to affect the trading operations 
of second-hand car dealers two criteria must be met by 
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the dealer. First the dealer must know correctly what 
conditions are applied to the licence held. Second the 
dealer must comply with those conditions. The typology 
of district councils developed in the previous chapter 
was based upon an ordering of the conditions which were 
applied to licences. The typology used to structure the 
questions regarding licence conditions to the 104 
licensed dealers was on the following basis: 
(i) Low level licensing requires the keeping of 
records 
(ii) Medium level requires the keeping of records 
and the display of pre-sales inspection sheets 
on cars. 
(iii) High level which requires records to be kept, 
pre-sales inspection reports to be displayed 
and requires compliance with the motor 
industry code of practices 
In each case knowledge and compliance is assessed with 
reference to the characteristics of the host district. 
(i) Keeping Records 
The first condition is the keeping of records about the 
cars bought and sold by the dealer. This condition 
appears in the parent statute and therefore appears as a 
licence condition in all licensing systems. A total of 
80% of dealers knew of such a licence condition, 8% 
responded that they knew it was definitely not a 
condition of their licence and a further 12% did not 
know. In total 20% of licensed dealers did not know that 
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the keeping of specified records was required as a 
condition of their licence. A follow up question asked 
those who knew of the condition whether or not they 
actually complied with it. A total of 99% indicated that 
they did keep records of the cars they bought and sold. 
It should be noted that the question did not specify 
whether or not these records were kept specifically in 
response to the licence condition since obviously 
records of transactions would be kept as a matter of 
course for tax and accounting purposes. 
One interesting feature of the responses to this 
question is that the percentage of correct responses 
increased according to the level of licensing, that is 
to say dealers in-law level licensing areas displayed 
less knowledge than dealers in high level licensing 
areas. Table 8.6 below shows the distribution of correct 
and incorrect answers. 
Table 8.6 Contingency Table for Variable 'Licensing 
Status of District (High, Medium, Low)' by 
Variable 'Keeping Records is a Licence 
Condition' (na104) 
Licensing Status 
Lo Lic Med Lic Hi Lic 
(Records) (PSI+Rec) (CoP+Rec) 
YES 74.0% 88.9% 100.0% 
Keeping 
Records is NO 9.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Condition 
Don't 16.4% 11.1% 0.0% 
Know 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
73 18 13 
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The distribution of correct answers suggests that 
licensed dealers who operate in areas of higher level 
licensing and hold a licence are much better informed 
about the licensing system than dealers in other areas. 
This issue will be developed in a later section. 
(ii) Pre-sales Inspection Reports 
The second identified condition requires the display of 
pre-sales inspection reports on all cars for sale. This 
condition applies to dealers who operate in areas which 
both specifically require pre-sales inspection reports 
and in those who require compliance with the code of 
practice. As such this condition either directly or 
indirectly applied to 29.8% of the 104 licensed dealers. 
Of this selected group, 19% correctly identified it as a 
licence condition. 61.3% indicated that this was 
definitely not a licence condition when in fact it was 
and 29.8% did not know whether it was or not. The lack 
of knowledge displayed in relation to the first licence 
condition is even greater in relation to this second 
licence condition which in this analysis is assumed to 
be more onerous. 
The licensed dealers to whom this condition does apply 
and who knew of the condition were asked whether or not 
they actually displayed the pre-sales inspection 
reports. Only 3 dealers indicated that they did display 
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the necessary information. This represents 4.2% of all 
dealers operating within a district which requires'such 
information to be displayed. 
(iii) Compliance with the, Code of Practice 
The highest level of licensing is that which requires 
licence holders to comply fully with the motor industry 
code of practice. As such, dealers in these areas are 
required to keep records, display pre-sales inspection 
reports on all cars for sale and to comply with all 
other requirements of the code. The licensed dealers 
operating within these areas were asked to indicate 
whether or not compliance with the code of practice was 
a condition of their licence. 50%(6) of dealers 
correctly identified this as a licence condition, 33% 
indicated that it was not a condition and the remaining 
16.7% did not know. Consistent with previous results the 
second-hand car dealers displayed a considerable lack of 
knowledge of their licence conditions. 
Those dealers who correctly identified the licence 
condition were then asked whether they fully complied 
with the code of practice. Four dealers indicated that 
they did fully comply with the code of practice and two 
dealers indicated that they did not. The four dealers 
who indicated that they complied with the code of 
practice were already members of the code (thereby 
obliged to comply) before the introduction of licensing. 
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The two dealers who did not comply were not and had 
never been members. In total, 9% of dealers who operated 
within areas which required code compliance indicated 
they did in fact comply. It should be noted that 
excluding the dealers' response and a cross reference 
with information displayed on cars there is no other way 
of verifying compliance in the absence of specific 
purchase and complaint records. 
One issue raised by the responses is that dealers do not 
appear to have been told that they needed alicence. 
This issue was investigated by asking dealers whether 
they had received a visit, or any literature from the 
licensing authority informing them of the introduction 
of the licensing system or any information about the 
licence conditions. The dealers operating within 
licensing areas were selected from the sample and 63% 
had received information about licensing from the local 
authority. This group was then analysed with respect to 
licence holding and it was found that 92% held a 
licence. By contrast, of the group who had not received 
information from the local authority, only 74%-held a 
licence. These figures suggest that there has been very 
little communication between the dealers operating in 
licensing areas and the licence authority, but where 
that communication had taken place licence possesion was 
much higher. The receipt or non receipt of information 
was not associated with particular districts. One 
explanation is that all districts are using incomplete 
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lists of dealers to target their information activity. 
As a result licensing districts are failing to 
communicate with all eligible licensees. ' 
A second external factor which could explain differing 
degrees of knowledge and compliance, would be the 
activity of enforcement staff. This is on the assumption 
that dealers displaying greater knowledge of licence 
conditions and therefore higher compliance rates (as 
measured in this survey) would have received a greater 
number of enforcement visits. Dealers were asked whether 
anyone had come to their premises to check for 
compliance with licence conditions. Only 30% of licensed 
dealers reported that they had received an enforcement 
visit to check their compliance with licence conditions. 
The visits were not concentrated within any specific 
districts but showed a tendency toward the larger 
dealerships. This tendency was investigated further by 
reference to a later question about who the dealer 
thought responsible for enforcement within their 
district. The result showed that 62% of dealers thought 
trading standards officers were responsible. In view of 
the fact that trading standards officers are obliged to 
visit second-hand car dealer premises in respect of 
other consumer protection legislation the purpose of the 
visit may have been confused. As a consequence using 
enforcement to explain participation was rejected as 
unreliable in this context. 
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Patchen(1987) suggests that in considering the 
effectiveness of a particular policy some assessment 
must be made of the magnitude and perceived certainty of 
penalty versus the perceived cost of defiance. As a 
consequence, an additional factor in explaining 
compliance in this context is the assessment of the 
penalty by dealers for not complying. Dealers were asked 
to indicate what they thought would happen if a dealer 
were found to be persistently contravening a major 
licence condition. The responses to this question are 
shown below in Table 8.7 
Table 8.7 Frequency Distribution of Responses for 
Variable 'Perceived Penalty for Contravention 
of Major Licence Condition' 
Withdraw Licence 
Suspend Licence 
Send Warning Letter 
Warn Dealer Verbally 
Advise Dealer to Comply 
Do Nothing 
9.3% 
18.7% 
40.2% 
12.1% 
15.9% 
1.9% 
The results of this question indicate that nearly 70% of 
respondents thought the penalties arising from the 
scenario were small. This suggests that contravention of 
a major licence condition is not perceived to be very 
serious. Dealers do not perceive the threat to be 
serious and many do not perceive the-threat of licence 
withdrawal or a fine to be certain. There were no 
significant differences in response from dealers 
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according to the district in which they operate or from 
dealers of differing size businesses. The Patchett model 
may also provide'some explanation of the low levels of 
knowledge about licensing as well as low levels of 
compliance. 
The above results cast serious doubt upon dealer 
participation with respect to licences held as well as 
knowledge and compliance with licence conditions. It 
appears that both necessary conditions identified have 
not been fulfilled. In the absence of comprehensive 
licence possession and comprehensive compliance the next 
section concentrates upon dealer evaluations of the 
impact of licensing upon trading behaviour. The purpose 
is to assess the impact of licence possession on 
behaviour over and above the direct impact of licence 
conditions. 
8.6 Impact upon Trading Behaviour 
This section of the analysis concentrates upon three key 
issues in relation to the licensed dealers everyday 
experiences of licensing. The first of these is the 
assessment of costs of licence possession over and above 
the cost of the licence. Hallett(1988) and Patchen(1987) 
both make reference to the importance of perceived cost 
in explaining consequent action as opposed to real 
costs. As a consequence the nature of the perceived 
308 
costs of licensing are investigated with respect to 
dealers in different licensing areas. 
It had been argued that dealers in high level licensing 
areas would perceive higher costs than those in low 
level areas. In addition, it had been supposed that 
these costs may be passed on to consumers through higher 
priced cars and this too is assessed. The analysis of 
cost is juxtaposed with the assessment by the dealer of 
the impact of licence possession upon the operation of 
his or her business, particularly the quality of cars 
sold but also elements of service. Finally there are the 
results of two questions concerning perceptions of the 
overall impact of licensing on their trading operations. 
8.6.1 Assessment of Costs Associated with Licence 
Possession 
Dealers were asked to indicate whether or not they 
" incurred any extra costs apart from the cost of'the 
licence in complying with the licence conditions. The 
purpose of this section is to establish how onerous 
licence possession is perceived to be. Licensed dealers 
were asked whether or not they thought they incurred 
extra costs by holding a licence. The responses showed- 
that 81% of licensed dealers did not think they incurred 
any extra costs through holding a licence. 17% thought 
that they did incur cost with 2% uncertain. Within this 
17% there was no evidence to suggest that dealers in 
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higher level licensing areas thought they incurred more 
costs. Further there was no size effect; smaller dealers 
were just as likely to indicate that costs were incurred 
as larger dealers. The 17%(18 dealers) were then asked 
from where they thought these extra costs were 
generated. The question identified six areas and 
provided an opportunity for the respondent to identify 
any other. As a multiple response question with a small 
number of respondents, analysis of dealer type by size 
or licensing district would be inconclusive. Table 8.8 
shows a frequency distribution of responses. 
Table 8.8 Identified Sources of Extra Costs to Licence 
Holders. (n=18) 
Record Keeping 78% 
Vehicle Inspection Reports 39% 
Time During Enforcement Visits 41% 
Compliance with Code of Practice 18% 
Greater Emphasis on Customer 12% 
Sheer Aggravation 6% 
The source of the extra costs with the-highest frequency 
is record keeping, a feature of all licences. However 
only 16% of dealers had previously' identified this as a 
licence condition. Similarly, 41% of dealers in this 
group pointed to time with enforcement staff yet only 
half of the group had indicated previously that they had 
received an enforcement visit. The preparation of 
vehicle inspection reports was identified by 39% of the 
group but only one dealer who operated in a district 
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which required such reports said such information was 
displayed. 
Finally, of those dealers who identified compliance with 
the code of practice as an extra cost generated through 
the imposition of licensing, none displayed the 
inspection reports and only two had correctly identified 
it as one of their licence conditions. Looking at the 
inconsistencies in the answers about perceived costs it 
is difficult to come to any reliable conclusions from 
these questions. It is clear that dealer perceptions of 
cost do not correlate with actual activity. There is no 
evidence that the perception of cost is dependent upon 
the level of licensing being operated or that these 
costs are being passed ön to consumers in the form of 
higher second-hand car prices. Only 9% indicated that 
they thought licensing had made their cars more 
expensive than other dealers. 
8.6.2 Assessment of Impact of Licence Possession on 
Trading Activity 
As a general statement dealers were asked to assess the 
impact of licence possession upon the day to day 
activity of running their business. The results of this 
general evaluation are shown below in Table 8.9 
311 
Table 8.9 Frequency Distribution of Variable 'Dealer 
Evaluation of Overall Impact of Licensing' 
(n=104) 
Major Inconvenience 1% 
Slight Inconvenience 19% 
Unnoticeable 70% 
Slight Advantage 9% 
Major Advantage 0% 
Don't Know 1t 
By far the majority of licensed dealers see licensing as 
having no noticeable impact upon the day to day running 
of their business. There was some a tendency for larger 
dealers to see licensing as an advantage but the reasons 
for this are indeterminate. 
The overall assessment was taken a stage further by 
assessing the impact on three more specific criteria. 
First, the impact upon the quality of cars purchased and 
sold. Second, the impact upon customer complaint levels 
and finally the impact upon eight selected elements of 
the business. 
In respect of the first item dealers were asked whether 
they believed that licensing would have an effect upon 
the number of consumer complaints received. 70% of 
licensed dealers believed that licensing would have no 
impact while a surprising number, 22% thought that 
licensing would increase the number of complaints. 
Unfortunately this question was used as a control for 
other responses and no follow up reasons were requested. 
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8% of dealers believed that licensing would decrease the 
number of complaints. 
For the second item dealers were asked to assess whether 
they thought that licence possession had an impact upon 
the quality of the cars bought and sold. Dealers act as 
buyers of second-hand cars at auction and buy vehicles 
through cars traded-in on replacement vehicles. The 
effect of licensing upon the quality of cars would be in 
both the buying and selling activity. This would lead 
the dealer to buy cars of better quality to reduce the 
cost of preparation and inspection etc and thereby 
result in higher quality cars being sold to consumers. 
However 89% of licensed dealers did not perceive any 
increase in the quality of cars bought. In addition 84% 
of dealers did not perceive any increase in the quality 
of cars sold. There were no significant variations in 
answers due to dealer size or to location in different 
licensing areas. 
Dealer evaluation of the impact of licensing was also 
assessed with respect to features of their operations 
and their assessment of its effect upon the motor trade 
in general. Table 8.10 shows the frequency distribution 
of responses to the eight selected items. 
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Table 8.10 Frequency Distribution for Variable 'Dealer 
Evaluations of Impact of Licensing on Specific 
Items. (n=104) 
Beneficial No Bad Dont 
Effect% Effect% Effect% Know% 
Customer Relations 51 46 1 2 
Overall Vehicle Quality 43 55 0 2 
Protect Reputable Dealer 57 42 0 1 
Image of Trade 67 31 1 1 
Profitability of Busines 11 79 9 2 
Overheads of Business 1 73 24 2 
Business Expansion 15 78 6 1 
The results of questions about the impact of licensing 
show an important pattern. The items concerned with the 
relationship between the dealer and the consumer, 
principally customer relations, the image of the trade 
and the protection of the reputable dealers from unfair 
competition are all thought to be helped by licensing. 
By contrast the operational items, profitability, 
overheads and business expansion are seen to be 
unaffected by licensing, possibly because licence 
conditions are not being observed. From the dealers' 
perspective licensing appears to be helping their 
relations with the public while not unduly affecting the 
day to day operations of their business. 
8.7 Dealer Attitudes Toward Licensing 
8.7.1 Licensing for Unlicensed Dealers 
The final section of the analysis concerns all dealers 
and draws together the licensed dealers, as well as the 
unlicensed dealers and those who do not know of the 
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system, to assess the overall attitude of the trade 
toward licensing. The'purpose of the section is to 
contrast the attitudes of dealers who have had first 
hand experience of licensing with those who havenot. 
The first objective was to assess what unlicensed 
dealers thought about the scope of licensing. This 
question was asked of the dealers who had been 
eliminated during the filter questions. This was the 
only question asked only of unlicensed dealers and there 
is no comparison with licensed dealers. This group 
includes dealers who operate in non-licensing areas as 
well as those who operate within licensing areas but who 
knew nothing about the local licensing system. The 
dealers were asked, to identify what activities they 
thought licensing would control. This is a multiple 
response question with items generated from informal 
discussions with dealers. Respondents could choose any 
number of items and as a consequence percentages do not 
sum to 100. The results shown below in Table 8.11 are 
taken as a percentage of total responses: 
Table 8.11 Responses for Variable 'Non Participant 
Evaluation of Activities Covered by Licensing' 
(n=147) 
% Total Responses 
Compliance with code of Practice 84% 
Information on Vehicles Sold 664 
Record Keeping 58% 
Type of Credit Offered 41% 
Aspects of Customer Service 39% 
Cleanliness/Presentation of Cars 33% 
Elements of Staff Training 26% 
None of These 9% 
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There appears to be a considerable degree of knowledge 
about second-hand car dealer licensing among unlicensed 
dealers. The three main licence conditions are clearly 
visible as the most frequently identified activities. 
The responses from larger dealers (operating over 4 
outlets) were concentrated in one or two activities, 
mainly compliance with the code of practice. By contrast 
71% of the smaller dealers identified 4 or more 
activities. This suggests that the smaller dealers see 
licensing as a more comprehensive form of control. The 
control over the type of credit offered was the fourth 
most frequent activity identified. 79% of dealers who 
identified it as an activity covered by second-hand car 
dealer licensing already hold a consumer credit licence 
from the office of Fair Trading. There appears to be 
some confusion about how the licences relate to each 
other. 
8.7.2 Participant/Non Participant Attitudes 
A series of further questions investigated dealer 
attitudes toward licensing. Because these questions were 
asked of all dealers in the sample. it is possible to 
compare responses betwen the licensed group and the 
unlicensed group. The first question was a general 
attitudinal question about whether dealers thought 
licensing was a good idea or not. The reponses were 
cross-tabulated with whether or not the dealer was 
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participating or not. As such the dependant variable in 
the following analyses is dealer participation. 
The first comparison between participating dealers and 
, non participating dealers is differences in the 
responses to the question of. impact upon the business. 
This question has been analysed above in Table 8.9 in 
relation to licence holders only. It is also repeated 
here for ease of comparison. Table 8.12 contains all 8 
items, cross tabulated with the dependant participation 
variable. Where the differences between participant and 
non participant groups are, significantly different is 
have a significance greater than 95% the value of Chi 
and Phi is given. 
The results of the cross tabulation show a number of 
interesting disparities between the two groups. The 
first major difference is that the non participant group 
appears to overrate the beneficial impact of licensing 
on all the items analysed. Licensing was perceived by 
the non participant group to display positive benefits. 
When compared to the non participant group the pattern 
of responses is clustered in the no effect category. 
This difference suggests that those dealers with first 
hand experience of licensing are aware that licensing is 
not having the degree of control envisaged by the non 
participant group. It is this difference between the 
groups in the 'no impact' category which is crucial to 
the analysis. 
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Table 8.12 Combined Contingency Table for Variable 
'Participant and Non Participant Dealers' by 
'impact of Licensing on Aspects of Business' 
(n=253) 
Customer Relations: 
Good Effect 
No Effect 
Bad Effect 
Don't Know 
* Chi=9.67 
Vehicle Quality: 
Non 
Participant Total 
51.4 
45.8 
0.9 
1.9 
3df sig . 021 
Good Effect 43.9 
No Effect 54.2 
Bad Effect 0.0 
Don't Know 1.9 
Protection of Reputable Dealers 
Good Effect 57.1 
No Effect 42.1 
Bad Effect 0.0 
Don't Know 0.9 
* Chi=13.42 3df sig . 003 
Image of Trade in General 
Good Effect 66.4 
No Effect 31.8 
Bad Effect 0.9 
Don't Know 0.9 
* Chi-8.64 3df sig . 034 
Impact upon Profit 
Good Effect 11.2 
No Effect 78.5 
Bad Effect 8.4 
Don't Know 1.9 
Impact upon Business Overheads 
Good Effect 0.9 
No Effect 72.0 
Bad Effect 25.2 
Don't Know 1.9 
Impact upon Control over Sector 
Good Effect 57.0 
No Effect 39.3 
Bad Effect 2.8 
Don't Know 0.9 
Impact upon Business Expansion 
Good Effect 15.9 
No Effect 77.6 
Bad Effect 5.6 
Don't Know 0.9 
Participant 
67.1 60.5 
27.4 35.2 
2.7 2.0 
2.7 2.4 
(Phi=. 04) 
52.7 49.0 
45.9 49.4 
0.7 0.4 
0.7 1.2 
77.4 68.8 
21.2 30.0 
0.7 0.4 
0,7 1.8 
(Phi- . 05) 
78.8 73.5 
17.1 23.3 
3.4 2.4 
0.7 0.8 
(Phi= . 034) 
22.6 17.8 
65.8 71.1 
10.3 9.5 
1.4 1.6 
4.1 2.8 
65.8 68.4 
27.4 26.5 
2.7 2.4 
69.2 64.0 
24.7 30.8 
2.7 2.8 
3.4 2.4 
27.4 22.5 
64.4 70.0 
4.8 5.1 
3.4 2.4 
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There are three statistically significant differences in 
the table. These relate to customer relations, the 
protection of reputable dealers and the image of the 
trade in general. The non-participant group 
significantly over-rated the contribution of licensing 
on these three items: specifically that licensing has a 
beneficial effect upon the image of the trade, and 
customer relations but at the same time has the ability 
to protect the reputable dealers from competition. This 
is in line with the arguments expressed by Moore(1961) 
and the findings of Gellhorn(1976) who suggested that 
those who are not members of a licensed occupation over- 
rate the ability of licensing to protect them from what 
they view as unfair competition. By contrast the 
participant group responses are significantly less 
enthusiastic. An explanantion would be their observation 
" that the operation of licensing is severely flawed, that 
not all dealers are licensed and consequently they are 
not protected in any sense from competition from 
'disreputable' dealers. A second explanation is that 
consumers appear to have very little information about 
licensing and as a consequence there is no benefical 
effect upon the image of the trade. The final point is 
that customer relations are not considered to be 
affected. 
The results of the analysis for these three items 
characterise dealers' attitudes toward licensing. The 
non particpant group see the attractions of a system 
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which improves their relations with customers and 
improves their status through protection. The 
participant group see that it is not working effectively 
and the impact upon both is less than anticipated. 
8.7.3 Future Development of Licensing 
0 
In addition to the perceived impact upon aspects of the 
second-hand car business, participating and non 
participating dealers were asked to indicate whether 
they thought the licensing of second-hand car dealers 
should be developed or extended in any way. A number of 
scenarios were presented and responses were cross 
tabulated by participation as shown in Table 8.13 
Table 8.. 13 Combined Contingency Table for Variable 
'Participant and Non Participant Dealer' by 
Proposed Developments of Licensing (n=253) 
Non 
Participant Participant Total 
Keep the System As 
It Is YES 14.0 13.0 13.4 
NO 77.6 74.0 75.5 
Dont Know 8.4 13.0 11.1 
Extend Licensing Across 
All Scottish Districts 
YES 77.6 76.7 77.1 
NO 14.0 11.6 12.6 
Dont Know 8.4 11.6 10.3 
Extend Licensing to 
Whole of UK 
YES 75.7 76.7 76.3 
NO 15.0 11.6 13.0 
Dont Know 9.3 11.6 10.7 
Disband Licensing 
System in Scotland 
YES 14.0 8.9 11.1 
NO 77.6 80.1 79.1 
Dont Know 8.4 11.0 9.9 
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The responses to these questions between the two groups 
are remarkably similar on all aspects which is 
surprising. The results suggest that dealers in both 
groups are in the main quite happy with a system of 
licensing but would prefer to see some changes in 
future. In particular, the extension to all local 
authorities and preferably to the whole of the UK. This 
view is also consistent with the arguments presented in 
Chapter 4 concerning the participants' demand for 
licensing based upon the perceived advantages it offers 
to participants. The dealers who have experience of the 
system do not want it disbanded, in all probability 
because the perceived benefits of licensing exceed the 
perceived cost. 
8.8 Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter examined the extent to 
which two necessary conditions identifed for licensing 
to be considered operational are met in the Scottish 
context. These conditions are the requirement for all 
eligible licence holders to actually hold a licence, and 
that all licence holders comply with licence conditions. 
The meeting of these conditions implies that dealers who 
are unfit to trade are excluded and that the licensed 
group have altered trading behaviour dependent upon 
nature of licence conditions. 
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The results of this survey provide evidence that 
unlicensed trading is occuring within licensing areas. 
The reasons for this are not clear but a number of 
issues are raised. First, that a large number of dealers 
do not appear to know about licensing and that a 
significant number have never been contacted by the 
licensing authority. The lack of comprehensive licence 
holding is consistent with the results of the consumer' 
survey where consumer knowledge of licensing was also 
very low. A second reason is the lack of any visible 
deterrent for operating within a licensing area without 
a licence to trade. The survey found considerable 
confusion over who is responsible for checking whether 
dealers are complying, non-compliance is perceived by 
many of the unlicensed dealers to be the norm. 
With respect to the second necessary condition, the 
survey found evidence of substantial avoidance of 
licence conditions among licence holders. Very few 
dealers knew precisely what the conditions of their 
licence implied. This raises issues similar to those 
above about the lack of information especially that 
emanating from the licensing authority. If dealers do 
not know what the conditions of their licence are and 
there is little evidence of enforcement visits to ensure 
compliance, it is understandable that there is evidence 
of non compliance. 
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By establishing that the two necessary conditions are 
not met in any of the districts surveyed, the 
theoretical benefits to consumers cannot be attained. 
However the benefits to the participant group do appear 
to be delivered. Participant dealers are clear that 
licensing as presently operated is having a beneficial 
effect upon such aspects as the image of the motor trade 
and the protection of dealers from unfair competition. 
At the same time the cost to them in terms of modifying 
their trading behaviour by respecting licence conditions 
does not appear to be in evidence. As it stands, 
licensing is unable to deliver the benefits ascribed to 
it with respect to consumers. However it is able, 
according to the dealers, to deliver some benefit to 
participants. This explains the lack of detectable 
effects of licensing upon consumer's purchase 
experiences. 
The results of the consumer survey suggested that 
licensing was not having an impact upon the purchase 
experiences of consumers. The next stage in the analysis 
is to establish whether the reasons for this lack of 
evidence were due to the failure of licensing as a 
regulatory approach or a failure in the mechanism which 
delivers the policy. The results of this chapter suggest 
that dealers are not fully participating in local 
licensing systems which while explaining the consumer 
survey results also turns the focus of the study toward 
the remaining intervening mechanism which is the 
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district licensing authorities who operate licensing in 
conjunction with other external agents. It is the 
operation of licensing by district councils as opposed 
to the administrative framework considered in Chapter 6 
which will be considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter-9 The Operation of Second-hand Car Dealer 
Licensing in Scotland 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the consideration of the four 
intervening mechanisms identified in Chapter 5. This 
chapter concentrates upon the relationship between the 
district councils who operate licensing and the second- 
hand car dealers. The purpose is to establish whether 
there are deficiencies in the operation of local 
licensing systems which would provide some explanation 
of the earlier findings. 
The administrative arrangements for the introduction of 
second-hand car dealer licensing have been described in 
a previous chapter. This analysis concentrates upon how 
the licensing systems are operated on a day to day 
basis. In particular, it examines the role of two 
external agencies involved in the vatting of applicants 
and the enforcement of licence provisions. The analysis 
is based upon the two necessary conditions identified in 
the previous chapter, that of comprehensive licence 
possession and comprehensive compliance with licence 
conditions. By assessing impediments to the satisfaction 
of these two conditions, operational factors crucial to 
the success of the system can be identified 
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9.2 Aims of Study 
The aims of the chapter are to assess the operational 
characteristics of the second-hand car dealer licensing 
systems in Scotland. As such, it excludes the non- 
licensing districts except to identify the rationale for 
non-licensing which, in the context of Scotland is an 
impediment to comprehensive licence holding. 
In the absence of the two necessary conditions licensing 
cannot be said to be operating effectively. As a 
consequence it is not possible to make an objective 
assessment of the impact of licensing upon consumers in 
Scotland since the outcomes are as much a result of the 
form of delivery, as the policy itself. The results of 
the consumer and dealer surveys indicate that the focus 
must be upon the operational characteristics of the 
various licensing systems and an examination of factors 
preventing the achievement of the two necessary 
conditions. The broad aim of this study is to identify 
common operational characteristics which intervene in 
the delivery of the policy. Specifically: 
1. What operational factors prevent the achievement of 
comprehensive licence possession within districts ? 
2. What operational factors prevent the achievement of 
comprehensive compliance with licence conditions 
among licence holders ? 
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As well as investigating the common operational 
characteristics of licensing systems, two other agencies 
in addition to the district councils need to be 
considered. When the administrative framework in which 
licensing takes place was described, two additional 
agencies, external to the district councils emerged as 
integral to the operation of licensing. These were the 
local police and the regional trading standards 
department. According to the first district survey their 
role is two-fold: to provide a source of reference about 
the fitness of potential licensees to trade within the 
district and to provide enforcement support for the 
licensing system. These two roles will be also be 
considered in relation to the two necessary conditions. 
As a consequence a third aim of this study can be 
stated: 
3. What are the roles of the two external agencies in 
the achievement of comprehensive licensing and 
comprehensive compliance with licence conditions 7 
These three aims form the basis of the analysis. Under 
each of these broad aims there are a number of specific 
issues which emerged during the analysis of the consumer 
and dealer surveys relevant to each of the three 
parties: Districts, Police and Trading Standards 
Departments. 
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9.3 Issues Relevant to Districts, Police and Trading 
Standards Departments 
9.3.1 District Councils 
The first issue in relation to the district councils is 
to establish the overall objective they assign to their 
licensing system. Individual district rationales for 
licensing need to be identified because they are likley 
to have an impact upon the design and operation of the 
licensing system. in assessing the rationales some 
recognition must be made that districts had to decide to 
introduce licensing. The wording of the Act meant that 
licensing was not activated unless districts made the 
choice to introduce it. Such a choice must have been 
made on the basis of some evaluation of the impact of 
licensing. These criteria are likely to give an 
indication of the perceived purpose of licensing and may 
be relevant in considering'operational characteristics. 
The second issue arises from the results of the dealer 
survey in Chapter 8. The results indicated that the 
majority of dealers do not hold a licence and do not 
know that their local district operates a licensing 
system. This implies that communication between 
authority and dealers both at the time of introduction 
and during the life of the licensing system is failing 
to reach its target. As a consequence the issue of 
communication with prospective licence holders from the 
time the system was launched needs to be addressed. 
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The final set of issues arise from the existence of 
unlicensed trading within licensing areas and the 
apparent absence of any system to identify unlicensed 
trading. The results of the dealer survey suggested a 
great deal of confusion over enforcement, both in terms 
of who is responsible and the frequency of visits. 
Therefore the district's arrangements for enforcement of 
licensing need to be assessed. This question of 
enforcement is relevant to the second overall aim of 
this study. As a consequence enforcement provision needs 
to be assessed in relation to both the identification of 
unlicensed trading and the identification of non- 
compliance with licence conditions. 
9.3.2 Police Authorities 
In the survey of the administrative arrangements for, 
licensing, district councils identified two roles for 
the Police. The first was the provision of references 
about the character of potential licensees. The second, 
was the provision of enforcement, additional to the 
activities of their own staff. In order to evaluate 
these two functions the nature of the relationship 
between the police and the district councils within each 
administrative area need to be established. Specifically 
to assess whether the roles identified by the district 
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councils are synonymous with those perceived by the 
Police Authority. 
9.3.3 Trading Standards Departments 
The second external agency identified by the district 
councils was the Trading Standards Department of the 
Regional Councils. Two roles were identified by the 
district councils which are similar to those of the 
police. The first role is to provide information about 
potential licence holders in addition to the information 
provided by the police and second to provide additional 
enforcement to the district councils's own enforcement 
efforts. The study therefore needs to establish how 
trading standards departments see their role. 
Specifically the nature and frequency of information 
passed between the departments and the districts and the 
enforcement activity which they undertake. 
9.4 Methodology 
In order to investigate these issues and answer the aims 
identified above, each of the three parties, licensing 
districts, police and trading standards departments were 
approached. It would have been preferable to assess the 
set of relationships within each licensing district. 
However, they all display different licensing systems 
and as a consequence the relationship between districts, 
dealers and external agents, are also expected to vary. 
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Ideally a total census of licensing authorities and 
their relationships with external agencies as they 
operate within each district context would need to be 
carried out. However such a census presented a number of 
problems in terms of time and resources since such 
information would need to be collected via in depth 
interviews. Further that all interviews would have 
needed to be conducted by the same interviewer. In 
addition the information collected would be of little 
contribution to the argument without extensive analysis 
of covariates in each system such as the individual 
relationships between departments, management style, 
organisational structures and procedures in addition to 
the sources of variation already identified. As a 
consequence, it was decided to concentrate upon selected 
sets of relationships between each of the three parties. 
Since the dominant party is the district the sets of 
relationships will be chosen on the basis of the 
characteristics of the district. 
9.5 Research Method 
The nature of the information sought 
structured data collection technique 
in this case. The information sought 
essentially investigative and needed 
complex but as yet undefined issues. 
requirements suggested a qualitative 
consequences an unstructured persona 
suggested that a 
was not appropriate 
here was 
to probe some 
Both these 
technique and as a 
1 interview was 
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chosen which would provide the necessary degree of 
flexibility. 
9.5.1 Selection of Districts 
The selected sets of relationships between the three 
parties; district, police and trading standards 
department would need to be as representative as 
possible of different types of licensing system. This 
suggested a structured sampling technique and the 
selection was made on the basis of the typology of 
licensing districts developed in Chapter 6. This 
typology uses four levels of licensing operated by the 
districts, non-licensing, low, medium and high. It was 
decided to select districts on the basis of the typology 
and then identify the responsible police and trading 
standards departments. 
The districts within the central population belt, 
comprising the regions, Central, Lothian, Strathclyde, 
and Fife were grouped according to the typology. Each 
district was then numbered within each group and a 
sample of twelve districts was drawn randomly, three 
districts from each group being selected. in addition 
the appropriate external agency for the area was also 
identified. The identity of the selected districts and 
appropriate agencies is'shown below in Table 9.1 
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The selected group of districts and the associated 
police and trading standards departments were sent a 
letter asking for an appointment to conduct an 
interview. The letter to the districts was sent to the 
Administrative Director or Town Clerk of the district. 
The licensing function had already been identified as 
the responsibility of the central administrative 
function of the district councils. 
Table 9.1 Selected Districts 
Agencies 
District 
Non 
Licensing: Cumbernauld 
Hamilton 
West Lothian 
Low Level 
Licensing: 
Med Level 
' Licensing: 
High Level 
and Responsible 
Police 
Strathclyde 
Strathclyde 
Lothian 
Edinburgh Lothian 
Kirkcaldy Fife 
"NE Fife Fife 
Clackmannan Central 
Dundee Tayside 
Stirling Central 
External 
TSD 
Strathclyde 
Strathclyde 
Lothian 
Lothian 
Fife 
Fife 
Central 
Tayside 
Central 
Licensing: Eastwood Strathclyde Strathclyde 
Falkirk Central Central 
Glasgow Strathclyde Strathclyde 
The other letters were sent to the relevant Chief 
Constable and Chief Trading Standards Officer. The 
selection of'these posts was designed to produce a 
person who could speak on behalf of the organisation, 
but not necessarily the person in receipt of the letter. 
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The response to the letter was mixed. Those districts 
who did not licence refused to co-operate since they did 
not licence second-hand car dealers and could not see 
the purpose of an interview. However one authority did 
agree to be interviewed over the phone. Four authorities 
did not respond and a follow up letter was sent, but it 
produced no reply. A phone call to each of the four non- 
respondents was equally unproductive as these districts 
said they did not want to participate and they were too 
busy to speak to anyone about their licensing 
operations. 
As a result only five districts agreed to be 
interviewed, Stirling, Falkirk, Glasgow, Edinburgh and 
North East Fife. Although a smaller number than hoped 
for, these districts were drawn from all three levels of 
licensing and represented city, urban and rural 
districts. The charactersitics of each of these 
districts is shown below in Table 9.2. 
The reduction in the number of interviews had little 
impact upon the selection of external agencies. 
Strathclyde, Lothian and Central Police agreed to be 
interviewed as well as Central, Lothian and Strathclyde 
Trading Standards departments. Tayside Trading Standards 
refused to be interviewed. 
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Table 9.2 Description of District Councils Interviewed 
Conditions 
Falkirk Records 
Pre-sales Info 
Code of Practice 
Own Specialist- 
Officer 
Glasgow Records 
Code of Practice 
Stirling Records 
Pre-sales Info 
Edinburgh Records 
NE Fife Records 
Police 
Trading Standards 
Own Staff 
Own Staff 
Police 
None 
The interviews took place during March and April 1988. 
In each case the interview was tape recorded with the 
agreement of the interviewee and then transcribed for 
analysis. 
9.6 Analysis of Results 
The results of these interviews are not meant to 
describe the precise operational characteristics of all 
licensing districts in Scotland. They do however provide 
clues to some common operational features. With respect 
to each individual party the analysis will address the 
key issues identified earlier in this chapter. 
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In the presentation of results, the information is drawn 
from transcripts of the interviews and includes general 
comments as well as specific quotations from the 
interviewees. 
9.7 Results of Interviews with District Councils 
9.7.1 Reasons for Introduction of Licensing 
There was very little information available as to why 
the district councils decided to introduce licensing for 
second-hand car dealers. The reason was that very few of 
the original staff who were party to the decision were 
still in post. However three contrasting positions were 
identified. In the case of Falkirk District there was a 
recognition that second-hand car purchasers needed 
protection and the council felt that it had a duty to 
provide the best possible protection to its 
constituents. Therefore licensing was introduced solely 
to provide additional protection for the second-hand car 
purchasers within the Falkirk area. By contrast the 
introduction by Edinburgh District was undertaken 
because of an existing ancient statute concerning the 
licensing of occupations within the Royal Burgh which 
was in place before the Act was introduced. The main 
rationale was to provide some administrative control 
over provision within the district. The analogy used was 
the case of taxi licensing which is undertaken in order 
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to set fare levels and set a standard for entrants. 
There was an indication that licensing was introduced in 
order to benefit consumers, specifically in the setting 
of standards for entrants. In Glasgow the introduction 
of licensing was undertaken in an attempt to control the 
theft of vehicles and'the resetting of car odometers. 
These had been identified by the district council as a 
problem created by 'back street traders' in their area. 
Licensing was seen as an opportunity for greater control 
over dealers at the margin of the second-hand car 
business. 
The fact that a number of different reasons were given 
suggests no clear consensus about the purpose of 
licensing and as a consequence no clear rationale. This 
may provide some explanation for the differing licensing 
systems adopted. However a consistent theme is that 
licensing provides some benefit, ie the protection of 
consumers, or a reduction in theft. It could be implied 
that districts who do not licence do not identify any 
benefits. This is consistent with the guidance from the 
Scottish office referred to in Chapter 6. 
The selected districts were also asked why they had 
attached certain conditions to the licences they issued. 
None could provide an explanation for the requirement 
for pre-sales inspection reports. Falkirk which has a 
licence condition which requires compliance with the 
code of practice suggested that representations must 
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have been received from the local trading standards 
department at the time the system was designed although 
this was not confirmed. The precise reasons for 
different licence conditions appeared to have been lost. 
9.7-. 2 Communication with Prospective Licence Holders 
At The Time of System Introduction 
At the time licensing was introduced most districts, - 
approached communications with dealers in a very ad hoc 
manner. In North East Fife for instance the district 
sent a letter to all dealers listed in the local Yellow 
Pages telephone directory informing them of the 
introduction of second-hand car licensing. In Edinburgh 
and Falkirk advertisements were placed in the local 
press as public notices. Perhaps the most unusual 
approach to communication came from Glasgow District. 
The interviewee stated that the fact that a resolution 
had been passed by the district council and consequently 
appeared in the council minutes (which are public 
documents) was sufficient to inform all second-hand car 
dealers of the introduction of the system. This was also 
considered sufficient to inform the public. This view 
was based upon an. assumption that the public had a duty 
to acquaint themselves with district council business. 
There was no other communication with dealers by Glasgow 
district at the time the licensing system was introduced 
or subsequently. 
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Glasgow District explained the lack of provision of 
information both at system initiation and subsequently: 
"it would be illegal to invite applications from 
second-hand car dealers because by doing so the 
district would be taking upon itself a duty to 
inform every dealer. If a dealer was omitted he 
would be able to take legal action against the 
district for a failure to carry out the duty" 
"we couldn't produce leaflets or pamphlets or 
anything because there is bound to be some error 
and it would be torn apart by the local sheriff" 
This reasoning was also used to explain why Glasgow 
District Council did not send out reminders to dealers 
that their licence had expired. 
None of the districts interviewed approached the 
communication of information about licensing 
methodically. There was no preliminary collation of a 
list of dealers within their area which they could have 
collated internally from business rates information and 
externally from Trading Standards department lists. In 
addition there was no on-going process of communication 
with licence holders. This goes, some way to explaining 
the lack of information about licensing displayed by 
dealers. In addition no district undertook communication 
programmes to inform consumers about the system. 
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9.7.3 Identification of Dealers 
While communication about the introduction of licensing 
may have been beneficial the identification of dealers 
who would need a licence is essential. However it 
appears that the identification of prospective licensees 
was similarly ad hoc. In the survey of administrative 
arrangements among districts it was noted that some 
districts had issued very few licences. There was a 
consensus among those interviewed that there was no 
obligation upon the district to encourage licence 
applications. The following comments express the 
consensual view: 
"The role of the district is not to invite licence 
applications but to respond to applications after 
the applicant has decided they need a licence" 
"It is not the duty of the District Council to 
inform second-hand car dealers that they require to 
hold a licence. It is up to the second-hand car 
dealer themselves to decide whether they require 
one" 
This approach by the districts at the inception of the 
system goes a considerable way in explaining both the 
lack of knowledge among the dealers and the lack of 
comprehensive licence holding. Licensing is seen as an 
administrative function where the district responds 
rather than initiates. 
A second and potentially more serious observation 
relevant to the identification of potential licensees 
was that districts did not seem to define second-hand 
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car dealing in the same way. It was apparent during the 
interviews that some districts had identified an 
exclusion clause in the Act. The clause referred to is 
that which appears as Section 24(3)d of the Civic 
Government(Scotland) Act 1982, which states: 
"A second-hand dealer's licence shall not be 
required for carrying on a business as a dealer in 
second-hand goods or articles incidentally to 
another business not being that of a dealer in such 
goods. " 
According'to the guidance notes from the Scottish office 
(1983) (Scottish Office Circular No6/1983 Appendix A, 
Para 2.61) this clause should be interpreted as: 
"..... for example, where a multiple store takes 
used articles in part exchange for new articles" 
The initial analysis of the Civic Government(Scotland) 
Act did not identify this as an exclusion clause which 
would have a bearing upon second-hand car dealer 
licensing. All motor dealers sell both new and second- 
hand cars, therefore second-hand car dealing is not 
incidental to the business. However the interpretation 
by the district councils of this clause serves only to 
add to the degree of variation across licensing 
districts. 
Some districts have interpreted this clause as making 
all dealers who hold a franchise to sell new cars exempt 
from the licensing provisions of the Act. This is 
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achieved by considering the second-hand car sales as 
incidental to the main business of selling new cars. 
However other districts such as Stirling have taken to a 
subjective assessment of how much of the business is 
selling second-hand as opposed to new cars. If the 
proportion of second-hand cars sold exceeded that of new 
cars sold then the dealer required a licence. 'If not 
then the dealer was exempt. In addition, other districts 
such as Edinburgh imposed a 20% rule: if the second-hand 
car part of the business exceeded 20% of the total 
business then the dealer needed a licence. North East 
Fife and Glasgow had taken an opposite view that any 
dealer who sold second-hand cars required a licence as 
they did not believe the exemption applied to the motor 
industry. 
These differences in interpretation were not based upon 
objective information about individual licence 
applicants. The assessment of all districts operating a 
proportional entry to the exclusion clause was done on 
the basis of 'personal' knowledge of the dealer's 
business by the licensing officer. The existence and 
operation of such an exclusion clause severely 
undermines the achievement of the first necessary 
condition for the attainment of an operative licensing 
' system which is the achievement of comprehensive licence 
holding. 
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To summarise the paints raised above. The communication 
with dealers within a district at initiation of the 
system was severely limited. Compounded with the lack 
of communication is the position adopted by the 
licensing districts that they do not have a duty to tell 
dealers that they need a licence but only respond to 
licence applications after the applicant had decided 
they needed one. Finally if a district received an 
application from a dealer whom they perceived to be in 
an exclusion category they would return the application 
since the dealer would be exempt. 
9.7.4 Enforcement Arrangements 
The final issue raised with the district councils 
interviewed was the arrangement for enforcement. It was 
noted from the survey of administrative arrangements 
that districts had nominated their own staff as 
enforcement staff under the Act as well as other 
district council staff and external agencies. However 
the dealer survey found very little evidence of district 
council staff actually undertaking visits to dealers to 
check compliance with licence conditions. 
At the time of the interviews only one Scottish district 
council employed their own dedicated enforcement officer 
to provide enforcement for all the district licensing 
functions which includes second-hand car dealer 
i 
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licensing. Since the interviews took place two other 
districts have now introduced licensing and employed 
their own enforcement officer. This is clearly 
inconsistent with the number of districts who indicated 
that they had authorised their own staff to enforce the 
local licensing system. Glasgow and Stirling who have 
authorised their own staff were also of the opinion that 
these staff had no enforcement responsibility. The 
following are comments from the interviews: 
Edinburgh District: " The Police are the enforcement 
agency nominated by the 
District council to enforce 
licensing. We leave it up to 
them and we're quite happy with 
what they are doing. 
Glasgow District; " Enforcement is not the 
responsibility of the district 
in any sense, it is entirely a 
Police matter. 
North East Fife: " The council leaves it 
(enforcement) in the hands of 
the local Police and the 
Trading Standards Department 
(pause.... ) Although come to 
think of it I'm not sure 
whether we actually empower 
them under the Act. 
Stirling District: " The enforcement of licence 
conditions and the 
identification of unlicensed 
trading is entirely a Police 
function. We haven't got the 
resources or the manpower to do 
it. 
Districts are divided over how they see their own 
enforcement responsibilities. However, even Falkirk 
which operated its own enforcement officer saw the 
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officer's function as supporting' the efforts of the 
Police and the Trading Standards Department. 
The absence of any clear indication by the districts of 
an enforcement role for themselves puts a heavy burden 
upon the enforcement activities of the external 
agencies. The view that districts do not have 
responsibility for the detection of unlicensed trading 
and compliance with licence conditions calls into 
serious doubt their commitment to such a system and 
provides an explanation of the findings in the consumer 
and dealer surveys. 
9.7.5 Overall Opinion of Second-hand Car Dealer 
,0 
Licensing 
All the district councils interviewed indicated that 
they were quite happy with the operation of second-hand 
car dealer licensing within their area. However all 
pointed to the lack of resources especially manpower in 
administering the system. They indicated particular 
problems with the legislation which required them to 
dispose of applications within a specified time period. 
The districts appeared to be unaware that the wording of 
the Act allows them to charge licence fees which cover 
the'full costs of the system, including extra manpower. 
Glasgow District did concede that the licensing system 
they operated did not come close to achieving the 
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objectives originally set. The overall impression given 
by the interviews was that licensing was seen as an 
inconvenient administrative burden imposed upon them 
from above which was being maintained rather than 
pursued as a priority. The role of the district was only 
to issue licences in response to applications and some 
other 'body' was responsible for ensuring the system 
worked. In all cases the districts referred to the lack 
of information circulating between district councils and 
lack of examples of good practice. All districts said 
that if anyone felt strongly about the subject the 
council would review their licensing operations but that 
they received very few complaints about the system from 
the dealers and none from consumers. 
9.8 Results of Interviews with Police 
The second party to licensing is the police. Their role, 
identified by the district survey, was in providing 
information about the fitness of applicants and 
providing enforcement. Both these issues were raised 
with the police as well as their overall view of the 
licensing of second-hand car dealers. The interviews 
were with Lothian, Strathclyde and Central Police 
although the interview with Central Police is not 
included in this analysis. This interview was curtailed 
as it became apparent that the Inspector did not know 
about the licensing of second-hand car dealers by 
district'councils within Central Region. Central Police 
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were surprised they had been 'implicated' and confirmed 
that they had not received any information about the 
operation of the systems from the three districts within 
the region. There were no standing instructions to 
police officers and as far as they knew they gave no 
information about individuals to the district councils. 
9.8.1 Vetting of Applicants 
Both Strathclyde and Lothian Police have dedicated 
licensing departments who deal with requests from 
district councils about the fitness of licence 
applicants. The information requested relates to all 
licensing functions such taxi drivers, sex shops and 
street traders as well as second-hand car dealers. The 
information they provide is drawn from the Police 
National Computer and consists only of details about 
previous convictions. Both police authorities exercise 
some discretion about precisely which conviction 
statements are passed on as some are not considered 
relevant to a licensing application. There is no 
procedure for sending information to the districts on an 
on-going basis for instance about any recent convictions 
of licence holders. The procedure is only adopted at the 
time of licence issue or licence renewal. The fact that 
a dedicated licence department exists suggests that the 
vetting function is at least operating. 
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9.8.2 Enforcement 
Both police forces were surprised that they had an 
enforcement role in relation to the licensing of second- 
hand car dealers. Strathclyde Police pointed out that 
they did not know which districts were licensing and 
which were not and they did not know what licence 
conditions were attached to the licences issued. As a 
consequence enforcement would be very difficult. There 
was no record of district councils approaching the 
police authority to ask for enforcement assistance. As a 
consequence the police in Strathclyde gave no 
instructions to their officers about second-hand car 
dealer licensing. Lothian police were unable to confirm 
whether enforcement took place or not because 
enforcement criteria were determined at divisional 
rather than headquarters level. However due to the lack 
of resources and other more serious demands upon their 
time it was apparent that licensing was of a very low 
priority especially since they had no control over the 
licensing system and were allocated no resources to 
enforce licensing. 
(c) Overall Attitude to Second-hand Car Dealer Licensing 
The attitude of the police authorities interviewed was 
that they recognised the failings of the system 
presently operated by the district councils. However the 
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view was that something was better than nothing. In 
terms of crime prevention the licensing of second-hand 
car dealers offered enormous potential to control the 
criminal activities of dealers. It was suggested that 
licensing should be extended in its interpretation to 
all persons who trade in second-hand cars and not just 
those who sell to the public. In addition the vatting 
procedure should be improved along the lines of the 
procedure adopted by betting and gaming board licence 
inspectors. In this case the licensing authority can 
inspect financial dealings to establish beneficiaries 
and sources of funds. 
9.9 Results of Interviews with Regional Trading 
Standards Departments 
The third important party to licensing external to the 
district councils is the regional trading standards 
department. These departments are responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection legislation 
throughout a region as well as collecting, collating and 
investigating consumer complaints. In the survey of 
administrative arrangements for licensing the licensing 
districts identified this external agency as having 
responsibility for providing information about licence 
applicants in addition to that provided by the police. 
Their role is also to provide enforcement support for 
the activities of the district enforcement staff. Three 
interviews were conducted with the Chief officers of the 
three appropriate regions; Central, Lothian and 
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Strathclyde. The interview aimed to assess their role in 
providing information relevant to the vetting of 
applicants and their enforcement role, and to establish 
the attitude of the agency toward the licensing system. 
9.9.1 Vatting of Applicants 
The vetting procedure takes place when the trading 
standards department receives a copy of a licence 
application from a district council within the region. 
However not all districts who licence send copies of 
their licence applications and some do not send copies 
of all the applications they receive. The departments 
were concerned that they received very few requests for 
information from their constituent districts. 
Upon receipt, the applicant's name is cross-referenced 
with departmental. records to establish whether the 
department has any record of legal proceedings against 
the applicant. The information passed to the districts 
requesting the information is only that which is already 
in the public domain. The trading standards departments 
are restricted in the information that they can provide. 
First, they cannot pass on information which is 
subjudice. Second they cannot express any opinion about 
the suitability of the applicant based upon complaints 
they have received, principally because the complaints 
may well be unjustified, unrepresentative or malicious. 
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Third, there is a legal restriction on information the 
agency can pass on to other outside agencies. This 
restriction is contained in Trade Descriptions Act 1968. 
The majority of investigations into fraud or deception 
in relation to cars are carried out under the powers 
contained in this Act. These powers are wide-ranging and 
allow access to most forms of premises, as well as the 
seizure of goods and documents. Section 28(5) states 
that: 
"If any person discloses to any person- 
(a) any information with respect to any 
manufacturing process or trade secret obtained 
" by him in premises which he has entered by 
virtue of this section; or 
(b) any information obtained by him in pursuance 
of this Act - 
he shall be guilty of an offence 
This section prevents any information obtained in the 
course of such an investigation from being communicated 
to an outside organisation. Due to these three 
restrictions on information, trading standards 
departments cannot provide any additional information to 
that of the Police. As a result the vetting procedure 
operated by the district councils appears to be based 
solely upon the criteria of criminal convictions. The 
point was made that the simple statement of a conviction 
was very often insufficient to convey the full nature of 
the offence committed. There are procedures in operation 
which provide information to some districts about 
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offences which arise during the course of a licence. 
This information has been used in two instances to call 
the dealer before a licensing board for a review-of his 
licence. In one instance in Lothian region this 
procedure has resulted in a licence being withdrawn. 
9.9.2 Enforcement Activity 
None of the trading standards departments interviewed 
were authorised to enforce the licensing provisions of 
the civic Government(Scotland) Act 1982. The fact that 
they do. not have authorisation means that officially 
they cannot undertake any enforcement role with respect 
to licensing. -It was made clear by one chief trading 
standards officer that the Region would be very unhappy 
to discover that officers were enforcing legislation 
which did not appear on their warrants. The departments 
indicated that they left enforcement to the Police. 
However, unofficially all trading standards officers 
knew of licensing and would make sure that dealers were 
aware that they may need a licence if they operated 
within a licensing district. In addition it was made 
clear that in the event of the prosecution of a second-_ 
hand car dealer the department would ascertain whether a 
licence was required and inform the Procurator Fiscal if 
the dealer had been operating without a required 
licence. This information would, at the discretion of 
the Procurator, be included as an additional charge. Two 
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of the departments attended regular briefing sessions 
between the region and the districts to discuss matters 
where there was a conflict of interests. There was no 
recollection of the matter of enforcement of licensing 
being mentioned. 
9.9.3 General Attitude Toward Licensing 
A general comment was that the licensing of second-hand 
dealers had fallen into disrepute because the district 
councils had not been prepared to "bite the bullet" and 
impose any sanctions upon dealers who were either, 
unlicensed or not complying with the licence conditions. 
Together with the Police, the trading standards 
departments were of the view that the system as 
presently operated was better than nothing at all but 
that the system had the potential to be a "major piece 
of consumer protection legislation". Thä present system 
had limited current effectiveness due to the way in 
which it was being operated by the districts. 
The degree of variation between districts caused 
problems not only for the larger dealers who operated in 
different districts with different licence conditions 
but also for any enforcement agency. The absence of 
standardisation across districts presents a significant 
impediment to effective enforcement by an outside 
agency. Any staff would need to know, on a dealer by 
dealer basis, in which district the dealer operates, the 
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precise interpretation of the exclusion clause to 
establish whether a licence is required, and finally 
what conditions were attached to the licence. As-a means 
of achieving standardisation the trading standards 
departments were all of the view that licensing' would be 
best operated at a regional level by themselves or an 
independent body. It was suggested that the move to a 
higher tier of local government would minimise 
variation, complement existing consumer protection 
activity and ensure that the policy was pursued in the 
interests of consumers. The-condition for this shift in 
the level of responsibility for policy delivery would be 
adequate resources and the facility for charging licence 
fees to ensure the system was self-financing was 
attractive. 
9.10 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter three broad issues were 
identified related to the achievement of necessary 
conditions for licensing to operate. The analysis which 
followed identified a number of operational 
characteristics of licensing systems which in the first 
instance prevent the achievement of an operational 
licensing scheme and in the second instance explain the 
wide variation in licensing systems in Scotland. 
There are three operational defects common to each 
district interviewed which contributed to the failure to 
attain comprehensive licence holding and comprehensive 
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compliance. The first of these derives from the 
introduction of the licensing scheme which although a 
unique event is indicative of future communication 
techniques. The process of introduction was not carried 
out in a way designed for maximum impact upon second- 
hand car dealers. 'The decision to introduce was 
inadequately publicised, evidenced by the significant 
number of dealers who did not know that their local 
district was licensing. The posting of public notices in 
local newspapers is a form of communication very common 
in local government, yet without the use of other 
sources of information such a medium is clearly 
inadequate to convey both the purpose of the system and 
the likely effect upon dealers. The reliance upon 
published council minutes as the sole means of 
communication seems designed to inform the least number 
of people as possible. It would appear that few 
districts went as far as writing to all second-hand car 
dealers operating within the district. Even those 
districts which did communicate directly, did so on the 
basis of inadequate lists. 
The second operational characteristic is the 
interpretation of the identified exclusion clause. None 
of the surveys, or discussions with industry 
representatives, identified a new car dealer who did not 
sell second-hand cars. This would imply that all dealers 
are included in the definition of a second-hand car 
dealer. The interpretation provided by the Scottish 
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Office from which the government's position can be 
inferred does not contradict this view. However, the 
adoption by districts of various 'measures' to define 
second-hand car dealing presents the most serious flaw 
in terms of the achievement of licensing objectives. The 
effect'is that districts, without compulsion, are 
undermining their own systems by introducing an 
obstruction to the attainment of comprehensive licence 
holding at local level. 
The third operational characteristic is the failure to 
provide for the adequate enforcement of licensing. It is 
an anachronism for districts to introduce a licensing 
system, allocate resources to the administrative 
operation and yet have no interest in ensuring that 
unlicensed trading is identified and removed. The. 
reasons for this anachronism appear to be associated 
with the underlying objectives assigned by the local 
district. The only district interviewed who identified 
the protection of consumers as the overriding objective 
was the only district to have its own operational 
enforcement staff. This general failure in enforcement 
in a system which implies, at least in principal, 
additional costs to licensees, is bound to produce a 
situation where non-compliance is the dominant feature. 
These three characteristics have an amplified effect 
upon licensing when considered in relation to the two 
external agencies. The principal identified task of 
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these agencies is enforcement support. However, the 
results of the interviews indicate that this support is 
not forthcoming. It could be argued that even if. the 
arguments about resources and authorisation were absent 
such support would still not be forthcoming. 
When the licensing of second-hand car dealers by 
districts is considered from an enforcement perspective, 
the variation in the licensing systems operated in 
different districts has a number of important 
implications. The first is that a regional or other 
external enforcement agency would need to know precisely 
how the district has interpreted the exclusion clause in 
order accurately to identify unlicensed trading. 
Further, the agency would need to know precisely which 
licence conditions applied in different districts. This 
would make the enforcement task extremely onerous. 
The results of the interviews, while not representative 
of all licensing districts do point to severe 
shortcomings in the delivery of licensing by the 
district councils. Specifically these are: the 
introduction of local mechanisms which contradict the 
overall objective of a workable licensing system; and 
the existence of substantial discretion in the design 
and operation of licensing systems. The implications of 
this for consumers, dealers, and government will be 
addressed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusions and Implications 
10.1 Introduction 
The licensing of an occupation to control its provision 
has been applied in a number of different countries and 
to a number of different occupations. The rationale 
presented for this form of control has been to protect 
the public interest but there has been very little 
evaluation of the impact of licensing upon'the 
purchasers of goods and services. This thesis has 
developed a rationale for government intervention in 
consumer markets based upon the existence of specific 
market failures identified in Chapter 1. It has 
identified a role for government in offering the 
regulation of a market to address these market failures. 
The second-hand car market displays a number of specific 
market failures with respect to consumers. In response, 
a number of different regulatory approaches have been 
taken by government. This thesis has evaluated licensing 
in terms of its proposed benefits to consumers in this 
market, specifically the licensing system introduced in 
Scotland by the Civic Government(Scotland) Act 1982. 
The evidence suggests that licensing as applied to 
second-hand car dealers in Scotland is having no 
beneficial impact upon the purchase experiences of 
consumers. This result has'implications for the Scottish 
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licensing system and also for consumer policy in 
general. 
10.2 Summary of Findings 
In order to undertake the assessment of. the impact of 
licensing there was a need to recognise that consumers 
and second-hand car dealers had different interests each 
of which could be. served through the same policy but 
that the mediating mechanism was the district councils 
who design and operate individual licensing systems. The 
policy of licensing as applied to consumer markets has 
been presented as a , way in which the interests of 
individual consumers can be protected. Licensing 
theoretically has the potential to benefit consumers by 
improving the standard of provision, of information and 
of protection. However it also has the potential to 
serve the interests of the licensed group by introducing 
characteristics of imperfect competition causing 
barriers to entry which results in increased prices, and 
a reduction in mobility. The difference between a 
licensing system which serves licensees' interests 
rather than the consuming public is dependent upon the 
operational characteristics of the system. 
Unlike many other licensing systems, this specific 
application was introduced by central government via 
legislation. The objectives for the licensing of second- 
hand car dealers were never stated explicitly although a 
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number of rationales were presented for a market 
intervention of this type. The underlying assumption was 
that the introduction of licensing would in some way 
contribute toward the reduction of market failure in 
consumer markets. Features of the legislation such as 
the recording of mileage and the keeping of records 
supported this contention. As a consequence the 
introduction of licensing in the second-hand car market 
was seen by many as a way in which consumer interests 
could be protected. 
Central government introduced licensing to the Scottish 
second-hand car market via the delegation of 
responsibility to district councils, the second tier of 
local government in Scotland. This delegation of 
responsibility was accompanied by a significant degree 
of administrative flexibility, ostensibly to allow 
districts to tailor the policy to serve local 
circumstances. This administrative flexibility 
emphasised the role of the district councils as an 
intervening mechanism which mediated between central 
government and second-hand car dealers. This mediation 
had a number of direct consequences. The first 
consequence was that some district councils decided not 
to introduce licensing for second-hand car dealers at 
all. This presented an immediate difference between 
different areas in Scotland. In addition, the delegation 
of responsibility by central government also carried 
with it a great deal of discretion in terms of the 
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design of local licensing systems. The districts could 
design and implement their own licence conditions, 
charge different licence fees, make their 'own 
arrangements for enforcement and decide upon what 
criteria licence applicants should be accepted or 
rejected. This presented a further source of difference 
between licensing districts. Accepting that there were 
differences in the licensing schemes adopted by the 
district councils in Scotland, these differences were 
incorporated into the methodology of two key surveys, 
one of consumers and one of second-hand car dealers. In 
both cases the impact of licensing was assessed by 
reference to the non-licensing areas. These provided an 
approximation of a control group. 
The results of the consumer survey compared the purchase 
experience of consumers in licensing districts with 
consumers in non-licensing districts. The existence of 
three specific benefits was assessed. The first was the 
improvement in information. This benefit is provided 
either directly through more information on cars or 
indirectly through knowledge of the licensing system. 
The second benefit from licensing is the improvement in 
the standard of provision in the market. In the second- 
hand car market this applies to the unrs sold as well as 
elements of dealer PoRnlce. The final benefit is an 
3 npi. crement in protection. This was investigated with 
respect to economic loss suffered by consumers. 
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The survey failed to detect any differences with respect 
to these criteria between licensing and non-licensing 
areas. In addition there were no differences detected 
between different designs of licensing system. It was 
concluded that none of the identified benefits were 
accruing to second-hand car purchasers. 
The results of the dealer survey investigated the extent 
of dealer participation in licensing. Dealer 
participation was extremely low. There were significant 
numbers of dealers operating within licensing areas 
without a licence and without any knowledge of the 
licensing system. Even among licence holders knowledge 
of the system was poor. The, majority of licence holders 
failed to identify correctly their licence-conditions. 
The lack of knowledge and apparent lack of enforcement- 
activity resulted in low levels of compliance with 
licence conditions and little detectable impact upon 
trading behaviour. 
The lack of any detectable effect upon consumers due to 
licensing was explained by the lack of participation by 
dealers. This result highlighted the importance of the 
district councils and their role in implementing the 
policy. The results of interviews with district councils 
suggested that there were deficiencies in both the 
legislation which introduced the licensing powers and in 
the design and operation of local licensing systems. 
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The legislation which provided the administrative 
framework for licensing contained three deficiencies. 
First, the optional nature of licensing allowed- 
districts to choose whether or not to adopt the 
licensing powers. At a time of tighter financial control 
over local government by central government and the 
absence of additional resources this allowed over 50% of 
districts not to implement licensing. Second the 
flexibility with respect to licence conditions allowed 
for significant variation in the potential for licensing 
to affect the trading behaviour of licence holders. The 
lack of uniformity caused confusion among car dealers, 
consumers and enforcement agencies. The third weakness 
was the imprecise drafting of an exclusion clause. The 
clause allowed district councils to arrive at their own 
definition of who constituted a second-hand car dealer. 
A dealer would require a licence in some licensing areas 
but not in others. 
More fundamental to the explanation of operational 
differences between districts was the absence of any 
clear objectives for the system. Districts had no 
rationale for their own system, some seeing it as a 
means of controlling crime, others as means of 
protecting consumers. The final explanation for the lack 
of participation among dealers was the absence of any 
perceived responsibility by the districts for 
enforcement. Districts were relying upon agencies 
external to the district council to provide enforcement 
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but did not appear to have any mechanism for-informing 
the agencies of this reliance or have any procedure for 
monitoring enforcement activity within their 
administrative area to check that this reliance was 
reasonable. 
The results of the surveys indicate that the licensing 
of second-hand car dealers in Scotland is not being 
administered effectively. In view of the aim of this 
thesis this makes it impossible to assess whether 
licensing as operated in Scotland is a policy capable of 
having any beneficial impact upon consumers. At this 
level all that can be assessed is whether or not 
licensing as applied in Scotland is having any impact 
upon the market failures identified in the second-hand 
car market. It cannot be used to assesss the potential 
of licensing per se. 
The original proposition was that consumers would 
benefit from improved information, improved standards of 
provision and improved protection if licensing operated. 
The fact that there were no detectable benefits would 
suggest that consumers are in the same position viz a 
viz market failure as if licensing did not exist. 
However, the incomplete application of a policy does not 
imply that consumers are unaffected by its operation. 
This phenomenon is described by Wolf(1988) as a 
situation of non-market failure where government action 
to alleviate the effects of market failure fails with 
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implications for consumers who do not benefit from the 
policy or from the removal of market failure. These 
effects will be evaluated in terms of the three , 
principal benefits of licensing identified in Chapter 4. 
10.3 Specific Implications for consumers 
The first chapter of this thesis presented the model of 
a perfectly competitive market. It was shown that within 
the assumptions of the model that such a distributive 
mechanism would achieve a solution to the allocation of 
resources in the economy. Further it was shown that such 
a solution simultaneously met the conditions of a Pareto 
optimal solution such that there was no individual who 
could be made better off without another person being 
made worse off. The intervention of government was 
rational only where the market mechanism failed to reach 
equilibrium, a situation of market failure. The second- 
hand car market was presented as a market which 
displayed characteristics of market failure with respect 
to consumers and as such intervention by government in 
principle was justified. An assumption was made that 
intervention would be directed at reducing the impact of 
market failure upon consumers in this market. 
The results of the analysis have revealed that licensing 
as a policy instrument has failed to achieve any 
detectable impact upon the purchase experiences of 
consumers in Scotland. On the assumption that market 
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failure still exists such an intervention has not 
reduced the impact of market failure and cannot be said 
to have achieved a Pareto optimal solution to the 
problems of consumers in this market. One could 
criticise the Pareto criterion itself as a means of 
assessing the effectiveness of a policy intervention. 
McKee(1979) for instance, draws attention to the 
inherent confusion in using this method to assess group 
as opposed to individual welfare. In the absence of a 
Pareto efficient solution this policy should perhaps be 
evaluated using less restrictive criteria such as 
efficiency or equity as suggested by Usher(1981) and 
Ramsay(1984 and 1985). These too can be criticised on 
the grounds that they do not provide an adequate means 
of discrimination. For instance they provide no 
indication of degrees of equity or efficiency. However, 
the partial operation of the policy in the Scottish 
market could not be defined as efficient or equitable. 
An alternative method of assessment presented by 
Stigler(1971) is that of evaluating net consumer 
benefit. This compares the benefits of intervening with 
the costs of not intervening. Using this latter 
approach, the benefits and costs to consumers derived 
from licensing can be explored. 
10.3.1 Improved Information 
The first benefit derived from licensing is improved 
information. Any increase in the direct provision of 
information about second-hand cars is an improvement in 
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the total amount of information provided in the market. 
It must be accepted that even one more dealer displaying 
a pre-sales inspection report due to licensing 
represents an improvement. However, the indirect 
information provided through knowledge of licensing and 
the contribution this makes to reducing the information 
burden of consumers has an inverse effect when viewed 
with respect to incomplete licence application. A 
consequence of having knowledge of licensing which was 
construed as a benefit could, if such information is 
incomplete present a cost. Of the 38% of consumers who 
knew of the operation of licensing, over a third wrongly 
categorised their local authority as licensing when it 
did not operate such as system. In addition, this group 
all identified licensed dealers as much better dealers 
yet purchased from unlicensed dealers. These consumers 
could rely upon the information they have, in the 
mistaken belief that it implies that every dealer is 
licensed. The existence of both licensed and unlicensed 
dealers in licensing areas as well as the existence of 
licensed dealers who are not complying with licence 
conditions increases the amount of information needed in 
the market viz a viz dealers. This implies an increase 
in the information necessary for consumers successfully 
to differentiate dealers. As a result the potential 
benefit of indirect information and of improved direct 
information offered through licensing turns into a cost 
where licensed and unlicensed dealers operate alongside 
each other. 
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10.3.2 Improved Standards 
The second proposed benefit delivered by licensing is 
the improvement in overall standards of provision by the 
exclusion of dealers who fail to qualify as 'fit' 
persons to trade. This improvement in the quality of 
provision in a situation where unlicensed dealers 
operate and licensed dealers do not comply with licence 
conditions is doubtful. The purported contribution of 
licensing is a reduction in the distribution of 
standards across market provision. This reduction is 
said to alleviate market failure directly by eliminating 
low quality provision and-indirectly through setting a 
minimum standard of provision in the market which has 
. the effect of providing standardised information to 
consumers. This implies that consumers need only 
differentiate between the quality of provision in the 
market within the margin bounded by the minimum quality 
defined by licensing and the maximum quality available. 
However, the fact that some dealers are licensed and 
many will have altered their trading behaviour due to 
licence possession and many will not, may lead to an 
overall increase in the distribution of quality in the 
market place. The degree of increase in quality 
dispersion due to licensing depends upon the difference 
between pre-licensing quality dispersion and post 
licensing dispersion. This situation is described below 
in Figure 10.1. The pre-licensing quality dispersion is 
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indicated by distribution Q1 between points A and C with 
a mean X1. The proposition is that licensing removes the 
lower quality provision and increases the mean quality 
of provision providing for an improvement in quality 
indicated by the shift in the distribution to a position 
bounded by points B and D with mean X2. With incomplete 
licence holding some'dealers have improved and some 
dealers have not. As a consequence the quality 
dispersion ina situation of incomplete licensing is the 
distribution bounded by points A and D with an 
indeterminate mean. 
Figure 10.1 Effect of Licensing Upon Quality 
Distribution 
Lair Qualify Xl X! High Qualify 
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As a consequence of the increase in the quality 
dispersion through partial licensing any overall 
improvement in standards is indeterminate. This 
situation does have implications for consumer 
information in that the degree of differentiation in the 
quality of market offering implies the need for greater 
evaluation by consumers. Again incomplete licensing 
application and participation among dealers increases 
not reduces the burden upon consumers. 
10.3.3 Improved Protection 
The final proposed benefit which it is suggested accrues 
to consumers is an improvement in protection. The 
reasoning behind this benefit is that dealers who have 
or are likely to compromise the interests of consumers 
are excluded by the vetting procedure. in addition any 
transgression during the period of the licence would 
lead to the licensee being fined or having the licence 
removed. In the latter case the dealer would be unable 
to serve the market. The incomplete application of 
licensing both within districts and across Scotland 
allows unlicensed trading to occur, Clearly in these 
circumstances undesirable dealers cannot be excluded 
within a district and cannot be excluded across 
Scotland. As such there can be no overall improvement in 
protection through the vatting procedure. In addition, 
the absence of any mechanism for enforcement suggests 
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that control over the activities of licensed dealers is 
also absent. The benefit of improved protection is 
unsubstantiated, but the evidence suggests that the 
Scottish licensing system cannot deliver increased 
protection. 
10.4 Additional Costs 
To, the failure to identify any benefits to consumers 
there must be added a number of additional costs. 
Dealers are not passing on the direct costs of licensing 
to consumers by increasing the price of cars they offer. 
However the costs for consumers associated with this 
market remain and have not been removed or reduced by 
the introduction of licensing. These are the indirect 
costs associated with making poor purchase decisions 
identified by Sproles(1983) and Morris and 
Bronson(1970). Specifically these are the costs of 
search, in terms of time and money as well as the 
increased probability of a 'poor' purchase in terms of 
the quality assessment resulting in a complaint. 
The most . mportant issue for consumers in relation to 
second-hand car buying is the reduction of risk. A 
system which provides for control over entry to the 
market and is administered by an independent body is an 
attractive proposition for consumers. It suggests that a 
purchase from a licensed dealer provides a degree of 
purchase security. At the same time as the Scottish 
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licensing system promises purchase security to 
consumers, it is actually having no impact upon the 
trading operations of dealers. As such unlicensed 
dealers are 'free riding' upon the perception of risk 
reduction offered by a licensing system and specifically 
by licensed dealers. 
The above analysis suggests that the partial operation 
of licensing is providing no benefit to consumers and in 
some cases could increase their economic costs. In the 
absence of net benefits the licensing system operated in 
Scotland can be considered as contributing to a net 
reduction in social welfare, where the costs of the 
policy exceed the benefits. 
10.5 Conclusions on the Scottish System 
There is no evidence to suggest that the licensing of 
second-hand car dealers as a policy is unable to meet 
consumer protection objectives. It is the application of 
licensing in Scotland which has severely undermined its 
effectiveness. The administration of licensing by 
districts is characterised by a lack of co-ordination 
among licensing authorities, a lack of enforcement of 
the duties imposed by licensing and a corresponding lack 
of participation by second-hand car dealers. Faults in 
the drafting of the legislation and any clear 
understanding of how the policy would apply to second- 
hand car dealers has presented district councils with 
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inadequate guidance. This has been compounded by a lack 
of resources, a lack of motivation and an inability to 
secure any licensing objectives. As a result, there is 
only a small proportion of dealers who could be 
considered to be participating in licensing. As a 
consequence licensing has had no detectable impact upon 
the purchase experiences of consumers and has made no 
contribution to consumer interests in the second-hand 
car market. Government intervention in this instance has 
failed to achieve a net increase in welfare in this 
market and according to the rationale for intervention 
the policy cannot be justified either in terms of Pareto 
efficiency, equity-or a net welfare benefit. 
10.6 Implications for Policy 
There are two central questions as far as policy 
implications are concerned. The first is in what way can 
the existing licensing framework be improved so as to 
achieve a working licensing system. Second, what lessons 
can be learnt from the Scottish experience about the 
application of consumer policy in a wider context. 
10.6.1 Improvements Within the Existing system 
The first improvement to the system must be the 
achievement of comprehensive licensing. This objective 
must be pursued by individual districts in terms of 
securing comprehensive licence holding among dealers 
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operating within their administrative area. Second this 
objective must be secured by encouraging all districts 
to introduce a licensing system. If this can be achieved 
it will provide a sound basis upon which to effect 
modifications to the trading behaviour of second-hand 
car dealers in line with the rationale for government 
intervention in the market. 
The second improvement is to standardise the form and 
content of licence conditions which will reduce 
confusion in the market for all parties concerned. For 
consumers, the standardisation of conditions would 
reduce the information burden and provide market 
pressure in securing compliance. This is in addition to 
any absolute, increase in information, standards and 
protection. This improvement would also provide an 
incentive to dealers. Many larger companies indicated 
that there were substantial additional costs involved in 
operating outlets in a number of licensing districts. 
Specifically the training of staff and the preparation 
of vehicles. Uniformity would allow for the introduction 
of company wide procedures for companies who operate 
across districts to meet licence conditions thereby 
reducing the cost of compliance. 
If we assume a priori that the benefits of intervention 
exceed the costs, both of these improvements require a 
re-assessment of enforcement provision. District 
councils are able to charge licence fees to cover the 
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costs of the system. The complaint about a lack of 
resources could be resolved with-respect to this 
specific responsibility by increasing the licence fees. 
It would be possible, though perhaps not politically 
feasible, to charge a sufficiently high licence fee to 
cover the costs of local enforcement personnel. ' In the 
absence of this, there need to be dramatic improvements 
in communication between district and dealer as well as 
with any outside agencies to enhance enforcement 
performance. 
It is desirable for administration and enforcement to be 
at the same administrative level to ensure consistency 
in activities and to take advantage of economies of 
information through central recording and centralised 
monitoring. If it is accepted that licensing is a local 
government function, this implies that in the interests 
of uniformity, responsibility for enforcement should be 
placed at the highest administrative tier in Scotland. 
This would be at the regional level. This shift in 
responsibility for enforcement suggests that in the 
interests of consistency the administration of licensing 
should also be moved to regional level. if this is 
accepted the most appropriate agency within regional 
councils would again be the trading standards 
departments who already enforce consumer protection 
legislation relevant to the secönd-'hand car trade. 
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If this arrangement were to be adopted, it would have a 
number of benefits. First it would avoid problems 
associated with restrictions on the passing of 
information between agencies. Legal restrictions such as 
that which appears in the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 
would not be operative. More important is the potential 
for introducing the systematic communication of 
information between those responsible for issuing 
licences with those responsible for enforcing the 
licensing system. In addition the placing of 
responsibility for licensing with an existing consumer 
protection agency could derive synergy with other 
consumer protection activities, for instance, the 
enforcement of consumer credit licensing under the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the preparation of 
assurances under Pt 3 of the Fair Trading Act 1973. 
However this prospect raises issues about the 
appropriateness of this. agency operating licensing 
especially as they are not viewed by the motor trade as 
impartial. 
The objective of these recommendations is to achieve a 
licensing system which operates effectively. Once in 
place such a system could contribute significantly to 
existing consumer protection in this market. One 
mechanism which has been used, but not effectively is 
the citing of the voluntary code of practice for the 
motor industry-as a licence condition. This has the 
effect of making compliance with a voluntary code 
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mandatory for licence holders. The voluntary code of 
practice has been criticised for not having a strong 
enough deterrent against non compliance, but has also 
been seen as a useful and flexible method of defining 
duties and responsibilities in specific industries. The 
incorporation of voluntary codes into a licensing system 
has the advantage of providing a deterrent yet does not 
alter the nature of the control in terms of its 
flexibility or precision. 
A fully operational licensing system could also be used 
in conjunction with sheriff court and small claims court 
judgements. This would feed information about successful 
actions back to the licensing body to be used in the 
monitoring of licence holders and in the renewing of 
licences. Or, additionally licence possession or renewal 
could be made conditional upon the-observance of court 
judgements. 
10.6.2 Implications for the Policy of Licensing 
The application of licensing to second-hand car dealers 
in Scotland raises a number of issues for policy makers. 
The first must be ,a recognition that delegating 
responsibility for the implementation of a policy 
requires some mechanism for co-ordination between the 
objectives of the delegating authority and the 
activities of the implementing authority. This problem 
has been well documented by Browne and Wildavsky(1984), 
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Montjoy and O'Toole (1979), Thomas(1979) and 
Marvel(1982). Skelcher et al (1983) make explicit 
reference to the problems of co-ordination associated 
with implementation by local government. 
In the Scottish case, district councils were given the 
power to licence with little or no guidance as to why 
such a policy had been passed by Parliament or 
guidelines as to how the policy should be implemented. 
The absence of clear objectives was in conjunction with 
the delegation of significant discretion with respect to 
the implementation of the policy. Where the delegation 
of responsibility is to a single authority, any 
deviation in implementation or any addition or deletion 
of objectives can be controlled. However, where the 
delegation is to 56 different authorities there is 
considerable scope for deviation, both in terms of 
objectives and, as a consequence, system design. 
Berman(1978) believes that considerable discretion for 
those who implement policy is desirable in recognition 
of different local conditions. But a number of other 
authors point to the necessity of some mechanism for the 
control and monitoring of implementation activities to 
ensure success. Several heuristics have been presented 
for policy makers which consist of conditions necessary 
to achieve the effective delegation of responsibility 
for the implementing of public policy, see especially 
Pressman and Wildavsky(1984), O'Toole and Montjoy(1984) 
and Barrett and Fudge(1981). The work of Bunker(1972) is 
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particularly relevant in this context. Bunker identified 
five variables relevant in considering the 
implementation of public policy by what he describes as 
'multi-actors', in this case the district councils. 
These are the degree to which the delegated organization 
(a) Is consensually clear about its task. 
(b) Is appropriately differentiated into its 
pertinent sub environment. 
(c) Is integrated by information exchange. 
(d) Has clear knowledge about its performance. 
(e) Is able to make corrective adjustments to 
its own action. 
Using this model it is clear that districts are not 
consensually clear about their task in relation to the 
licensing of second-hand car dealers. Similarly they are 
not differentiated into the pertinent sub-environment, 
ie historically they have had no consumer protection 
enforcement functions with respect to the motor trade. 
The results also indicate a lack of information exchange 
between the districts and other agencies involved. The 
absence of any mechanism for monitoring the effects of 
licensing makes the possibility of corrective action not 
yet established. 
When considering consumer policy in a wider context, 
uniformity in policy application must be an overriding 
concern. The legislation which introduced licensing in 
Scotland was not drafted with uniformity in mind. This 
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had knock-on effects through the process of implementing 
licensing. 
10.7 Recommendations for Future Research 
This research has attempted to evaluate one regulatory 
application with respect to a specific market, as such 
it is a specific policy application to a specific 
market. However, the implications of this research can 
be developed in a much wider arena. 
This thesis suggests that in delegating responsibility 
for policy implementation, central government must be 
aware of the impact of existing structures upon the 
operation of the policy. This approach to policy 
research, concentrating upon the mediation between 
policy statement and policy implementation has not been 
developed with respect to consumer policy yet provides a 
useful framework for policy analysis. For instance we 
can use the five criteria set out by Bunker above and 
also use the considerable theoretical work of Van Horn 
and Meter(1975,1979) which concentrates upon policy 
standards, enforcement and the characteristics of 
implementing agencies. In the case of second-hand car 
dealers features of the administration of licensing have 
reversed the impact of the policy, turning theoretical 
benefits into practical costs to consumers. The 
application of general theoretical frameworks for the 
implementation of public policy to the specific 
application of consumer policy could be used to design 
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delivery mechanisms better able to meet consumer policy 
objectives. This would include a consideration of 
methods to integrate consumer policy with existing 
administrative structures as well as examine the role of 
consumer education in the implementation of consumer 
policy. 
The nature of existing government intervention in 
consumer markets is almost entirely legislative although 
increasingly based upon codes of practice. The 
monitoring of performance of these responses is still 
undertaken by local government enforcement agencies each 
operating within its own specific geographical area. Co- 
ordinating bodies have been established on the 
assumption that they will be able to co-ordinate 
objectives but their success has as yet been unproven. 
There are significant opportunities to extend this 
research by looking at spatial variations in the 
implementation of consumer policy. In particular, this 
could-involve the identification of whether or not the 
attitudes of responsible agencies have a direct impact 
upon local trading conditions and apparent local market 
failures. For instance, the analysis of the role of 
enforcement staff in their individual interpretation of 
the objectives of policy and their perception of their 
role. Preliminary work on the coping behaviours of 
'street level bureaucrats' has already been carried out 
by Weatherly and Lipsky(1977) and Sorg(1983) but'in 
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studies not directly associated with consumer policy and 
without specific reference to enforcement by local 
government staff. 
Since the survey work for this thesis was published by 
the Scottish Consumer Council in 1989, a number of 
developments have taken place. First, the Confederation 
of Scottish Local Authorities(COSLA) has set up a 
working party to look into the operation of second-hand 
car dealer licensing. The working party has still not 
reported fully but it is likely to recommend to all 
districts that they introduce a licensing system and 
come to some agreement about what licence conditions 
should be applied. In view of this, an obvious 
development of this thesis would be to re-assess the 
position in five years' time. Hopefully there would be a 
comprehensive licensing system in operation at that time 
which could be evaluated. In addition one district 
council has adopted a radical approach by inviting 
consumers to refer complaints directly to them as, the- 
licensing authority. This, it is hoped will lead to an 
association between district council and consumer 
protection while at the same time generating an 
information base which can be used in the vetting 
process. 
The second underlying theme of this research has been 
the nature of consumer problems in the second-hand car 
trade. The most significant of these is a lack of 
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information. Licensing along with many other forms of 
regulation in this market addressed this problem through 
requiring information to be displayed on cars and by 
reducing the information burden by introducing a minimum 
standard of provision. The problem for policy makers is 
in prescribing exactly what information should be 
communicated by sellers as a minimum is open to market 
reaction. Sellers may well ensure that the product or 
service scores well in terms of the required 
information. in the case of second-hand cars the pre- 
sales inspection checklist becomes the minimum check. 
Similarly in improving standards by vetting applicants 
the market response is to produce applicants who score 
well on the fitness criteria. For instance applicants 
who do not have criminal convictions may act as 'front 
men' for those who do. 
What is required in both cases is a rigorous statement 
of consumer information needs in order to design 
appropriate policy responses. But this is an incomplete 
answer. The results of work by Claxton, Fry and 
Portis(1974) as well as Katona and Mueller(1955) and 
Newman and Staelin(1972) all suggest that consumers 
engage in very little search for information, even for 
expensive appliances. This has been explained by 
Stigler(1961) as the outcome of a perceived cost-benefit 
trade-off. As a consequence more research is needed on 
the passive acquisition of information and the limits on 
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the complexity and quantity of information that can be 
absorbed in this way. 
A further implication of the results of this thesis is 
the importance of providing evidence of the market 
demand for consumer protection effort. One district 
stated quite categorically that there were no problems 
with the second-hand car trade in their area on the 
grounds that they had never received any complaints from 
the public. Direct demand for consumer policy has 
traditionally been delegated to 'consumer organisations' 
but no assessment has been made of systems which 
effectively channel consumer dissatisfaction as opposed' 
to consumer complaints. However, consumer 
dissatisfaction has proved remarkably difficult to 
measure in an aggregate sense. This thesis used the 
levels of consumer complaint to provide evidence of 
consumer dissatisfaction in the second-hand car market. 
The disadvantages of this approach are well documented 
pointing to the unrepresentative nature of voiced 
complaints among other criticisms. However, there are 
implications for central government activity which is 
reliant upon such a reactive measure of dissatisfaction. 
The results of the consumer survey indicated a complaint 
level in excess of 50% of purchases. However, less than 
10% of the complaining group went on to report this 
complaint to another agency. This suggests .a substantial 
underestimate in official statistics of actual 
complaints about products and services which implies 
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that policy makers may be severely underestimating the 
extent of market failure. This may well be true of other 
sectors in which the information available to policy 
makers is severely flawed. 
The underlying motives for voicing consumer complaint 
demands the attention of researchers but there also 
needs to be a recognition of the role of structures and 
information systems which could communicate 
dissatisfaction in an objective manner for the use of 
policy makers and business alike. The recent launch by 
Perth District Council of their 'Used Car Charter' 
invites the communication of complaints and comments 
from the public direct to the licensing authority and 
may provide a mechanism for improving information for 
the administrators of licensing. The effect of this 
direct and proactive approach needs to be assessed. 
10.8 Summary and Conclusion 
This research has demonstrated that the licensing of 
specific activities presents a number of opportunities 
for consumer protection. However the implementation of 
the policy through the delegation of responsibility and 
subsequent neglect by district councils has ensured that 
the licensing of second-hand car dealers in Scotland is 
not operating effectively. The future licensing of 
second-hand car dealers is in the hands of government. 
Selective repeal of the parent legislation by central 
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government could improve the existing situation to a 
point where the activities of local licensing districts 
would be uniform. Alternatively voluntary agreement 
between district councils with the involvement of 
enforcement agencies could achieve a solution in the 
short term. Only by the coordinated activity of district 
councils across Scotland can this policy hope to achieve 
any improvement in the position of second-hand car 
purchasers. 
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the spine. 
Some images distorted 
Institute for Retail Studies 
University' of Stirling 
x3RF; 
Stirling FK9 4LA 
Scotland U. K. 
John A. Dawson 
Fraser of AIIander Professor of Distributive Studies 
ref E/6212/L 
Dear Sir 
Used Car Dealer Licensing in Scotland 
6 Febuary 1987 
You may remember that I contacted you in August 1986 
concerning the operation of your second dealer licensing scheme, in 
particular Used Car Dealer licensing. This was in connection with a 
three year study into the licensing systems in Scotland commissioned 
by the Scottish Consumer Council. 
As a-continuing up date on the data already obtained, I would 
be grateful if you could fill in the enclosed numerical 
questionnaire for the six month period July to December 1986 and 
return it to me at your earliest convenience. The information would 
then be added to the data already held to give an up to date picture 
of the operation of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982. 
You may or may not be aware that a working paper has been 
published by the Institute for Retail Studies on the results of the 
survey of local authorities in 1985. Second hand Car Dealer 
Licensing in Scotland: A Survey of Local Authorities, it can be 
ordered from the above address at price £2.50. 
I thank you again in anticipation and can assure you that the 
information you are providing is of the utmost importance to this 
project. 
Yours faithfully 
yýý, 
Telephone: (0786) 73171 
Telex: 777557 STUNIV G 
. 
Fax. No. 0786 63000 
International +44 0786 63000 
Mark Gabbott 
Research Fellow 
Institute for Retail Studies 
IRS 
John A. Dawson 
Fraser of Allander Professor of Distributive Studies 
ref N/6212/L 
Dear Sir 
Used Car Dealer Licensing in Scotland 
6 Febuary 19 87 
You may remember that I contacted you in September 1985 
concerning the implementation of Used Car Dealer licensing in 
Scotland under the above Act. At that time you indicated that you 
may be introducing a system during 1986. As part of a three year 
study into the operation of used car dealer licensing commissioned 
by the Scottish Consumer Council. I am writing to ascertain whether 
you are now engaged in the licensing of Used Car Dealers. If so 
would you please send me details of the system you are operating 
such as conditions, cost of licence etc so that you may be included 
in the study. 
As a continuing up date on the data already obtained, 
licensing authorities are asked to respond every six months by 
completing a numerical questionnaire. If you are now licensing could 
you also fill in the enclosed numerical for the six month period 
July to December 1986 and return it to me at your earliest 
convenience. The information would then be added to the data already 
held. to give an up to date picture of the operation of the Civic 
Government (Scotland) Act 1982. 
You may or may not be aware that a working paper has been 
published by the Institute for Retail Studies on the results of the 
survey of local authorities in 1985. Entitled Second hand Car Dealer 
Licensing in Scotland: A Survey of Local Authorities, the working 
paper can be ordered from the above address at price £2.50. 
I thank you again in anticipation and can assure you that the 
information you are providing is of the utmost importance to this 
project. - 
University of Stirling 
Stirling FK9 4LA 
Scotland U. K. 
Telephone: (0786) 73171 
Telex: 777557 STUNIV G 
Fax. No. 0786 63000 
International +44 0786 63000 
Yours faithfully 
It rp 59ect of the, priori January d6 to June 83 please 
in« ica ta: 
I. The total number o: apnlica%ions received from second hand car 
dealers for licences (excluding renewals) 
2. The number of licences issued in respect of these applications 
3. The total number off licence renewals from second hand car 
dealers. 
4. The total number of refusals to grant a second hand car dealers 
licence for any reason. 
S. Total number of refusals to grant any category of second hand 
dealer licence. 
6. How many second hand car dealer licences have been withdrawn 
for failure to comply with conditions etc ? 
7. How many licences have been withdrawn from other categories of 
second hand dealer for the same reason ? 
8. How many applications for a second hand car dealers licence have 
been refused because of an unsatisfactory reference from an outside 
body ie police, trading standards etc ? 
9. Have you had reason to withdraw any used car dealer licences 
in this period ? If so, how many and for what reason ? 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
---------- -- ---------------------V------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1. How many second hand dealer licences are currently in force 
in your district ? 
........ 
How many of these current licences are held by second car 
dealers ? 
2. What is the number of second hand dealer licences issued 
in the last 12 months to new applicants ( not including renewals 
or temporary . 
licences-) 
.. 000.00 
How many of these new licences issued in the last 12 months 
have been to second hand car dealers ( not including renewals 
and temporary licences) 
3. In relation to second hand car dealers please indicate 
which of the following are conditions of the licence you issue : 
j`ý (a) that any dealer display a personal identity 
(b) that all second hand vehicles be subject ýJ to a pre-sales inspection and that the result 
of that inspection should be displayed in 
" the form of a check sheet an the vehicle at 
the time of sale. 
(c) that records relating to the second hand 
I, J vehicle be kept by the dealer. 
if condition (c) is one that you have indicated your-authority 
requires, please tick those pieces of information listed 
below are required to be recorded 
Q date and time of purchase of vehicle 
Cf colour, make and model of vehicle 
registration-number 
Q chassis and engine number 
M name and address of seller 
previous owner (as on registeration document. ) 
odometer reading on purchase 
date and time of sale 
t name and address of purchaser 
''odometer reading at time of sale 
4. Do you require that any records kept by the second hand 
car dealer be made available for inspection by an authorised 
officer of the licensing authority ? 
Yes Nof 
-I 
if yes please indicate by means of a tick which officers 
your district has authorised to undertake the inspection. 
Police Officers 
Trading Standards Officers 
Officers of the licensing department 
Fire Officers 
Other (please specify) ............... 
.......... 9.. 00... 00000.000... 6000a0. 
5. Would you say that the processing of an application for a 
second hand car dealer licence takes longer on average than 
applications from other second hand dealers ? 
Yes 
ý 
Noý 
Typically how long is the period between the receipt ofLaa 
completed application and the ultimate issue of a licence ? 
(please tick) 
1 
week 
for a second hand dealer () 
for a second hand car 
dealer () 
I3 over 3 
month months months 
) C) C) 
6. How much money does a second hand car dealers licence cost ? 
........ 
for what period is the licence valid coresponding to the 
price(s) you have indicated ? 
.0.00.6 
7. How many staff hours per week would you say were dedicated 
to second hand dealer licensing ? 
0*00*0000 
S. When deciding whether or not to grant a second hand car 
dealer licence, to-which sources of information do you refer 
before making your decision ? 
please indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 the relative importance 
of those sources where 1 is least important and 5 is most 
important. A'o'would indicate that you do not consult that 
particular source 
mark 0 or 
1 to 5 
Own records(previous refusals or applications 
Fire Brigade () 
Regional Trading Standards Department records () 
Regional or District planning records () 
Police Authority (, ) 
Company registeration etc. () 
Tax or VAT office (, ) 
Other (please specify).. ' ...::.....:...:....:... 
......................... (5 ) 
9. When licensing was adopted by your authority did : 
(please tick) 
all existing dealers become automatically 
licensed 
all dealers become licensed on payment of 
the appropriate fee 
771 
each dealer to whom the resolution applied 
have to apply using the appropriate forms, 
give public notice and be subject to the 
process of approval 
some other method apply (please specify) 
"0f""0"0000"""0"0""0"""0""000"""0"00"0"" 
"""0"00000f0000"040"00000fi0900000f000f0 
10. Where a person deals in second hand goods but only as a. 
secondary activity to their main business, would they require 
a second hand dealer licence in your authority ? 
e. g. a large franchised garage selling mainly new cars but 
some second hand cars, a clothes shop selling. some second 
hand clothes, or a jeweller selling some second hand 
jewellery. 
YesiI No 1: 1 
11. Is there a register of persons who hold licences in your 
authority ? 
Yes 
a 
No 
li 
Is this register a public document in the sense thst it 
may be inspected at your office by members of the general 
public ? 
Yes No 
Q 
12. Does your authority receive notification of prosecutions 
against second hand dealers as a matter of course ? 
Yes 
a 
No7 
if yes, plesae tick those sources from which you receive 
this information 
Police Authority 
Trading Standards Department 
Q Local Courts 
a Other (please specify)............ 
.................................. 
13. To your knowledge, has a scottish court ever made an order 
revoking a licence or banning the holder from holding a 
licence for a licensee in your authority ? 
Yes 71 NoF-I 
14. How many licences presently in force in your area are 
restricted in some way ? 
0... 0.. 0.. 
Please state what type of restriction is used by your 
authority i. e. time period for renewal, higher fee, 
specific place of business, specific second ahnd goods etc. 
........ CS ........ "" .......... "* ................ "S .. "" ..... 
.......... "" .. "S .................... SS ..................... 
00&&0.0f00000*0**0000006.00*00000000000*00000006a6990*000*06 
APPENDIX II 
Pre-sales Information Pro-Forma 
DSID CAR PRE-SAIL'S INFORMATION REPORT 
Details of Car: Cash Price £ .......... 
Nake 
........................ 
Model 
.................. '.. i. i.... 
Colour 
............... . 
Engine Capacity ............. Date 
First Reg. ................. Reg. No. ............... 
fiter Reading ............ 
Where the lower box has been ticked the The reading is COP= 
I] 
statutory mileage information notice must 
be displayed alongside the mileage The reading is UNVERIFIED 
777 
reading. 
REQUIRES REPAIR OR REPLACIIMENr 
Either YES or NJ to be deleted. If YES, list faults and state repairs or replacements 
required. 
Brakes YES/M 
t inc. servo) 
Wheels and Tyres YES/NO 
tine. e) 
Steering YES/NO 
(inc. steh) 
Suspension YES/NO 
YES/DD 
tine. ancillaries) 
Cooling System YES/NJ 
Clutch/Zbrque YES/NO 
Convertor 
Gear Box YES/ND 
(inc. auto or overdrive) 
Transmission 
(inc. final drive and YES/NO 
drive shaft) 
Electrical Systc º YES/PD 
&dy, Trim and YES PD 
Ibiderstructure 
Signed ................................. 
Umm ................................... 
Date ................................... 
Status of person making 
this Statement ............................... 
For (e. g. eody. corporate) .................... 
IF YOU BOY MS CAR IT IS IN YOUR INT I. ' 10 KEEP 'ISS RE 0I I' 
APPENDIX III 
Code of Practice for the Motor Industry 
Code of Practice 
for 
the Motor Industry 
Introduction 
This Code of Practice was originally drawn up In 1976 by the 
Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), the 
Motor Agents Association (MAA) and the Scottish Motor 
Trade Association (SMTA) in consultation with the Director 
General of Fair Trading to govern the conduct of 
manufacturers and dealers in relation to the supply of new and 
used cars, petrol, parts and accessories and car servicing and 
repair, and embodies principles which have been observed by 
the majority of the industry for many years. Improvements 
have now been agreed which are incorporated in this revised 
edition. It will be brought up to date from time to time as the 
occasion demands. 
The principles set out are not intended to interpret, qualify 
or supplant the law of the land, and are not intended to be 
applied on non-consumer sales. 
The associations concerned regard It as a duty laid on their 
members that they will accept the Code in its entirety. A 
customer who feels dissatisfied with the treatment he has 
received from a member will be able to submit his grievance to 
the conciliation and advisory service operated by the relevant 
association. 
It should not be overlooked that the customer also has his 
part to play. It is only by co-operating fully with those-who 
make, sell and service cars that the customer can get the 
maximum benefit from his purchase. In particular, by 
maintaining his car in accordance with the manufacturer's 
instructions; by observing any warnings given in the 
handbook; and by giving as much information as possible to 
anyone servicing it, he can ensure he gets the best possible 
use out of his car and his troubles reduced to a minimum. 
Throughout the Code: 
The term MANUFACTURER is taken to include 
concessionaire or 
importer. 
The term DEALER is taken to include retail 
dealer or distributor or 
supplier of goods or 
services, whether or not 
franchised by a 
manufacturer. 
I New Car Salami 
1.1 Dealers must bear in mind that in sales of goods to consumers 
they are responsibl4 undar the Sale of Goods Act 1979 for 
ensuring that the goods are of rr archartab: a quality and fit for 
the purpose for which they are required. Statements whether 
oral or in writing which are in apparent conflict with this 
principle must be avoided. 
1.2 Manufacturers relying on dealers to carry out a standard Pre- 
Oeli%, ery Inspection shall provide dealers with a standard check 
list for the particular model of car. Dealers must ensure that 
these insoections are carried out properly and a copy of the 
POI check list shall be given to the customer. 
1.3 The car must be delivered in condition which is to the 
manufacturer's standard. Each car must conform fully to all 
legislation affecting its construction, use and maintenance. 
This paragraph does not affect any legal responsibilities which 
may be placed on manufacturers and user to ensure this. 
1.4 The benefit and limitations of any tre3trrsnt over and above 
that already provided by the manufacturer which is 
recommended by the dealer in order to inhibit oe growth of 
rust or other corrosion should be exolaired to the customer. 
t. 5 Order forms are intended to help both parties to the contract 
by spelling out the terms and conditions on which business is 
being done. Such terms and conditions must be fair and 
reasonable and set out clearly. together with a statement of the 
circumstances under which the order can be cancelled. 
1.6 All documents must be legible. 
1.7 Order forms must contain details of all charges additional to 
the car price so that the customer may understand clearly the 
total price he has to pay to out the car on the road. 
1.8 Manufacturers and dealers should ensure that the 
manufacturer's handbook relating to the model of car being 
sold is available to the customer at the time of sale of the car 
and for a reasonable length of time thereafter. 
1,9 The terms of the manufacturers' warranties should be drawn to 
the attention of the customer and any relevant document 
published by the manufacturer must be handed over to him. 
2 Car Menufaeturers' Warranties 
(or Guarantees hereafter called 
Warranties] 
2.1 A manufacturer's warranty is a simple and straightforward way 
for the customer to have faults of manufacture appearing 
within certain times (or before the car has done a certain 
mileage) put right at little or no cost to the customer without 
the necessity of his pursuing legal rights against the seller. 
2.2 The warranty must not adversely affect the consumer's 
remedies against the seller under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
and must include a statement making this clear to the 
customer. 
2.3 The warranty must include a statement advising the customer 
that it is in addition to any other remedies he may have under 
the contract of sale. 
2.4 The warranty will not extend to cover defects arising from a 
failure by the customer to have the car serviced in accordance 
with the manufacturer's recommendations. 
3 Used Car Sales 
3.1 Used cars sold to customers must conform to legislation 
affecting the construction and use of cars and should, where 
appropriate, be accompanied by a current Department of 
Transport Test (MoT) Certificate. 
32 Dealers must bear in mind that sales of used cars are subject to 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and attention is specifically drawn 
to the conditions of merchantable -quality and fitness for 
purpose contained in this Act. If, however, defects are 
specifically brought to the attention of the customer or the 
customer examines the car before the contract is made there is 
no condition of merchantable quality as regards those specific 
defects or ones which that examination ought to reveal, 
Dealers should therefore reveal defects on an approved 
checklist. See 3.5. The format and use of the checklist are 
determined and approved by the trade associations or the 
manufacturer of the car concerned. Dealers should provide all 
reasonable facilities to enable prospective customers or their 
nominees to carry out an examination of the car prior to sale, in 
order that any defects which ought to be revealed at the time 
of sale are made known to both parties. 2.5 The terms of the warranty must be easily understandable 
particularly in relation to any items specifically included in or 
excluded from its provisions. Manufacturers and dealers 
3.3 
should also give advice to customers as to who is responsible 
and what to do if they have a problem regarding parts a nd 
accessories not covered by the mänufacturer's warranty. 
26 The manufacturer should permit the transfer of the unexpired 
portion of any warranty to a second or subsequent owner. 
2.7 The manufacturer should make clear that rectification work 
may be done under warranty by any of his franchised dealers. 
Manufacturers and dealers will take steps to ensure that 
warranty work is carried out rapidly and effectively. 
28. Manufacturers will operate fair and equitable policies to permit 
the extension of warranty in the event of a car being off the 
road for en extended period for rectification of warranty faults, 
or of the repetition outside warranty of a fault which had 
previously been the subject of rectification work during the 
warranty period. 
Vehicle off road for warranty work 
2.9 There is no automatic right to a loan car or contribution 
towards hiring charges in circumstances where a customer's 
own car is otf the road for repair under warranty. Whether 
there is any such right will depend on the normal legal rules 
relating to damages. 
210 Manufacturers must give clear advice to their dealers as to the 
circumstances in which a loan car or contribution towards 
hiring charges should be provided. Such guidance should take 
full account of the legal position and be made available to 
customers on request. 
2.11 Where a loan car is made available, this will merely be as 
reasonable alternative transport rather than an exact 
replacement for the car which is off the road. 
Dealers are reminded of the legal requirement that when selling 
a used car subject to a printed guarantee or warranty, that 
guarantee or warranty must not purport to take away or 
diminish any rights which the consumer would otherwise enjoy 
in law. The warranty document must also include a statement 
advising the consumer that the warranty is in addition to his 
statutory or common law rights. 
3.4 If a printed guarantee or warranty is not used, then any specific 
promises which the dealer is willing to make in relation to the 
used car should be set out in writing. 
3.5 Used cars will be subject to a pro-sales inspection in 
accordance with an approved checklist. The checklist must be 
completed before the car is offered for sale and displayed in a 
prominent place in the car. A copy of the checklist shall be 
given to the customer for his retention. 
3.6 All descriptions, whether used in advertisements or in 
negotiations regarding the sale of used cars should be honest 
and truthful. Terms which are likely to be misunderstood by 
the customer or which are not capable of exact definition 
should be avoided. 
3.7 Copies of relevant written information provided by previous 
owners regarding the history of cars should be passed on to 
the customer. This may include service records, repair 
invoices, inspection reports, handbooks and copy of 
warranties, as applicable. 
3.8 Reasonable steps will be taken to verify the recorded mileage 
of a used car and dealers will use their best endeavour= to 
obtain a signed statement from the previous owner as to the 
car's mileage. Dealers should pass on any known facts about 
an odometer reading to a prospective customer. 
3.9 Unless the dealer is satisfied that the quoted mileage of a used 
car is accurate, such mileage should not be quoted in 
advertisements, discussions or negotiations or in any documents related to the supply of the used car. Where the 
car's mileage cannot be verified the customer should be informed. The law requires that any disclaimer used must be as 
bold, precise and compelling as the car's mileage reading itself 
and as effectively brought to the prospective customer's 
attention. 
4 Replacement Parts, Accessories and Petrol 
4,1 Dealers must bear in mind that in sales of goods to consumers 5.5 
they are responsible under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 that the 
goods are of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose for 
which they are required. Statements, whether oral or in 
writing, in apparent conflict with this principle must be 
avoided. 
4.2 Whenever goods are offered for sale a clear indication of cash 
price must be available to the customer. 
4.3 Terms must not be used in advertisements if they are likely to 
be misunderstood by the customer or if they are not capable of 
exact definition. 
4.4 With offers of promotions or trading stamps, any restrictions 
which are attached to sales other than cash sales must be 
clearly stated. 
4.5 A dealer must not display any notices or make any statements 
which might mislead a consumer about his legal rights in 
relation to the purchase of faulty goods. 
6 Repairs and Servicing 
(excluding work carried out under 
a car manufacturer's warranty] 
5.1 Dealers must bear in mind that when supplying parts or 
accessories in connection with repairs or servicing work for 
consumers, they have a similar responsibility to that which 
exists under a contract for the sale of goods to ensure that the 
goods are of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose for 
which they are required and that work is performed in a proper 
and workmanlike manner. 
5.2 Manufacturers accept a responsibility for ensuring the 
reasonable availability of spare parts to the distribution chain. 
5.3 Spare parts should be readily available from the manufacturer 
from the time that a new model is offered for sale continuing 
throughout its production and for a reasonable period 
thereafter. 
5.4 Dealers will provide at least an estimate of the cost of labour 
and materials for all major repairs and manufacturers' 
recommended servicing. A firm quotation should be offered 
wherever possible. It must be made clear to a customer 
whether an estimate or quotation is being made and whether it 
is inclusive of VAT and where applicable the rate at which this 
is chargeable. Quotations should always be in writing 
identifying the dealer. If requested, estimates will be In writing. 
It should be remembered that An estimate is a considered 
approximation of the likely cost involved whereas a quotation 
constitutes a firm price for which the work will be done. If a 
charge is to be made for the estimate or quotation this must be 
made known to the customer before his instructions are 
accepted. Any dismantling costs which are necessary to arrive 
at such estimates or quotations should be notified to the 
customer in advance on the clear understanding whether or 
not dismantling costs are to be charged on an estimate or 
quotation which is refused. If, during the progress of any work, 
it appears that the estimate will be exceeded by a significant 
amount, then the customer should be notified and asked for 
permission to continue with the work. 
Parts replaced during service or repair will be made available 
for return to the customer until the customer has taken delivery 
of the car unless a warranty claim is involved or unless the 
parts have to be submitted to the supplier because 
replacement parts are being supplied on an exchange basis. 
Dealers should notify customers in advance of work being 
done what their arrangements are in regard to retention and 
disposal of parts replaced. 
5.6 Invoices should be clearly written or typed and give full details 
of the work carried out and materials used. The amount and 
rate of VAT should be clearly indicated. Dates and recorded 
mileages should always be noted where applicable. 
5.7 Dealers should exercise adequate care in protecting customers' 
property while it is in their custody, and must not seek by 
disclaimers to avoid their legal liability for damage or loss. 
Dealers should carry adequate Insurance to cover their legal 
liability and should strongly advise customers to remove any 
items of value not related to the car. 
8.8 Repairs must be guaranteed against failure due to 
workmanship for a specific mileage or time period which 
should be stated on the Invoice. Dealers are advised to ensure 
that they are adequately insured against consequential loss 
claims arising from any such failure. 
5.9 A dealer's rules as to the method of payment he will require on 
completion of the work -should always be notified to the 
customer before the work is accepted. 
5.10 When it is necessary to sub-contract work, the dealer will 
agree to be responsible for the quality of the sub-contractors' 
work. Any estimate given to the customer must include the 
sub-contracted work and in the event of any increase in charge 
for the work, the principles in pare 5.4 must apply. 
If. 11 Dealers must make it clear whether or not servicing will be 
carried out in accordance with the appropriate manufacturer's 
recommended service schedule. 
8.12 While a dealer's contractual responsibility is limited to the 
exact terms of the customer's instructions or, for standard 
services, the schedule prepared by the manufacturer or other 
body or person, he should make it a general rule to advise the 
customer of any defects which may become apparent while 
the work is being carried out. 
6'Advsrti. rng 7 Handling Complaints 
8.11 All advertising by manufacturers and dealers must comply with 7.1 
the codes and standards set by the Advertising Standards 
Authority and the Independent Broadcasting Authority, and 
with the requirements of the Trade Descriptions Act and the 
Energy Act leg. concerning fuel consumption figures). In 
particular, references to credit facilities must conform to the 
appropriate legal requirements current at the time. 
III- Advertisements must not contain any references to guarantees 
Ior warranties which would take away or diminish any rights of 
a- customer nor should they be worded as to be understood by 
the customer as doing so. 
63 Advertisements must not contain the words "guarantee" or 
"warranty" unless the full terms of such undertakings as well 
as the remedial action open to a customer are either clearly set 
out in the advertisement or are available to the customer in 
writing at the point of sale or with the product. 
1.4 Claims and descriptions in advertisements should not be 
misleading. In particular any comparison with other models of 
different manufacturers should be based on a similar set of 
criteria and should not be presented in such a way as to 
confuse or mislead the customer. 
6.5 In principle, a price quoted should be a price at which the 
customer can buy the goods. Manufacturers and dealers 
should therefore quote prices for new cars, whether in 
advertisements or in showrooms, inclusive of the price of any 
extras known to be fitted to the car together with the 
appropriate VAT (quoting the rate applicable) and Car Tax. If 
the price excludes delivery charges or number plates, such 
exclusions must be clearly specified. 
6.5 Advertisements for used cars must quote prices inclusive of 
VAT and they should state that the prices are inclusive. 
6.7 in the description of used cars, terns likely to be 
misunderstood by the customer or which are not capable of 
exact definition should be avoided. For example, if the word 
"reconditioned" is used, the nature of the reconditioning must 
be carefully explained. 
1.8 
, In the 
description of a used car, any year must be either: 
(al the year of first use, or 
(b) the year of first registration, or 
(C) the last year that the car complied with the manufacturer's 
specification of a model sold at new during that calendar year 
whichever is the earliest. 
6.8 Where an advertisement quotes the price of one model in any 
model range but depicts another, the actual price of that other 
model should also be shown. 
"4.10 Where a manufacturer advertises a rust-proofing process, information about the process and its limitations should be 
made freely available. 
Manufacturers and dealers must ensure as appropriate that 
effective and immediate action is taken with a view to 
achieving a just settlement of a complaint. To this and there 
will be, from the point of view of the customer, an easily 
identifiable and accessible arrangement for the reception and 
handling of complaints. In addition, manufacturers must give 
every assistance to their dealers in handling complaints under 
warranty, or those in which the manufacturer is otherwise 
involved. 
7.2 When complaints are raised through a third party leg the 
Automobile Association, the Royal Automobile Club, a 
Trading Standards Officer or a Citizen's Advice Bureau). 
willing guidance must be given to that body and every attempt 
should be made to re-establish direct communication with the 
complaining customer and to reach a satisfactory settlement 
with him. 
7.3 In the event that a complaint is not resolved, manufacturers 
and dealers must make it clear to a customer that he has a right 
to refer the complaint to the appropriate trade association. 
7.4 Manufacturers and dealers will give every assistance to the 
association concerned while it is Investigating a complaint. The 
SMMT, the MAA and the SMTA will establish liaison as 
necessary. 
7.5 Where conciliation has failed to resolve a dispute the SMMT, 
the MAA and the SMTA havp agreed to co-operate in the 
operation of low cost arbitration agreements which will be 
organised by an Independent Panel of Arbitrators. Details of 
the arbitration arrangements are set out in the Appendix. 
Customers must always be advised that they have the option 
of taking a claim to the Courts. 
7.6 The award of the arbitrator is enforceable in law on all parties. 
13 Monitarfng 
8.1 As Subscribers to the Code of Practice, dealers should ensure by the clear display of appropriate symbols or other means that 
customers are Informed of dealers' adherence to the industry's Code of Practice. 
82 All manufacturers and dealers should maintain an analysis of justified complaints relating to any of the provisions of the Code of Practice and should take action based on this information to improve their service to the customer. 
8.3 The SMMT, the MAA and the SMTA will analyse all complaints about the Code or matters referred to the. 
association for conciliation or arbitration. The results of such 
analyses will be published In the Annual Report of the relevant association, 
Appendix 1: Complaints and Arbitration 
A customer who has a complaint about the quality of the 
goods or service to his motor car should in the first place and at 
the earliest opportunity refer it to the dealer concerned. 
2 The complaint, preferably in writing, should be addressed to a 
senior executive, a director, a partner or the proprietor. Some 
dealers will have an executive especially appointed to deal with 
compliants. 
3 If the complaint relates to warranty on a new car and the dealer 
is unable to resolve the matter, the customer should take his 
complaint direct to the manufacturer concerned. 
4 If attempts to reach a satisfactory solution fail, the customer 
has a right to refer his complaint to one of the trade 
associations who subscribe to the Code of Practice for the 
Motor Industry, if the dealer concerned is. a member of that 
association. Any such complaint must be in writing. 
(a) if the complaint refers to a manufacturer's warranty or lies 
against a dealer who is a member the address is: 
The Customer Relations Department, 
Society of Motor Manufacturers 6 Traders Ltd, 
Forbes House, 
Halkin Street 
London SW1X 70S. 
(b) if the complaint lies against a dealer who is also a member 
situated in any part of the United Kingdom except Scotland the 
address is: 
The Conciliation Service, 
Motor Agents Association Ltd. 
73 Park Street, 
Bristol BS1 SPS. 
(c) if the complaint lies against a dealer who is a member 
situated in Scotland, the address is, 
Customer Complaints Service, 
Scottish Motor Trade Association, 
3 Palmerston Place, 
Edinburgh EH12 SAO. 
All complaints referred to the appropriate trade association 
(SMMT, MAA or SMTA) within a reasonable time of the cause 
for complaint arising will be considered. 
If the trade association fails to resolve the complaint, its 
members will agree to go to arbitration except in those cases 
where the trade association is of the opinion that it would be 
unreasonable for the member to be required to do so. 
Parties to arbitration will be asked to pay the registration fee 
laid down by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. When, 
later, the arbitrator makes his award, he will consider whether 
the registration fee should be returned to the successful party. 
8 The parties will also be asked to sign an application for 
arbitration which will be sent, together with the registration 
fee, to: 
The Independent Panel of Arbitrators, 
c/o The Motor Agents Association, 
73, Park Street, 
BRISTOL BS1 5PS 
9 In order to keep costs as low as possible, the arbitration will 
normally rely On documents. In these cases, none of the parties 
to the dispute may be present nor may they be represented by 
any other person. 
10 The trade association will submit to the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrator all the documentary evidence in their possession 
that they consider relevant to the case. The Chartered Institute 
of Arbitrators will advise the parties to the dispute of the 
written evidence they have available on which to base their 
judgement and invite the parties to submit any further evidence 
which they consider relevant. 
11 The President of the Chartered Instituts of Arbitrators will 
appoint a single arbitrator and will make all the necessary 
arrangements for the arbitration to be conducted as speedily as 
possible. 
12 In suitable cases, the Arbitrator has the right to conduct an oral 
arbitration and the parties may then attend to present their 
evidence. Legal representation may only be employed if the 
Arbitrator so directs. 
13 The Arbitrator will have the power to direct any party to 
provide him and to the other partylies) any additional 
document or Information he considers to be relevant to the 
matter under dispute. 
14 The award of the Arbitrator will be published In writing to the 
parties to the dispute and to the relevan; association. 
16 The award of the Arbitrator is enforceable in the Courts by any 
party. 
The Motor Agents The Society of Motor 
Association, Manufacturers Et Traders, 
201 Great Portland Street, Forbes House, 
London W1N SAS. Halkin Street, 
London SW1X 70$. 
The Scottish Motor Trade Association, 
3 Palmerston Place, 
Edinburgh EH12 SAG. 
APPENDIX IV 
Consumer Questionnaire 
ý --ý, r...... a.. a, ý . ý.........,... 4.... y. ýý .., .,. ý.... . ý... _.... _. cgza-. ar.. z-. rr_.., r 
SURVEY AMONG CAR USERS (JOB 1101) 
urr icz USG UNLY 
(1-4) 
(3- 
1ý 9) 
SECTION 1 BACKGROUND 
Do you personally carry out any repairs (10) 
to your own vehicle on a regular basis? Yes 1 
No 2 
Do you belong to a motoring 
organisation? 
NOW PLEASE LOOK AT THE ENCLOSED SHEET 
SHOWING $MILINGIUNSMILING FACES 
How confident would you feel in 
giving your car a full mechanical 
service on your own.? 
Please give the number of the face 
which best reflects how confident 
you would feel. II 
Yes - AA 
- RAC 
- National Breakdown 
- Other 
No, do not belong 
Face 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
8 
7 
Don't know 
Do you read any motoring magazines 
on a regular basis? yes 
No 
J IF 'YES' AT "Q. 4 - GO TO Q. 5 IF 'NO' AT Q. 4 - GO TO Q. 6 
Which motoring magazines do you read? 
WRITE ON LINES PROVIDED 
............................ ...........:........................ 
................................................................ 
0......................... 00....... 0... 0........ ............ .. 
How would you rate your interest in 
cars and motoring in general? Very interested 
(13. ) 
i (12) 
1 (13) 
I (xs) 
i (15) 
(16) 
2 
2 
3 
4 
3 
6 
7 
Y 
i (i? ) 
1 
2 
(19) 
(WV' 
(2 
41. 
) 
(22) 
i 
3 
4 
5 
Fairly Interested 
Neither interested nor 
uninterested 
Not very interested 
Not at all interested 
1% 
a 
1118 
1Q. 4 
Would you normally carry out the following 
work on your car? 
Yes No 
Don't know/ 
Not 
applicable 
Top up radiator with water or antifreeze 1 0 2 (23) 
Check and top up oil level 1 0 2 (24) 
Change the oil 1 0 2 (25) 
Replace the spark plugs and points 1 0 2 (20) 
Adjust valve clearances 1 0 .2 (27) 
Service carburettor 1 0 2 (28) 
Check and adjust braking system 1 0 2 (29) 
Replace clutch 1 0 2 (30) 
Strip down engine and decarb, 
change rings, shims etc 
1 0 2 (31) 
Stri down gearbox to replace arts 1 0 2 (32) 
SECTION 2 BUYING A CAR 
Why did you decide to purchase your used car from a dealer rather 
than buy privately? 
WRITE ANSWER ON LINES PROVIDED 
0.9 00 toes*- to *to 0 90*0. *** 0.0*** too 00*0000000 
.... ....... .................... ..... .... ........... . .... . .... .... ..... . 
...... .................... ....... ............. ............ . .... ..... ... 
............... .... to .... ... ý. ....... ...... ... .... ...... ..... . 
ý.... ,... . 
When deciding to buy a used car, which 
of these publications, it any, did 
you look at? 
(33) 
(34) 
(33) 
(36) 
Local newspaper 1 (37) 
Local advertising ireesheet 1 (38) 
UK National newspaper 1 (39) 
Scottish national newspape 1 (40) 
Classified advertiser 1 (41) (Exchange & Mart) 
Specialist magazine 1 (42) 
Other 1 (43) 
" None 1 (44) 
Don't know 1 (45) 
Now long did it take you to find your 
used car, from when you started 
looking to when you actually bought 
the vehicle? 
How many car dealers premises did 
you visit when looking for your 
used car? 
Did the dealer that you bought your 
used car from sell only used cars 
or both new and used vehicles?. 
(46) 
Less than 3 days 1 
About 1 week 2 
About a fortnight 3 
About a month 4 
Over a month 5 
Don't know 6 
(47) 
Less than 3 1 
Between 3 and 6 2 
Between 7 and 10 3 
Over 10 4 
Don't-know 5 
(48) 
Only used cars 1 
Both new and used cars 2 
Don't know 3 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'ONLY USED CARS'/'DON'T KNOW' AT Q. 12 - GO TO Q. 14 
17 YOU ANSWERED 'BOTH NEW AND USED CARS' At Q. 12 - GO TO Q. 13 
Were the new vehicles being sold 
by this dealer from one manufacturer? Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Was the dealer from whom you bought 
your car a member of a Motor Trade Yes 
Association? No 
Don't know 
Was the dealer licensed as a used 
car dealer by the Local Authority? Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Which three of the following features first drew your attention 
to the car you eventually purchased? 
(49) 
1 
2 
3 
(50) 
z 
3 
(si) 
i 
2 
3 
Colour 1 (52) Special otter 1 (59) 
General condition 1 (53) 
Guarantee 
Position on forecourt 
1 
1 
(60) 
(61) Price 1 (54) Model 1 (62) 
btake 1 (55) Service History 1 (63) 
, 
Mileage 1 (56) Accessories 1 (64) Size 1 (57) Storage 1 (63) Age 1 (58) 
Did you test drive the vehicle 
before your purchased it? 
Did you have the vehicle inspected 
or surveyed by an outside organisation 
before your purchased it? 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' AT Q. 18 - GO TO Q. 19 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' AT Q. 18 - GO TO Q. 20 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
(66) 
1 
2 
(67) 
1 
2 
Did the dealer let you use his (68) 
garage facilities for the inspection? Yes I 
No 2 
Which of the following appeared on the used car 
when you saw it on display? f 
Price display on windscreen 
Guarantee offer 
Special offer/bargain offer 
Inspection sheet of any faults found 
Sticker covering over recorded mileage 
Sheet with description of the car 
Details of credit terms 
Did you get a written guarantee 
with the car? 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' AT Q. 21 - GO TO- Q. 23 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' AT Q. 21 - CO TO g. 22 
Were you given a verbal promise 
at any stage that the car-was 
guaranteed? 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' AT Q. 22 - GO TO Q. 23 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' AT Q. 22 - GO TO Q. 25 
Yes 
No 
- Don't know 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
How long was the guarantee period? 
WRITE IN ................................ 
Did you have to pay extra for 
a guarantee? Yes 
No 
Don't know 
1 (69) 
I (70) 
1 (71) 
1 (72) 
l (73) 
1 (74) 
1 (75) 
(76) 
1 
2 
3 
(77) 
1 
2 
3 
(78). 
(79) 
(80) 
1 
2 
3 
OFFICE USE ONLY 
CARD 2 
(1 - 8) DUPLICATE 
(9) Q 
At the time of purchasing your car, 
did the dealer give to you any written 
information relating to its condition, Yes 
for instance, service reports or receipts, No 
details of recent repairs? Don't know 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' AT Q. 25 - GO TO Q. 26 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO'/ 'DON'T KNOW' AT Q. 25 - GO TO Q. 27 
What information were you given? 
WRITE ANSWER ON LINES PROVIDED 
............................... ... ".... "........... 
............... .. 
......................... "... . ..: ".. "".. """. 
".... """0 099 000".... e 
.00.. 00... 000.000..... ". "..... ... ".. ".. 4 
099000 0"" 969969999 00-0 0000044 
Have you contacted the dealer from 
whom you bought the car with a complaint? 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' AT Q. 27 - GO TO Q. 28 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' AT Q. 27 - GO TO Q. 42 
How many times have you had to complain 
to the dealer? 
Yes 
No 
Once 
Twice 
3 or 4 times 
5 or more times 
Can't remember 
I 
what was the reason for your recent Engine breakdown 
complaint? Major part failure 
. Minor part failure 
" Performance 
Fuel consumption 
More than one of the above 
Other (WRITE IN) 
". """""""""........ ". """"". """f"""""""""""""""""""""""""""ff. """"fi""" 
(10) 
2 
3 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
1 
2 
(16) 
"1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(I1) 
1 
3 
3 
4 
s 
oý 
i 
Q- 30 
1 4.31 
1 4: 32 
x. 33 
I a. 34 I 
I q. 33 1 
I q. '36 I 
How long after purchase did you 
complain to the car dealer? 
Was the fault identified covered 
by the guarantee that you got 
with the car? 
Within 1 week 
Within 1 month 
Withiai 6 months 
Over 6 months from purchase 
Don't know 
Yes 
No 
No guarantee with car 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES'/'NO GUARANTEE' AT Q. 31 - GO TO Q. 33 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' AT Q. 31 - GO TO 'Q. 32 
Why was the fault not covered by the guarantee? 
WRITE IN ANSWER 
........................... ............................ . ... .... ...... . 
................... ......... .... "......................... .... ..... .... 
....................................................................... 
When you returned to the garage with 
your complaint, how satisfied were 
you with the treatment you received? 
Was your complaint satisfactorily 
resolved? 
How quickly do you think your complaint 
was dealt with by the dealer? 
Did you complain to some other 
body or seek advice? 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' AT Q. 36 - CO TO ßj. 37 
ZF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' AT Q. 36 - CO TO . 38 
Very satisfied 
Quite satisfied 
Satisfied 
Not satisfied 
Very unsatisfied 
Yes 
No 
Very quickly 
Quite quickly 
Average 
Quite slowly 
Very slowly 
Yes 
No 
(18) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(19) 
1 
2 
3 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
1 
0 
3 
4 
s 
czsý 
Y 
(26) 
1 
2 
3. 
4 
5 
(27) 
1 
2 
C. 37 
Q. 38 
1 '4.39 
Q. 40 
1 4.41 
Face 
k) Attention by staff 1 2 3 4 
b) Range of vehicles 1 2 3 4 
C) Presentation of vehicles 1 2 3 4 
Garage facilities 1 2 3 4 
Knowledge of staff 1 2 3 4 
Overall service 1 2 3 4 
e)_ After sales service 1 2 3 4 
Which of these did you approach to help 
resolve your problem? 
It your complaint had not been resolved 
would you have considered taking the 
matter to court? 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' AT 9.38 - GO TO Q. 40 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' AT Q. 38 GO TO Q. 39 
Citizens Advice Bureau 
Scottish Motor Trade 
Association 
Consumer Advice Centre 
Trading Standards/ 
Consumer Protection 
Solicitor 
Yes 
No 
Why do you think that you wouldn't have taken your complaint 
to court? 
WRITE ON LINES PROVIDED 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""". """""". """"""""""""""""""""""""" Si """ 
""""""""""""""""""""+""""""""""""""""""""""""""i""""""""""""""""""" 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""1""""1""""""t"" 
In 1986 there will be a new court system introduced in Scotland. 
that will make the process of going to court cheaper and quicker. 
But this new system will mean that you will have to fill in forms 
and put your own case. If, in future you were to have a complaint 
which was unresolved would you consider using this new 
court system? 
Yes 
No 
NOW PLEASE LOOK AGAIN AT THE ENCLOSED 
SHEET SHOWING SMILING/UNSMILING FACES 
Considering your car purchase overall, how satisfied were you 
with the following things. Please answer by giving the number 
of the face which best describes how you felt. 
er 
s 
s 
S 
s 
S 
5 
1 (28) 
1 (29) 
1 (30) 
1 (31) 
1 (32) 
(33) 
1 
2 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
1 
2 
87 (39) 
87 (40) 
87 (41) 
B7 (42) 
67 (43) 
87 (44) 
67 (45) 
14.42 
14-43 
Q. 44 
Which phrase best describes your approach to buying 
your used car? 
I decided upon a particular type of car and looked 
around until I found it 
I decided that r could afford a certain amount of money 
and went to look for a car within that price range 
I knew of a dealer I wanted to buy a used car from and 
would purchase only from him 
I knew exactly the car I wanted and who was selling it 
I didn't have any fixed idea of the type of car I 
wanted and just went to see what I could find 
I had previously bought a used car from a particular 
dealer and wanted to purchase from him again 
NOW LOOKING AGAIN AT THE 'FACES' 
Please indicate the number of the face which best describes 
how satisfied you are with the used car you bought. 
FACE :123456 
If in future you were to buy another used car, would any of the 
following make you more likely to return to a particular car 
dealer. 
Please answer Yes or No or Don't know for each: 
(46) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
Yes No I Don't know 
Pleasant staff 123 
Large range of cars 123 
Nearby location 123 
Licensed by local authority 123 
Large size of business 
ý 123 
Cleanliness of cars and premises 123 
Previous satisfactory purchase 123 
Member of Motor Trade Association 123 
Competitive prices 1'23 
Good service facilities 123 
Good credit terms 123 
Trade in price I23 
Opening hours 123 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(5t) 
(52) 
(33) 
(S4) 
(55) 
(56) 
(S7) 
(58) 
(59) 
(60) 
4.43 
Q"46 
Q-47 
. 48 
49 
SECTION 3 LICENSING 
Did you know that, in certain areas, 
second hand car dealers need a licence 
issued by the local authority before 
they can sell used cars? 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' AT Q. 45' - GO TO Q. 46 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' AT Q. 43 - GO TO g. 47 
Does your local authority issue 
licences to second hand car dealers? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Do you think that having a licence from 
the local authority means that the 
dealer is generally........ A much better dealer 
A better dealer than others 
The same as other dealers 
Worse than other dealers 
A much worse dealer 
Don't know 
Do you think that the tact that a 
dealer holds a licence would make any 
difference to the condition of his Yes 
second hand cars? No 
Do you think that licensing used 
car dealers is........... 
A very good idea 
A good idea 
Neither good nor bad idea 
A bad idea 
A very bad idea 
Don't know 
(61) 
1 
2 
2) 
1 
2 
(63) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
(84) 
1 
2 
(63) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
3 
6 
OFFICE USE ONLY 
CARD 2 Cols 66 - 80 BL. ºN. 
ter. r--r--w 
CARD 3 
(1 - 8) DUPLICATE 
( 9) CS) 
C4" 50 
14,31 
4.52 
. 5a 
c. 34 
q. 55 
Q. 36 
G. 57 
Which of the following would you associate with a dealer who held 
a second hand car dealers licence from the local authority..... 
Honesty 1 (10) Badly trained staff 
, 
Unreliable cars 1 (11) Limited guarantees 
Attractive showrooms 1 (12) Unimpressive premises 
Good service 1 (13) Good garage facilities 
Cheaper cars 1 (14) "ishonesty 
Good range of vehicles 1 (13) Extensive guarantees 
d9lean cars 1 (16) Well trained statt 
Expensive cars 1 (17) Good reliable cars 
Was the dealer from whom you bought 
your car a licensed dealer? 
All things being equal, would you prefer 
to purchase a used car from a licensed 
or unlicensed car dealer? 
Would you expect to pay more for your 
car it you purchased from a licensed 
car dealer? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
0 
Prefer licensed 
Prefer unlicensed 
No preference 
Doa't know 
Yes 
Yo 
Don't know 
SECTION 4 
The following questions are about yourself and the used car 
that you bought 
What is your age? WRITE IN .................. 
What is your occupation? WRITE IN ............................. 
Are you presently employed? yen 
No 
What is the MAKE of car you purchased? 
(e. g. Ford, British Leyland, Renault etc) 
WR I= IN 
0..... 0.0.0.0.. 0.0.... 0906.. 9.0... 0... 0.. 0.0.. 
q. 38 What is the MODEL of car? 
(e. g. Escort, Metro etc) 
1 (18) 
1 (19) 
1 (20) 
1 (21) 
1 (22) 
1 (23) 
1 (24) 
1 (25) 
(26) 
1 
2 
3 
(27) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
(28) 
1 
2 
3 
x 
2. 
WRITE IN .............................................. 
U- 
59 How much did you pay for the car? WRITE IN £ ................ 
60 Which of the following, if any, did you 
use in purchasing your car? ....... Bank loan 
Credit arranged by dealer 
Savings/cash 
Hire purchase by dealer 
Loan from credit company 
None 
q. 61 Did you trade in another car as part Yes 
of the purchase price? No 
} 62 In what year was the car you purchased 
first registered? Please give the year ................... Year. 
and/or registration prefix or suffix 
(A, B etc) Prefix/Suffix ................ 
Q. 63 If you can remember what was the WRITE IN ................... mileage on your car at the time Don't remember of purchase - to the nearest 1000 miles 
rt 
c. 64 How many cars are owned by persons 
living at this address? 
WRITE IN .................... 
Q. 65 From which dealer or garage did you buy your used car? 
Name ................................. "f """"""""". "" 
Address ................................ 
....................................... 
........... 
............ 
4.66 Approximately how far is this dealer's premises from your home? 
WRITE IN ...................... 
} 
t 
s 
#. 
E 
t' .ý 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
i 
1 
2 
APPENDIX V 
Dealer Questionnaire 
USED CAR DEALER SURVEY (JOB 1214) 
Name of respondent .................................... 
Position in company ................................... 
Name of company ....................................... 
Address ............................................... 
Telephone number ...................................... 
III 
iewer ................................. 
(SECTION 
A- RECRUITMNT 
Date ................. ........... 
Does your company sell new vehicles only, New vehicles only 
new and used vehicles, or used vehicles only? New and used 
Used vehicles only 
IF NEW ONLY, ASB A. 2, TEEN CLOSE INTERVIEW 
IF 'NEW-AND USED' OR 'USED ONLY', GO TO SECTION 3 
How does your company dispose of the used cars it receives - 
for instance, those received in trade-ins? PROBE 
""""f""f"f. "". "... """"""... ". """"". """""""... ""... "". """. """"". "".. 
" 
""""""""""""""".. ".. """"""""""""""""f"""""""""""f"""" """ f""" 
................................. 00..... 4.4.. 0.......... 0000.. 0 .... 
.................................. 0....... 6.... 0......... 0...... 0.0 
rk 
R 
i 
IS 
[SECTION 
B 
Could I just start by asking you how long you personally have 
been working in the motor trade? 
WRITE IN NO. OF YEARS ............... 
And how long has this company been 
selling cars in Scotland? WHITE IN NO. OF YEARS ............... 
How many retail outlets does this company 
have in Scotland selling new or used cars? 
WRITE IN NO. OF OUTLETS............ 
Is this company a member of the Yes 
Scottish Uotor Trade Association? NO 
SHOW CARD 
Which of the descriptions on this card do you Booming 
think applies to the present state of the Buoyant 
motor trade? Static 
SINGLE CODE ONLY Declining 
Depressed 
(Don't know) 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
a 
3 
4 
S 
V 
III 
S 
ý` 
ýý 
ý: 
, 
') 
\° ý'., = 
,. ýý` 
U 
1SECTION C' 
I would now like to ask you some questions on the subject 
of licensing of motor dealers. 
If a system of licensing were to be introduced for the following 
people, would your attitude towards this be favourable, unfavourable 
or would you have no strong feelings either way? 
READ OUT AND CODE EACH 
Favourable No strong feelings Unfavourable 
Used car dealers 12 3" 
New car dealers 123 
Car auctions 123 
All car dealers, 23 
but not auctions 
All car dealers and 23 
car auctions 
Are you aware that some district councils in Scotland 
currently operate a licensing system that requires 
dealers in used cars to hold a licence to trade? 
IF 'YES', CONTINUE AT C. 3 
IF ! NO', SKIP' TO SECTION E 
Does the local district council for this dealership 
operate such a licensing system for used car dealers? 
:F 'YES', CONTINUE AT C. 4 
IF 'NO' OR 'DON'T KNOW, , SKIP TO SECTION E 
Did your local authority ever contact your company 
to say that you might need a used car dealer's licence? 
And does this company actually hold a second-hand 
car dealer's licence from the local authority? 
JIF 
'YES', SKIP TO SECTION D 
IF 'NO', ASK C. 6 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
(Don't know) 
Yes 
No 
(Dos't'know) 
Yes 
NO 
Why do you not hold a used car dealer's licence? PROBE FULLY 
.......................... 0..... 0............. ".................. 
.".. r. """""""""s"""""a""""""""""i"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""i 
-I............................... 0................................ 
". """""""".. ". "". 9""%4"0""""""""""01"44f"""""""6""""""""""""0 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""0""""""0""0""""""""""""""""0"4140 
'NOW 
GO TO SECTION E 
1 
2 
1 
y 
w 
V 
i 
.2 v 
X 
2 
4 
Tl 
(SECTION D 
For how long have you held a used car dealer's licence? 
WRITE IN ....................... 
Fz 
1 3aß 
%4. 
) 
Has the local authority explained to you either Yes 
personally or through leaflets etc., the conditions No 
on your licence and how to comply with them? (Don't know) 
Does your licence have a condition attached to Yes 
it that requires you to keep a record of the No 
details of the used cars you buy and sell? (Don't know) 
IIF 
'NO' OR 'DON'T KNOW, SKIP TO D. 4_ß 
IF YES 
Do you in tact keep a record of the details Yes 
of the used cars that you buy and sell? No 
17 'NO', PROBE FOR EXPLANATION Why is that? 
1"""""""""""""""""f"""""""1""""""""""""""""""""1"""f"""""""""""f!! 
...... "....... ". " ....................... "......................... 
f"""""""""f""""""""""""""". """. "". """""""""". """"""""! """"""""""f 
Does your licence contain a condition that requires 
you to display pre-sales inspection reports on all 
your used cars that are displayed for sale? 
IF 
IF 
'YES' 
'NO' 
, ASK b) 
OR 'DON'T 
- d) 
WOW' SKIP TO D. 5 
Do you display pro-sales inspection reports 
on all the used cars you sell? 
Do you feel that, because of the pro-sales 
inspection reports, you are able to offer 
more extensive or longer guarantees? 
Are you equipped with on-site service facilities? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
1 
2 
V 
1 
2 
Y 
1 
2 
1 
e 
V 
I 
Y 
ýýr 
1 
a 
1 
2 
r 
'l 
I-a 
N 
4 
,* 4*1 
Ik 
Does your licence contain a condition that 
requires you to comply with the motor industry 
code of conduct? 
IIF 
'YES', ASK b) - d) 
IF 'NO' OR 'DON'T WOW, SKIP TO D. 6 
Do you in fact comply with the motor industry 
code of practice, including the requirement 
for pre-sales inspection reports? 
lIF 'NO', SKIP TO D. 6 
Did you comply with the motor industry 
code of practice before licencing was 
introduced into your area? 
Do you think that compliance with the 
motor industry code of practice has meant 
that your customer service is better, 
the same or worse than it was before 
licensing was introduced? 
Has anybödy come to your premises to 
inspect any records you may have kept 
or check that you are complying with 
your licence conditions? 
Do you advertise the tact that you are 
licensed as a used car dealer by the 
local authority? 
How much did your licence cost? WRITE IN 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
(Don't know) 
Better than before 
Same as before 
Worse than before 
Don't know 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Yes 
No 
..... . .... ....... . 
2) Do you think that compliance with the yes 
licence conditions means that you incur No 
extra costs apart from the cost of the Don't know 
licence? 
IF 'YES', ASK b) AND c) 
IF 'NO' OR 'DON'T KNOWSKIP TO D. IO 
ft 
1 
2 
V 
1 
2 
1 
0 Y 
V 
1 
Z 
3 
V 
1 
2 
v 
1 
2 
i 
V 
V 
SHOW CARD 
Which of these do you think are 
sources of these extra costs? 
PROBE Any others? 
Record keeping/filing 
Vehicle inspection/preparation 
Time with enforcement staff 
Compliance with code of practice 
Emphasis on customer relations 
Other (SPECIFY) 
............... 0......... 0.. 0.. 0 
ff"""f""""""""""f"f"""ffff 
t4 
ii 
t, ý 
Z3° 
What percentage of the sale price of 
your vehicles do you think these extra 
costs amount to? READ OUT..... Less than 1% 
2- 3% 
6- 10% 
11 - 15% 
16 - 20% 
Over 20% 
(Don't know) 
Do you think that the possession of a More expensive 
used car dealer's licence means that About the same 
your cars are more expensive, about the Cheaper 
same or cheaper than those of other dealers? (Don't know) 
Do you think that being licensed improves 
the quality of the cars that you......... i) Sell? Yes 
CODE FOR EACH 
No 
ii) Buy? 
SHOW CARD 
Overall, how do you assess the effect 
of licensing upon the day-to-day 
running of your business? 
What sort of impact do you think 
licensing has had on the motor trade 
in your area -a strong impact, 
little impact or no impact at all? 
Yes 
No 
A major inconvenience 
A slight inconvenience 
Unnoticeable 
A slight advantage 
A major advantage 
(Don't know) 
Strong impact 
Little impact 
No impact 
(Don't know) 
1 
r 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
V 
i 
z 
3 
V 
1 
a 
1 
a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
ß 
V 
1 
2 
3 
V 
NOW SKIP TO E. 4 
J 
Z 
Ea 
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% 41 . 
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SECTION E 
SUOW CARD 
If a system of licensing for used car Record keeping 1 
dealers were in operation, which of these Credit offered 2 
activities do you think would be controlled Customer service 3 
by a used car dealer's licence? Information on vehicles 4 
PROBE sold 
Cleanliness/pIresentation 5 
of vehicles 
Compliance with code 6 
of practice 
Staff training 7 
None of these 0 
Don't know V 
Would the existence of such a licensing 
scheme for used car dealers be attractive Attractive 1 
or unattractive to you? Unattractive 2 
Would the fact that a district council 
operated a licensing scheme for used car More likely 1 
dealers in its area make you more or less Less likely 2 
likely to locate in that district, or have Have no effect 3 
no effect on your decision? Don't know V 
SHOW CARD 
Which of these do you normally display Credit details 1 
on your used vehicles when they are on Guarantee details 2 
otter for sale on the forecourt? Mileage disclaimer 3 
Price 4 
Inspection sheet with 3 
faults found 
Description of vehicle 6 
details 
Special/bargain otters 7 
None of these 0 
SHOW CARD 
What level of control do you-feel 'is Substantially more controls 1 
exerted by central and local government Slightly more controls 2 
over the motor trade, as opposed to Same controls as others 3 
other retail sectors? Slightly less controls 4 
Substantially less controls 5 
(Don't know) V 
SHOW CARD 
Whose responsibility do you think it 
Police officers 1 
Environmental Health officers 2 is to ensure that used car dealer Trading Standards officers 3 licence conditions are complied with? Local council admin. staff 4 
Local council planning dept. S 
Other (SPECIFY) 
........................... 
No-one 0 
Don't know V 
SHOW CARD 
IY it was found that used car dealer 
licence holders had tailed to comply 
with a significant licence condition 
that had directly affected the 
interests of consumers, what action 
do you think the local authority 
would take? 
SHOW CARD 
How sympathetic do you think motor 
dealers would be to consumers' complaints 
it they held a licence to trade that 
could be withdrawn? 
Do you think that licensing would 
lead to an increase, a decrease or 
have no effect on the number of 
complaints made by consumers to 
used car dealers? 
SHOW CARD 
When buying a used car, what level 
of protection do you think consumers 
have at present? 
Withdraw the licence 
Suspend the licence until 
compliance 
Send a warning letter 
Give a verbal warning 
Give advice on how to comply 
Do nothing 
4 (Don't know) 
Much more sympathetic 
A little more sympathetic 
No different 
A little less tolerant 
Much less tolerant 
(Don't know) 
Increase 
Decrease 
No effect 
Don't know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
0 
V 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
V 
1 
2 
3 
V 
Far too much protection 1 
Slightly too much protection 3 
About the right amount 3 
Some, but not enough, protection 4 
Par too little protection a 
(Don't know) IV 
SHOW CARD 
What sort of impact, good or bad, do you think used car dealer 
licensing would have on the following aspects of'trade? 
READ OUT AND CODE EACH - ROTATE ORDER 
Good ettect 
+ No e. Ytect I Bad ettect I Don't know 
Customer relations 1 2 3 V 
Vehicle ality 1 2 3 V 
Protecting reputable dealers 1 2 3 V 
Image of the motor trade 1 2 3 V 
Profitabilit 1 2 3 V 
Overheads 1 2 3 V 
Controlling the used 
car sector 
1 2 3 V 
Business expansion for 
car dealers 
1 2 3 V 
  
iz 
lis 
Iii 
At present used car dealer licensing is confined to about 
halt of the authorities in Scotland. Would you be for or 
against the following possible future developments? 
READ OUT AND CODE EACH 
Extending licensing to all 
authorities in Scotland 
Extending licensing to the 
whole of the U. K. 
Extending licensing to all car 
dealers, selling new or used cars 
Disbanding licensing completely 
Keeping the situation as it 
is at present 
SHOW CARD 
All things considered, which of these 
best reflects your feelings about a 
system of used car dealer licensing? 
0 
For Against (Don't know) 
12V 
12V 
12V 
12V 
12V 
Very good idea 
A good idea 
Neither good nor bad 
A bad idea 
A very bad idea 
(Don't know) 
Do you foresee any particular developments in the used car sector 
over the next ten years in the area of consumer or customer relations? 
PROBE FULLY 
" ................................................................ 
................................................................. 
.................................................................. 
""""""""""f""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""f"""""Y 
i3 
What is in fact the name of the local district council for this business? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
V 
WRITE IN ............................................................. 
I 
1i? 
Lk 
k% 
Finally, to help us classify your answers along with those 
of the other companies we are interviewing, a few questions 
about your company itself......... 
What is the status of this company? 
IS IT ...... READ OUT 
I 
One man business 
A partnership 
A private limited compan3 
t public limited company 
A subsidiary 
Other (SPECIFY) 
....................... 
Does your company hold a consumer credit licence? Yes 
No 
How many employees does the company have working......... 
i) in total? :...... ..... ... 
ii) at this retail outlet in particular? ............ 
What aas the total number of units sold by this retail outlet 
in the last financial year, 1985 - 1986? 
WRITE IN ................... 
ad For this retail outlet, what is-the proportion of new cars 
to used cars in terms of units sold? 
New cars .................. % 
Used cars ... 6 ............. 60% 
(CHECK PERCENTAGES TOTAL 100) 
ýýýý And what was the approximate value of your second-hand 
sales last year? 
WRITE IN £ ................... 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
., I 
